Archive for the 'Recession' Category

Nov 18 2011

A closer look at the crowding-out effect

To spend or not to spend. That is the question. In order to determine whether or not a government should increase its budget deficit in order to stimulate economic activity in its economy, it is important to determine whether said deficit spending will lead to a net increase in the nation’s GDP or a net decrease in GDP. Obviously, if increasing the debt to pay for a government spending package leads to lower aggregate demand in the economy, then it should not be undertaken. However, if a deficit-financed spending package leads to an overall increase in output and national income, it may be justified.

To understand the circumstances under which a government stimulus package will increase or decrease overall output in the economy, we must compare two competing possible impacts of a government stimulus. The multiplier effect of government spending refers to a theory which says that any increase in government spending will lead to further increases in private spending, as households enjoy more income and thus consume more and firms, which earn more revenues due to the government’s increased spending, make new capital investments, contributing to the stimulus provided by government and leading to an overall increase in GDP that exceeds the increase in government spending.

The crowding-out effect, on the other hand, refers to the theory that any increase in government spending, when financed by a larger deficit, will lead to a net decrease in private expenditures, as firms and households face higher interest rates due to the governments’ intervention in private financial markets. Government spending will crowd out private spending, thus any increase in spending will be off-set by a decrease in private spending, possibly even reducing overall income in the nation.

This post will focus on the second of these effects, and attempt to explain the circumstances under which crowding-out is likely to occur, and those under which it is unlikely to occur.

Deficit-financed government spending refers to any policy that increases government expenditures without increasing taxes, or one that reduces taxes without reducing government expenditures. In either case, a government must increase the amount of borrowing it does to pay for the policy, which means governments must borrow from the private sector by issuing new debt in the form of government bonds.

When a government must borrow to spend, it has to attract lenders somehow, which may require the government to offer higher rates of return on its bonds. The impact this has on the supply of private savings, which refers to the funds available in commercial banks for lending and borrowing in the private sector, will be negative. In other words, the supply of loanable funds in the private sector will decrease.

The graph below shows the market for loanable funds in a nation. The supply curve represents all households and other savers who put their money in private banks, in which they earn a certain interest rate on their savings. The demand for loanable funds represents private borrowers in the nation, who demand funds for investments in capital and technology (firms) and durable goods and real estate investments (households). The demand for loanable funds is inversely related to the real interest rate in the economy, since higher borrowing costs mean less demand for funds to pay for investment and consumption.

When a government needs to borrow money to pay for its deficit, private savers (represented by Slf above) will find lending money to the government more attractive than saving in private banks, since the relative interest rate on government bonds is likely to rise. This should reduce the supply of loanable funds in the private sector, making them more scarce and driving up borrowing costs to households and firms. This can be seen below:

In the illustration above, a government’s deficit spending crowds-out private spending, as firms and households find higher interest rates less attractive and thus demand less funds for investment and consumption. Private expenditures fall from Qe to Q1; therefore any increase in economic output resulting from the increase in government spending may be off-set by the fall in private spending. Crowding-out has occured.

Another way to view the crowding-out effect is to think about the impact of increased government borrowing on the demand for loanable funds. Demand represents all borrowers in an economy: households, firms and the government. An increase in public debt requires the government to borrow funds from the private sector, so as the supply of loanable funds fall, the demand will also increase, although not from the private sector, rather from the government. The effect this has can be seen below:

In the graph above, both the reduced supply of loanable funds resulting from private savers lending more to the government and the increased demand for loanable funds resulting form the government’s borrowing from the private sector combine to drive the equilibrium interest rate up to IR2. The private quantity demanded now falls from Qe to Qp, while the total amount of funds demanded (from the private sector and the goverment) now is only Qp+g. This illustration thus shows how an increase in government borrowing crowds out private spending but also leads to an overall decrease in the amount of investment in the economy.

Based on the two graphs above, a deficit-financed government spending package will definitely crowd-out private spending to some extent, and in the case of the second graph will even lead to a decrease in overall expenditures in the economy. This analysis could be used to argue against government spending as a way to stimulate economic activity. But this analysis makes some assumptions that may not always be true about a nation’s economy, namely that the equilibrium level of private investment demand and the supply of loanable funds occurs at a positive real interest rate. There are two possibilities that may mean the crowding-out effect does not occur. They are:

  1. If the private demand for loanable funds is extraordinarily low, or
  2. If the private supply of loanable funds is extraordinarily high.
When might these conditions be met? The answer is, during a deep recession. In a recession, household confidence is low, therefore private consumption is low and savings rates tend to rise, increasing the supply of funds in private banks. Also, firms’ expectations about the future tend to be weak, as low inflation or deflation make it unlikely that investments in new capital will provide high rates of return. Home sales are down and consumption of durable goods (which households often finance with borrowing) is depressed. Essentially, during a recession, private demand from borrowers is low and private supply from households is high. If the economy is weak enough, the loanable funds market may even exhibit an equilibrium interest rate that is negative. This could be shown as follows:

Notice that due to the exceedingly low demand and high supply of loanable funds, 0% acts as a price floor in the market. In other words, since interest rates cannot fall below 0%, there will be an excess supply of funds available to the private sector. Such a scenario is known as a liquidity trap. The level of private investment will be very low at only Qd. Banks cannot loan out all their excess reserves, and even though borrowing money is practically free, borrowers aren’t willing to take the risk to invest in capital or assets that may have negative rates of return, a prospect that is not unlikely during a recession.

So what happens when government deficit spends during a “liquidity trap”, as seen above? First of all, the government need not offer a very high rate to borrow in such an economy. Private interest rates will be close to zero, so even a 0.1% return on government bonds will attract lenders. So the supply of loanable funds may decrease, and demand may increase, but crowding-out will not occur because there is almost no private investment spending to crowd out! Here’s what happens:

Here we see the same shifts in demand and supply for loanable funds as we saw in our first graph, except now there is no increase in the interest rate resulting from the government’s entrance into the market. Since private interest rates stay at 0%, the private quantity of funds demanded for investment remains the same (Qp), while the increased government borrowing leads to an increase in overall spending in the economy from Qp to Qp+g. Rather than crowding-out private spending, the increase in government spending has no impact on households and firms, and leads to a net increase in overall spending in the economy.

If the government spends its borrowed funds wisely, it is possible that private spending could be crowded-in, which means that the boost to total output resulting from the fiscal stimulus may increase firm and household confidence and shift the private demand for loanable funds outwards, increasing the level of private investment and consumption, further stimulating economic activity.

So what have we shown? We have seen that in a healthy economy, in which households and firms are eager to borrow money to finance their spending, and in which savings rates are not exceedingly high, government borrowing may drive up private interest rates and crowd-out private spending. But during a deep recession, in which consumer spending is depressed and firms are not investing due to uncertainty and savings rates are higher than what is historically normal, an increase in government spending financed by a deficit will have little or no impact on the level of private investment and consumption. In such a case, governments can borrow cheaply (at just above 0%), and increase the overall level of demand in the economy without harming the private sector.

Crowding-out is a valid economic theory, but its likelihood of occurring must be evaluated by considering the actual level of output and employment in the economy. In a deflationary setting, in which savings is high and private spending is low, government may have the opportunity to boost demand and stimulate growth without driving up borrowing costs in the private sector and decreasing the level of household and firm expenditures.

5 responses so far

Aug 16 2011

Too much debt or not enough demand? A summary of the debate over America’s fiscal future

As yet another school year begins, we once again find ourselves returning to an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, sluggish growth, and heated debate over how to return the economies of the United States and Europe back onto a growth trajectory. In the last couple of weeks alone the US government has barely avoided a default on its national debt, ratings agencies have downgraded US government bonds, global stock markets have tumbled, confidence in the Eurozone has been pummeled over fears of larger than expected deficits in Italy and Greece, and the US dollar has reached historic lows against currencies such as the Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen.

What are we to make of all this turmoil? I will not pretend I can offer a clear explanation to all this chaos, but I can offer here a little summary of the big debate over one of the issues above: the debate over the US national debt and what the US should be doing right now to assure future economic and financial stability.

There are basically two sides to this debate, one we will refer to as the “demand-side” and one we will call the “supply-side”. On the demand-side you have economists like Paul Krugman, and in Washington the left wing of the Democratic party, who believe that America’s biggest problem is a lack of aggregate demand.

Supply-siders, on the other hand, are worried more about the US national debt, which currently stands around 98% of US GDP, and the budget deficit, which this year is around $1.5 trillion, or 10% of GDP. Every dollar spent by the US government beyond what it collects in taxes, argue the supply-siders, must be borrowed, and the cost of borrowing is the interest the government (i.e. taxpayers) have to pay to those buying government bonds. The larger the deficit, the larger the debt burden and the more that must be paid in interest on this debt. Furthermore, increased debt leads to greater uncertainty about the future and the expectation that taxes will have to be raised sometime down the road, thus creating an environment in which firms and households will postpone spending, prolonging the period of economic slump.

The demand-siders, however, believe that debt is only a problem if it grows more rapidly than national income, and in the US right now income growth is almost zero, meaning that the growing debt will pose a greater threat over time due to the slow growth in income. Think of it this way, if I owe you $98 and I only earn $100, then that $98 is a BIG DEAL. But if my income increases to $110 and my debt grows to $100, that is not as big a deal. Yes, I owe you more money, but I am also earning more money, so the debt burden has actually decreased.

In order to get US income to grow, say the demand-siders, continued fiscal and monetary stimulus are needed. With the debt deal struck two weeks ago, however, the US government has vowed to slash future spending by $2.4 trillion, effectively doing the opposite of what the demand-siders would like to see happen, pursuing fiscal contraction rather than expansion. As government spending grows less in the future than it otherwise would have, employment will fall and incomes will grow more slowly, or worse, the US will enter a second recession, meaning even lower incomes in the future, causing a the debt burden to grow.

Now let’s consider the supply-side argument. The supply-siders argue that America’s biggest problem is not the lack of demand, rather it is the debt itself. Every borrowed dollar spent by the goverment, say the supply-siders, is a dollar taken out of the private sector’s pocket. As government spending continues to grow faster than tax receipts, the government must borrow more and more from the private sector, and in order to attract lenders, interest on government bonds must be raised. Higher interest paid on government debt leads to a flow of funds into the public sector and away from the private sector, causing borrowing costs to rise for everyone else. In IB and AP Economics, this phenomenon is known as  the crowding-out effect: Public sector borrowing crowds out private sector investment, slowing growth and leading to less overall demand in the economy.

Additionally, argue the supply-siders, the increase in debt required for further stimulus will only lead to the expectation among households and firms of future increases in tax rates, which will be necessary to pay down the higher level of debt sometime in the future. The expectation of future tax hikes will be enough to discourage current consumption and investment, so despite the increase in government spending now, the fall in private sector confidence will mean less investment and consumption, so aggregate demand may not even grow if we do borrow and spend today!

This debate is not a new one. The demand-side / supply-side battle has raged for nearly a century, going back to the Great Depression when the prevailing economic view was that the cause of the global economic crisis was unbalanced budgets and too much foreign competition. In the early 30′s governments around the world cut spending, raised taxes and erected new barriers to trade in order to try and fix their economic woes. The result was a deepening of the depression and a lost decade of economic activity, culminating in a World War that led to a massive increase in demand and a return to full employment. Let’s hope that this time around the same won’t be necessary to end our global economic woes.

Recently, CNN’s Fareed Zakaria had two of the leading voices in this economic debate on his show to share their views on what is needed to bring the US and the world out of its economic slump. Princeton’s Paul Krugman, a proud Keynesian, spoke for the demand-side, while Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff represented the supply-side. Watch the interview below (up to 24:40), read my notes summarizing the two side’s arguments, and answer the questions that follow.

Summary of Krugman’s argument:

  • Despite the downgrade by Standard & Poor’s (a ratings agency) there appears to be strong demand for US government bonds right now, meaning really low borrowing costs (interest rates) for the US government.
  • This means investors are not afraid of what S&P is telling them to be afraid of, and are more than happy to lend money to the US government at low interest rates.
  • Investors are fleeing from equities (stocks in companies), and buying US bonds because US debt is the safest asset out there. The market is saying that the downgrade may lead to more contractionary policies, hurting the real economy. Investors are afraid of contractionary fiscal policy, so are sending a message to Washington that it should spend more now.
  • The really scary thing is the prospect of another Great Depression.
  • Can fiscal stimulus succeed in an environment of large amounts of debt held by the private sector? YES, says Krugman, the government can sustain spending to maintain employment and output, which leads to income growth and makes it easier for the private sector to pay down their debt.
  • With 9% unemployment and historically high levels of long-term unemployment, we should be addressing the employment problem first. We should throw everything we can at increasing employment and incomes.
  • Is there some upper limit to the national debt? Krugman says the deficit and debt are high, but we must consider costs versus benefits: The US can borrow money and repay in constant dollars (inflation adjusted) less than it borrowed. There must be projects the federal government could undertake with at least a constant rate of return that could get workers employed. If the world wants to buy US bonds, let’s borrow now and invest for the future!
  • If we discovered that space aliens were about to attack and we needed a massive military buildup to protect ourselves from invasion, inflation and budget deficits would be a secondary concern to that and the recession would be over in 18 months.
  • We have so many hypothetical risks (inflation, bond market panic, crowding out, etc…) that we are afraid to tackle the actual challenge that is happening (unemployment, deflation, etc..) and we are destroying a lot of lives to protect ourselves from these “phantom threats”.
  • The thing that’s holding us back right now in the US is private sector debt. Yes we won’t have a self-sustaining recovery until private sector debt comes down, at least relative to incomes. Therefore we need policies that make income grow, which will reduce the burden of private debt.
  • The idea that we cannot do anything to grow until private debt comes down on its own is flawed… increase income, decrease debt burden!
  • Things that we have no evidence for that are supposed to be dangerous are not a good reason not to pursue income growth policies.
  • When it comes down to it, there just isn’t enough spending in the economy!

Summary of Rogoff’s argument:

  • The downgrade was well justified, and the reason for the demand for treasuries is that they look good compared to the other options right now.
  • There is a panic going on as investors adjust to lower growth expectations, due to lack of leadership in the US and Europe.
  • This is not a classical recession, rather a “Great Contraction”: Recessions are periodic, but a financial crisis like this is unusual, this is the 2nd Great Contraction since the Depresssion. It’s not output and employment, but credit and housing which are contracting, due to the “debt overhang”.
  • If you look at a contraction, it can take up to 4 or 5 years just to get back where you started.
  • This is not a double dip recession, because we never left the first one.
  • Rogoff thinks continued fiscal stimulus would worsen the debt overhang because it leads to the expectation of future tax increases, thus causing firms and households increased uncertainty and reduces future growth.
  • If we used our credit to help facilitate a plan to bring down the mortgage debt (debt held by the private sector), Rogoff would consider that a better option than spending on employment and output. Fix the debt problem, and spending will resume.
  • Rogoff thinks we should not assume that interest rates of US debt will last indefinitely. Infrastructure spending, if well spent, is great, but he is suspicious whether the government is able to target its spending so efficiently to make borrowing the money worthwhile.
  • Rogoff thinks if government invests in productive projects, stimulus is a good idea, but “digging ditches” will not fix the economy.
  • Until we get the debt levels down, we cannot get back to robust growth.
  • It’s because of the government’s debt that the private sector is worried about where the country’s going. If we increase the debt to finance more stimulus, there will be more uncertainty, higher interest rates, possibly inflation, and prolonged stagnation in output and incomes.
  • When it comes down to it, there is just too much debt in the economy!

Discussion Question:

  1. What is the fundamental difference between the two arguments being debated above? Both agree that the national debt is a problem, but where do the two economists differ on how to deal with the debt?
  2. The issues of “digging ditches and filling them in” comes up in the discussion. What is the context of this metaphor? What are the two economists views on the effectiveness of such projects?
  3. Following the debate, Fareed Zakaria talks about the reaction in China to S&P’s downgrade of US debt. What does he think about the popular demands in China for the government to pull out of the market for US government bonds?
  4. Explain what Zakaria means when he describes the relationship between the US and China as “Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)”.
  5. Should the US government pursue a second stimulus and directly try to stimulate employment and income? Or should it continue down the path to austerity, cutting government programs to try and balance its budget?

19 responses so far

Sep 23 2010

The magical recession proof bunny

Chocolate Sales: A Sweet Spot in the Recession – TIME

Living in Switzerland, I find an article featuring a local business from the town my school is in irresistible, particularly when it appear in TIME magazine. Lindt chocolate, the company featured in this article, manufactures its delicate treats right down the hill from the ZIS campus, which means that when the wind is just right, you can just catch the scent of fresh, creamy chocolate wafting up the hillside while walking to campus.

Lindt, as well as its global competitors in the chocolate business, is enjoying surge in demand even while countless other industries are forced to cut back production, lay off workers, and close their factory doors. From TIME:

While the credit crisis has slowed down sales of everything from cars to organic groceries, people seem happy to keep shelling out for chocolate. Last year, as the global recession was gaining ground, Swiss chocolate makers bucked the trend with record sales — nearly 185,000 tons, an increase of 2% over 2007, sold domestically and in 140 export markets

“Switzerland’s image sells well abroad, and nothing says ‘Switzerland’ more than chocolate,” says Stephane Garelli, director of the World Competitiveness Center at the Institute of Management Development (IMD) in Lausanne, predicting that this comfort food will continue to sweeten the sour economy for months to come…

“Now that people don’t have a new television or a new car,” he noted, “they eat a bit more chocolate.”

“Chocolate is one of the more recession-resilient food sectors,” says Dean Best, executive director of Just-Food, a U.K.-based news and information website for the global food industry. “With consumers eating out less and eating at home more, there is evidence that they are still allowing themselves the occasional indulgence — and chocolate is a relatively inexpensive indulgence.”

But the question of why there is no meltdown in the chocolate business may be more a matter of psychology than economics. “There is well-documented evidence going back to Freud, showing that in times of anxiety and uncertainty, when people need a boost, they turn to chocolate,” says Garelli of the IMD. “That’s why when the economy is bad, chocolate is still selling well.”

Which goes to show that chocolate is more than a candy treat — it’s real food for the soul.

So does this mean chocolate is an inferior good, or one for which demand increases as incomes fall? I doubt many Swiss chocolate producers would consider their product inferior, but perhaps it does fit the definition.

On the other hand, perhaps the reason demand for chocolate increases during a recession has more to do with the substitution effect than the income effect. As people eat out less, they consume fewer expensive deserts at restaurants and instead fill their shopping baskets with more affordable dessert options for the home. I can say from experience that this is the case for myself.

Living in Switzerland, I find myself rarely going out to eat at restaurants, an activity reserved for special occasions in this country where a steak can set you back 75 dollars. Instead, I eat at home almost every night, and nothing is more appealing to me, especially during hard economic times, than a bar of delicious chocolate after a home cooked meal. Demand for chocolate may rise during recessions simply because the demand for one of its substitutes (restaurant desserts) falls.

Discussion questions:

  1. Do you think chocolate is an inferior good or a normal good? What’s the difference? What types of goods do YOU consome more of when you find yourself faced with a tighter budget?
  2. Does economics have a good explanation for the above situation? The article mentions Freud, a pioneer in  the field of psychology; do humans’ economic behavior always appear rational?
  3. If chocolate were an inferior good, what would happen to chocolate sales when the global economy finally turns around and incomes start increasing? What do you think will happen to chocolate sales when the economy starts imrpoving? Explain.

26 responses so far

Aug 25 2010

The Big “C” – America’s crisis of confidence and the Great Recession

Over a year has gone by since the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed and put into action by the Obama Administration. Supporters of the program say that it has been successful, arguing that the economy would be in much worse shape if no stimulus had been introduced at all. In fact, some are arguing that government spending has not been sufficient for a full economic recovery and that more direct government spending is necessary. Economists on the other side argue that the stimulus package has done little for the economy except to delay the inevitable, self correcting forces of the economy needed to pave the road back to recovery. Some actually say that we are in a worse situation now due to the massive increase in government debt which will eventually have to be paid back.

So the question is, are we better off as an economy a year after the stimulus package was introduced? With growth still sluggish and unemployment at 9.5%, many people have begun to question the success of the ARRA. Again, some say the $784 billion was insufficient while others say less regulation and more tax cuts should have been utilized.

In a recent Washington Post article, Neil Irwin argues that the obstacles towards economic growth may not be solved by more stimulus, lower interest rates or tax cuts for corporations. The problem, he claims, is not a lack of funds for investment, but in the uncertainty businesses have in future conditions. He writes:

Corporate profits are soaring. Companies are sitting on billions of dollars of cash. And still, they’ve yet to amp up hiring or make major investments — the missing ingredients for a strong economic recovery. Many Democrats say the economy needs more stimulus. Business lobbyists and their Republican allies say it needs less regulation and lower taxes. But here in the heartland of America, senior executives say neither side’s assessment fits.

They blame their profound caution on their view that U.S. consumers are destined to disappoint for many years. As a result, they say, the economy is unlikely to see the kind of almost unbroken prosperity of the quarter-century that preceded the financial crisis.

With consumers choosing to save or pay off their debts now rather than spend, many businesses find it in their interest to hold off on investments into new capital until consumers begin spending again. With no planned investment and no incentive to hire workers, unemployment stays high and economic growth remains stagnant. With inflation rates low and economists predicting deflation, it makes more sense to hold onto money as it is not losing its value.

So is there a solution? In this situation, expansionary monetary policy through lower interest rates will not have the desired effect as demand for loanable funds is low. As stated in the article:

For large companies such as Illinois Tool Works, the price of borrowed money isn’t the problem. The company had $1.3 billion in cash on its balance sheet at the end of June, up from $743 million at the end of 2008. Lower interest rates wouldn’t make much of a difference, either.

“I could borrow $2 billion tomorrow for 3 1/2 percent,” said Speer. “But what am I going to do with it?””

Other executives claim that an increase in government spending would only provide a temporary fix but have no effect on long term consumer spending.

David Speer is chief executive of the company, which has 60,000 employees worldwide in more than 800 business units and $14 billion in sales. He said an additional burst of fiscal stimulus from Washington might help boost economic growth for a period of months. But that is unlikely to affect his decisions about hiring and expansion, which Speer said are based on expectations for sales over years to come, not just the immediate future. As long as U.S. consumers remain deeply strained, he is unlikely to undertake aggressive expansion.

More fiscal stimulus “might help make things a little better for a couple of quarters, but I’m not sure it would get at the underlying economic issue,” Speer said. “The core question is: How do you get consumers back on their feet. We need growth in a sustainable way, not another Band-Aid.”

Another solution would be for the government to implement supply side measures such as less market regulation and lower corporate taxes. Again, without the much needed consumer spending and confidence, its difficult to say whether or not this will materialize into increased investment and employment.

The rest of the Washington Post article can be read here. Once you’ve read the article, answer discuss the questions below and share your thoughts in a comment on this post.

Discussion Questions:

  1. Why is consumer spending and confidence so important for businesses?
  2. What role does business investment into capital play in the economy and why is it so important in leading the economy towards recovery?
  3. Is there any benefit in the economy for consumers to save and pay off their debts now? Is this a rational decision given the current economic conditions?
  4. If fiscal and monetary policies along with lower taxes for corporations are not the answer, then what is? What other possibilities are available for the government to implement?

34 responses so far

May 12 2010

When Spain’s unemployment problem gets ugly

With more than four million Spanish people out of work this week, the eighth largest economy in the world finds itself once more in a perilous position. In the last twelve months the number of unemployed people in Spain has doubled. Spain now has as many unemployed people as France and Italy combined, and the unemployment rate is nearing the historic highs of 1993.

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The type of unemployment in an economy can be classified in different ways. The main types are cyclical or demand deficient unemployment but other forms exist such as real-wage unemployment and equilibrium unemployment. Some economists also refer to unemployed people as structural, frictional, seasonally or cyclically unemployed.

From the graph below we can see that unemployment in Spain has been high for at least the last 20 years, compared to other countries within the European Union.

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics

The cause of growing Spanish unemployment in 2008 to 2010 is related to the collapse of the domestic building boom and the wider global recession. In 2006, Spain enjoyed low interest rates and therefore cheap loans, this allowed developers to build new apartment blocks, houses and commercial buildings with a relatively low cost of borrowing. Spanish people could afford mortgages at low interest rates and therefore purchased houses contributing to the building boom. However, when the flow of “cheap money” ran out in mid 2008 the building stopped and the flow on effects of spending dried up. Falling tourism receipts and less foreign investment have also exacerbated the issue leading to unemployment doubling between 2008 – 2010.

We can classify the form of unemployment, illustrated in the Spanish example as demand-deficient unemployment. It is related to a downturn in the economic cycle. This concept is explained below.

#3aEffects and Solutions

The social and economic impacts of 20.7% unemployment are obvious, but the solutions are less so. Climbing unemployment creates two evils; falling tax revenue as workers no longer earn wages and the increased burden of paying benefits to the four million unemployed citizens. In addition, a series of social problems are often intertwined with high unemployment, these include depression; lose of skills, poverty and higher crime rates. Spain therefore has a few problems to solve this summer. Whilst Spanish people may enjoy a summer by the beach, and a glass of sangria, the government will be hitting the books to find a solution to the problem. Here are a few suggests to get the politicians thinking.

  • Use fiscal stimulus to boost consumer and government spending, thereby increasing the demand for jobs. Spain could plan for a budget deficit (expansionary fiscal policy) and fund spending increases though increased government borrowing. Spain’s current level of public debt is 67% of GDP, which is well below stricken Greece at 124%. However, Spain now has to borrow money from international bond markets, which are skeptical about Spain’s ability to pay back this debt. This is despite assurances and favourable rates offered from the European Union this week. Increasing government debt in a period of European financial crisis is a risky option.
  • Use loose monetary policy (lowering central bank interest rates) to encourage Spanish people to increase their consumer spending through increased borrowing. If you understand the complexities of the European Union, you understand that all 21-member countries use the same currency and follow the lead of one central bank. Despite one country wishing to lower interest rates, other countries may think differently. Europe can be compared to a train rolling along on a set of rails, with 21 separate carriages. Each European country must follow behind the big engine, there is no room to deviate from the central banks interest rates and all of the countries must move together. Many people have wondered how long the European train would run, before one of the carriages derailed.
  • Force Spanish firms to employ more people. Firms have no requirement to hire more people. They may choose to employ more people but will logically offer everyone lower wages to maintain profitability.
  • Use supply side policies to bring greater efficiencies to firms though increased on the job training and worker education. This is a long-term solution, which will require large structural adjustments, how Spain produces goods and services and exactly what is does produce. A startling statistic is that the average Spanish university graduate will find their first job at the age of 27, long after they have graduated.

Discussion Questions:

  1. How do economists measure unemployment?
  2. Explain the causes of increased unemployment in Spain?
  3. Explain in a few sentences how expansionary fiscal policy could reduce the rate of unemployment?
  4. How could supply side policies be used to reduce the level of unemployment in Spain?

31 responses so far

May 05 2010

Facts and the Phillips Curve: new evidence of the short-run trade-off between unemployment and inflation

Introduction: The following is a selection of a chapter from my new Economics textbook project, the Pearson Baccalaureate Economics text, which will be available to IB Economics teacher for the 2011-2013 school year.

It should be noted that the original Phillips Curve theory did not distinguish between the (In macroeconomics): The period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible. A fall in aggregate demand will lead to unemployment and recession in the short-run. Due to the inability of the nation's producers to reduce wages paid to worker, they must lay workers off to reduce costs as demand falls.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">short-run and the long-run. In fact, the original Phillips Curve itself was a long-run model demonstrating a trade-off between unemployment and changes in the wage rate over a span of 52 years in the United Kingdom.

Up until the early 1970s, the Phillips Curve was treated as a generally accurate demonstration of the relationship between two important macroeconomic indicators. Throughout the 60′s data for the United States showed in most cases that increases in unemployment corresponded with lower inflation rates, and vis versa.

Year 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
UR 5.5 6.7 5.5 5.7 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.7
IR 1.46 1.07 1.2 1.24 1.28 1.59 3.01 2.78 4.27 5.46

As can be seen above, between almost every year of the decade a fall in the inflation rate corresponded with a rise in unemployment. The only exceptions were between 1962 and 1963, when both unemployment and inflation increased slightly, and between 1968 and 1969, when again both variables increased. Phillips’ theory of the trade-off between unemployment and inflation was generally supported throughout most of the decade, as the downward slope of the line in the graph above demonstrates.

Beginning in 1970, however, data for the US began to point to a flaw in the Phillips curve theory. Throughout the decade, both unemployment and inflation rose in the US, as oil exporters in the Middle Ease, united under the Oil Producing and Exporting Countries (OPEC) cartel, placed embargoes on oil exports to the US in retaliation for America’s support of Israel in a war against its Arab neighbors. The resulting supply shock in the US led to energy and petrol demand". Occurs when the price is below the equilibrium level, for example, when a government imposes a price ceiling in a market.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">shortages and rising costs for US firms, forcing businesses to reduce costs by laying off workers, while simultaneously raising output prices. Several other macroeconomic variables contributed to rising unemployment and inflation in the late 1970s, including the return of tens of thousands of troops from the Vietnam War who entered the labor market and found themselves unemployed as firms reduced output in the face of rising energy costs. The Phillips Curve for the 1970s told a somewhat different story about inflation and unemployment than that of the 1960s.

Year 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
UR 4.9 5.9 5.6 4.9 5.6 8.5 7.7 7.1 6.1 5.8
IR 5.84 4.3 3.27 6.16 11.03 9.2 5.75 6.5 7.62 11.22

Between 1973 and 1974, both the unemployment rate and the inflation rate increased significantly, and even as unemployment increased by almost 3% between 1974 and 1975, the inflation rate fell by less than 2% but still remained at nearly 10%. Unlike the 1960s, the 1970s was a decade of both high unemployment AND high inflation. By the end of the decade, unemployment was at approximately the same level as it was in 1963 (5.8%) but inflation was nearly 10 times higher (11.22% in 1979 versus just 1.24% in 1963). The Phillips Curve theory was apparently busted, as the seemingly random scattering of data in the graph above points to no discernible trade-off between unemployment and inflation throughout the 1970s.

Several prominent economists in the 1970s, including Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman, revived the classical view of the macroeconomy which held that policies aimed at managing aggregate demand would ultimately be unsuccessful at decreasing unemployment in the long-run, since a nation’s output and employment would always return to the full-employment level regardless of the level of demand in the economy. Friedman, whose theory of the macroeconomy would come to be known as monetarism, believed that changes in the money supply would lead to inflation or deflation, but no change in unemployment in the long-run. Monetary policy and its effects on aggregate demand and aggregate supply will be explored in more depth in a later chapter in this book. The basic premise of the monetarists, however, was that in order to maintain stable prices and low unemployment, the nation’s money supply should be allowed to grow at a steady rate, corresponding with the desired level of economic growth. Any increase in the money supply aimed at stimulating spending and aggregate demand would result in an increase in inflationary expectations, an increase in nominal wages, and a leftward shift of aggregate supply, resulting only in higher inflation and no change in real output and employment. Therefore, monetary rules were needed to assure that policymakers would not manipulate the supply of money to try and stimulate or contract the level of aggregate demand in the economy.

By the late 1970s, our current interpretation of the Phillips’ theory as including both a short-run and a long-run model became widely adopted. The short-run Phillips Curve may accurately illustrate the trade-off between unemployment and inflation observed in the period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible in a nation’s economy. For instance, during the twelve month period between July 2008 and June 2009, the level of consumption and investment in the US fell as the economy slipped into recession. Unemployment rose and inflation decreased and eventually became negative in the final three months of the period. The graph below shows the relationship between unemployment and inflation during the onset of the recession in 2008 and 2009.

A clear trade-off appears to have existed in the twelve month period above. At the time of writing, it is yet to be seen whether the unemployment rate will return to its pre-recession level in the United States. Although in the short-run it seems likely that the downward sloping Phillips Curve holds some truth, a look at a longer period of time for the same country tells a different story. The graph below shows the unemployment / inflation relationship during the twelve years leading up to the onset of recession in 2008.

Looking at data for a longer period of time shows that even as inflation fluctuated between 0.5% and 4%, US unemployment remained in a relatively narrow range of between 4% and 6%. Year on year unemployment and inflation often increased together, while at other times demonstrated an inverse relationship as Phillips’ theory predicts it should. The narrow range of unemployment portrayed in the data above is evidence that the Long-run Phillips curve for the US between 1997 and 1998 was more like a vertical line than a downward sloping one. It appears that during the period above the natural rate of unemployment for the United States was around 5%; meaning that even as AD increased and decreased in the short-run, the level unemployment remained relatively steady around the natural rate of 5% in the long-run.

The 1970′s represented a turning point in the mainstream economic analysis of the relationship between inflation and unemployment. Demand-management policies by governments may be effective at fine-tuning an economy’s employment level and price level in the short-run, but as data from the 1970′s and early 2000s shows, in the long-run a nation’s level of unemployment tends to be independent of the inflation rate, and is likely to remain around the natural rate of unemployment once wages and prices have adjusted to fluctuations in aggregate demand. In response to supply shocks such as the oil shortages of the 1970′s, both inflation and unemployment may increase at the same time, calling into question the validity of the original Phillips Curve relationship. Despite the breakdown in the relationship between unemployment and inflation in the long-run, the evidence from the recession of 2008 and 2009 seems to support the theory that an economy in which aggregate demand is falling will experience a short-run trade-off between the rate of inflation and the rate of unemployment.

11 responses so far

Mar 11 2010

Helping Singapore become an advanced economy

Singapore is an economy which is operating at a level which is very close to its full potential. The island has no natural resources, very little spare land and a small but educated workforce. The recent global financial crisis, highlighted Singapore’s vulnerability to changes in the global economy. Singapore is very export dependent country with a large positive trade balance.

The latest government budget was announced here last week and the focus has shifted towards improving productivity in the economy to make it more resilient to these external shocks in the future. The shift has been from Demand Side Policies a year ago, at the depths of the recession, to Supply Side policies in the recovery phase.

Singapore has always been considered one of the original Four Asian Tigers. The four tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) were economies, which shared the free market policies and outward looking, export orientated philosophies. All four countries were newly industrialized, and throughout the period between the 1960’s and 1990’s  they all experienced exceptionally high rates of economic growth. More recently other countries tried to follow this model on a road to development.

A picture of the CBD from near my apartment.

A full description of the budget is here. Most of this is copied below, along with my comments. When you read the article think about the four discussion questions at the end of this post.

S’pore unveils Budget aimed at helping country become advanced economy: By Imelda Saad, Channel NewsAsia | Posted: 22 February 2010 link

SINGAPORE: Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam has unveiled a Budget aimed at helping Singapore become an advanced economy.

A key theme of the Budget: raising the quality of jobs, skills and the workforce so that workers can continue to earn higher incomes, and the economy, grow.

Singapore emerged from the global financial crisis better than expected, with an overall budget deficit of S$2.9 billion for FY 2009 – much lower than the original S$8.7 billion shortfall projected a year ago.  This year, it is expecting a deficit of S$3 billion, as it spends on areas to boost productivity. The government’s key focus is to raise productivity by 2 to 3 per cent a year over the next decade. This will allow Singapore to maintain a healthy rate of economic growth of 3 to 5 per cent a year, even with a slower growth in the labour force.

The government has therefore managed its spending and revenues in the previous 12 months so is now in a position to spend money to boost the future prospects of the economy. This is unlike some other nations such as the United Kingdom which is searching to cut spending to reduce future budget deficits.

The finance minister said the Budget 2010 set out ways to help Singapore succeed with new growth strategies. Hence the plans seemed to focus more on the long-term growth and health of the economy, and not just the short-term position. The government has set aside S$5.5 billion over the next five years to help enterprises and workers raise productivity.

Mr Tharman said: “Raising skills and productivity is the only viable way we can achieve higher wages and is the best way to help citizens with low incomes. If we achieve this goal, we can raise real incomes by one-third in 10 years.”

The Finance Minster is focusing on long-term growth and the health of the economy. This suggests that Singapore is using supply side policies to increase the potential capacity of the economy and shift the Long Run Aggregate Supply curves towards the right. From a Keynesian perspective, supply side policies are effective when the economy is approaching it’s full potential. The policies are considered ineffective when the economy is a recession with depressed aggregate demand. This idea is illustrated below. (note: the same policies can also be illustrated slightly differently, using a neoclassical perspective of LRAS)

The minister signalled that some painful decisions may have to be taken. Less-efficient industries may have to exit Singapore, as the economy continues to restructure. Mr Tharman said the government must rely on the market to achieve this restructuring. Industries and companies will be given help to upgrade through tax benefits and grants to help to innovate and raise productivity, and invest in R&D and automation.

More will be pumped into raising the skills and tapping the potential of every worker. But this will have to be offset by reducing Singapore’s dependence on cheap foreign labour. To encourage companies to rely less on foreign workers, the government is imposing higher levies on foreign workers in phases over the next three years.

The government will pump in S$2.5 billion in over 5 years to enhance Continuing Education and Training.

It will also set up a high-level National Productivity and Continuing Education Council – to be headed by Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean – to develop a comprehensive system for lifelong learning. In addition, there will be help for older and low-wage workers in a new Workfare Training Scheme. The scheme is aimed at incentivising employers to send older workers for training by providing companies with up to 95 per cent funding for absentee payroll and course fee outlays.

For companies, there will be a Productivity and Innovation Credit so they can get tax deductions for investments in R&D and automation. There are also a slew of measures to help grow more globally competitive Singapore companies. These include tax deductions for angel investors, growth capital for SMEs and incentives to expand sectors with high growth potential.

The government also wants to ensure that no one is left out as it pushes for more inclusive growth, by taking care of the lower and middle income. For example, property tax will be tweaked to be more reflective of the annual values of homes.

Mr Tharman said: “Taking all our measures together, we will be spending S$1.4 billion this year in direct transfers for households. While most Singaporeans will receive some benefits, more will go to those with lower and middle incomes.”

In wrapping up the nearly two-hour speech, Mr Tharman said while the government will commit substantial resources to support the national effort of restructuring the economy and improving the quality of jobs, the success of this will depend very much on the ingenuity and drive of Singaporeans and companies here.

Discussion Questions:

  1. Explain why in Singapore demand side policies were favoured during the recession, but now Supply Side policies are being introduced.
  2. Explain how one of the suggested policies will affect the labour market and therefore the level of aggregate supply in the economy.
  3. What does the finance minister mean by the phrase “no one is left out as we push for inclusive growth” and how does the government support inclusive growth?
  4. Evaluate the short run and long run effectiveness of supply side policies to increase the level of Real GDP in Singapore.

45 responses so far

Oct 26 2009

Exchange rates, currency manipulations, and the balance of trade

FT.com | The Economists’ Forum | Imbalances and undervalued exchange rates: Rehabilitating Keynes

In our year 2 IB Economics class, we are beginning the part of our International Trade unit on exchange rates and the balance of trade . While the market for a particular currency reflects many of the same characteristics as a product market (i.e. upward sloping supply curve, downward sloping demand curve), the consequences of a change the price of a currency (the exchange rate) is far more powerful than a change in the price of a particular good or service in a product market.

How does the value of a country’s currency affect that country’s balance of trade with other countries? To understand this important concept, we first need to know something about the process by which currencies are exchanged when two countries trade. Let’s look at an example:

When an American consumer wants to buy an iPod that was made in China she will have to pay for it in US dollars, since that’s what she earns her wages in from selling her labor in the resource market. Apple now has the consumer’s $300, which gets split up to cover all the costs the company faced in the manufacture, distribution, marketing and sale of the iPod. Part of that $300 (say $100) will go to the manager of the factory in China where it was made.

The factory manager in Shanghai faces his own costs he must cover. He must pay rent on his factory space, interest on the loans he took out to acquire capital, and wages to the workers assembling iPods on his factory floor. The problem is, these costs are all in Chinese yuan, but he’s holding the US dollars that Apple paid him for his iPod. In order to cover his costs, the Chinese factory owner must take the $100 to a Chinese bank and swap it for RMB. The local bank that changes his money now hands the $100 over to China’s central bank (the PBOC) which prints and exchanges RMB to the bank at whatever the prevailing exchange rate is at the time.

Ultimately, China’s central bank will decide what to do with its holding of US dollars. Most of the dollars are loaned back to the United States through China’s purchase of US Treasury securities (the IOUs the US government sells to finance its deficits). China’s voracious demand for US dollar denominated assets keeps the demand for (and the the value of) dollars high on foreign exchange markets, meaning the RMB remains relatively cheap for Americans and therefore Chinese manufactured goods attractive.

China’s policy of exchange rate manipulation has upset many American politicians over the years, who often blame China for America’s shrinking manufacturing sector. A weak RMB means the cost of producing things like iPods in China is far lower than it would be in the US. By keeping demand for dollars high on the foreign exchange markets through its incessant demand for US treasury securities and other financial and real assets, while simultaneously hoarding vast reserves of US dollars in its central bank, thus keeping supply of dollars on foreign exchange markets low (see graph), China has prevented the RMB from appreciating, fueling the growth of the country’s export-manufacturing sector.

China’s currency manipulations may soon ilicit a response from the United States as president-elect Barack Obama takes office next year. Facing a recession and rising unemployment, combined with the recent appreciation of the US dollar, the pressure is on Obama to take immediate action to restore America’s manufacturing sector. According to the Financial Times blog “the Economists’ Forum”:

If the US economy takes a downturn and the dollar continues to strengthen, a resurgence of protectionist pressures is likely. This time around, these pressures could well take the form of unilateral action against competitive currencies. It is noteworthy that President-elect Obama has actively and repeatedly supported action against “currency manipulation.”

The “competitive currency” perceived to pose the greatest threat to America’s inustrial sector is certainly the Chinese RMB. Currency manipulation is a form of protectionism, which in a time of global economic slowdowns poses a larger threat than ever to both developed and developing nations’ economies alike. For this reason, the World Trade Organization may need to employ carrot and stick methods to create incentives for China to liberalize its currency controls and allow the RMB to strengthan against the dollar and other major currencies:

How would this new rule against undervalued exchange rates be incorporated in the WTO? Through negotiation. The (WTO) should place rules on undervalued exchange rates…. The US and EU have been the principal demandeurs for action by China in the past. But it is important to remember that until very recently, a number of developing countries—Brazil, Mexico, Korea, Turkey and South Africa—were affected by the competitive pressure from the undervalued (RMB). Indeed, some months ago, the Indian Prime Minister urged China to follow a more market-based exchange rate policy. For obvious reasons, more emerging market countries have not voiced their concerns, but it is possible that a coalition of affected countries could unite on this issue.

Clearly, Chinese concerns have to be addressed for any new rules to be crafted and commonly agreed… First, China’s major trading partners could pledge granting China the status of a “market economy” in the WTO contingent on it eliminating currency undervaluation and moving to a market-based system. This status would have significant value for China by shielding it against unilateral trade actions such as anti-dumping and countervailing duties by trading partners. Second, as part of radical governance reform of the IMF, which is desirable in itself, China should be offered a substantially larger voting share in the IMF commensurate with its economic status.

Discussion Questions:

  1. How does China continuing to undervalue its currency threaten the industrial economies of its largest trading partners?
  2. What is China’s purpose for maintaining the low value of the RMB relative to the currencies of other nations?
  3. What would be a unilateral protectionist measure an Obama administration may advocate if the WTO refuses to take action against China’s currency manipulations? How would you advise president-elect Obama on the issue of whether to take protectionist action against China in the context of the current economic crisis in America?

85 responses so far

Sep 29 2009

How big is the government spending multiplier in America? Well, it depends on which economist you ask…

Economics focus: Much ado about multipliers | The Economist

What is the goal of fiscal stimulus during a recession? Is it simply to increase nation’s total income by a certain amount determined by how much a government increases its own spending by? If this were the case, then an $800 billion stimulus package, like the one begun this year in the US, would lead to a total increase in national income of, well, exactly $800 billion.

While such an outcome is possible, it is not the desired outcome of the Obama administration and the economists who have supported the use of expansionary fiscal policy during economic downturns (i.e. the Keynesian school of economists). Keynesians expect that an initial increase in government spending (or a decrease in taxes) will result in households and firms increasing their own consumption and investment, meaning successive increases in spending. The initial change in spending ultimately gets multiplied through further rounds of spending. The total change in national income resulting from an initial change in government spending or taxes depends on the size of the fiscal multiplier. Now, this is where things get tricky! From the Economist:

The size of the multiplier is bound to vary according to economic conditions. For an economy operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier should be zero. Since there are no spare resources, any increase in government demand would just replace spending elsewhere. But in a recession, when workers and factories lie idle, a fiscal boost can increase overall demand. And if the initial stimulus triggers a cascade of expenditure among consumers and businesses, the multiplier can be well above one.

The above scenario, where an economy is operating below full-employment and government spending puts the nation’s idle resources to work, creates new income and further increases private spending, is precisely what the Obama team and its economists hope will happen in the US economy soon. A multiplier of above one means the $800 billion will ultimately increase America’s national income by something greater than $800 billion!

The multiplier is also likely to vary according to the type of fiscal action. Government spending on building a bridge may have a bigger multiplier than a tax cut if consumers save a portion of their tax windfall. A tax cut targeted at poorer people may have a bigger impact on spending than one for the affluent, since poorer folk tend to spend a higher share of their income.

Crucially, the overall size of the fiscal multiplier also depends on how people react to higher government borrowing. If the government’s actions bolster confidence and revive animal spirits, the multiplier could rise as demand goes up and private investment is “crowded in”. But if interest rates climb in response to government borrowing then some private investment that would otherwise have occurred could get “crowded out”. And if consumers expect higher future taxes in order to finance new government borrowing, they could spend less today. All that would reduce the fiscal multiplier, potentially to below zero.

Herein lies the controversy about the effectiveness of deficit-financed fiscal stimulus. Several posts on this blog have focused on the neo-classical, supply-side economists’ fears that expansionary fiscal policy financed by government borrowing will drive up interest rates to private borrowers, thereby “crowding-out” private investment, off-setting any expansion in output achieved through government spending. In the Keynesian model, however, it is precisely because interest rates have bottomed out at the “zero bound” (according to Paul Krugman) that government borrowing and spending will not lead to crowding-out, rather could actually increase investors’ willingness to spend (their “animal spirits”) on new capital, actually “crowding-in” private investment.

Alas, the debate continues. The ironic thing is that even years from now, after all of Obama’s stimulus money has been spent, and the US economy is either fully recovered or it is not, we still won’t know how large the fiscal multiplier was, since tomorrow’s economists will find it nearly impossible to isolate the variable of the $800 billion of government spending and determine just how much of America’s growth in income can be attributed to government spending, and how much resulted from automatic stabilizers built-in to help the economy recover on its own during recessions.

Discussion Questions:

  1. Why do tax cuts for the rich tend to have a smaller multiplier effect than tax cuts for lower income households?
  2. How can government borrowing drive up interest rates, and why is this a concern to policy makers deciding on the size of a fiscal stimulus package?
  3. What are the animal spirits the article mentions? Where have you heard this expression before?
  4. Do you think borrowing trillions of dollars and spending it to put people back to work and try to dig the US economy out of recession is wise, or should the US government be practicing better fiscal responsibility?

9 responses so far

Sep 14 2009

Jobless Growth? How could this be?

Economic Growth Yet to Hit Job Market – washingtonpost.com

In AP and IB Economics, we understand the importance of macroeconomics to policymakers, whose primary macroeconomic goal is growth. Economic Growth, defined as an increase in a nation’s total output of goods and service (and therefore the national income), is desidred not only for the sake of growth itself (producing more stuff requires more resources, and may not necessarily make the average citizen better off), rather growth is needed in order to achieve full-employment of a nation’s labor force.

Growth is good. This tenet of economics is rooted in two basic observations: 1. Growth leads to an improvement in the average standard living of a nation’s people, and 2. Growth is needed to employ the growing workforce of a nation experiencing population growth and immigration.

America’s work force is a diverse group of people of all skill levels. 150 million strong, the nation’s workforce requires a healthy national economy with strong investment and consumption to maintain enough jobs to keep unemployment low.   In the last two years, however, the prospect of employment in America has diminished as the number of people out of work has grown to nearly 15 million.

Involuntary unemployment is perhaps the most serious cost of an economic slowdown. A willing and able worker (or 15 million of them!), skilled in mind and body, unable to find prouductive work, represents a monumental failure of a nation’s economy. Policies aimed at promoting growth are in fact aimed at creating employment.

The costs of unemployment affect not only the unlucky  individuals who have have lost their job. Social costs include increased crime and poverty, psychological costs include stress, anxiety, loss of self-image and depression. The economic costs are myriad. Unemployed workers become dependent on the rest of society for support, in one way or another. Benefits for the unemployed payed by the government require greater budget deficits or increased tax burden on the employed. The large pool of jobless citizens seeking work puts downward pressure on the wages of those still working, as employers find it difficult to keep paying high wages while demand for their products has fallen and millions of job seekers are willing to work for less.

The families and friends to whom unemployed workers turn for help find their already stretched incomes spread even thinner. Without steady incomes, the unemployed consume less, putting further strain on an already depressed economy. Deflation can result from unemployment, which can lead to futher layoffs by pessimistic firms, excacerbating the situation and plunging the economy into what’s known as a deflationary spiral.

For all the reasons above, policymakers strive to promote growth. When monetary policy fails to incite spending, the government must pick up the slack, hence the stimulus package so discussed in America today. China’s stimulus of over $500 billion (twice that of the US, as a percentage of its GDP) has had a positive effect on both GDP and the job market.

Employment levels in China began to recover over the past three months in the latest evidence of the rapid rebound in the economy from the international financial crisis as a result of heavy public investment.

Yin Weimin, China’s labour minister, said there had been a modest increase in the number of jobs in the economy during June, July and August, reversing the sharp slump in employment which began last October.

America’s stimlus has also begun to restore growth, but the rise in employment has so far not occured:

Despite an emerging economic expansion, businesses were sufficiently skittish about the future that the job market continued its long, steep decline in August, according to a new government report Friday. The unemployment rate rose to 9.7 percent, from 9.4 percent, as employers shed jobs for the 20th straight month, the Labor Department said.

“Our clients tell us they will not hire in anticipation

of a recovery, but will wait until they see it,” said Jonas Prising, an executive vice president at Manpower, the giant employment services firm. “In a normal recession, people would now start to feel more comfortable and start hiring, but nobody is doing that today. They’ll do it when they see real orders and real business.”

The “silver lining” of the latest unemployment figures is hardly encouraging. The rise in unemployment is not as sharp as over most of the last year. In other words, workers are definitely worse off, but not as badly as they could have been if things were as dismal as they were earlier this year.

While the unemployment rate, as seen on the graph to the right, has risen almost every month since August of 2008, the rate at which the rate has increased has begun to slow. In other words, the economy is probably close to “bottoming out”.

The tally of lost jobs now stands at 6.9 million since the beginning of the recession in December 2007. But the rate of job losses has been declining, if haltingly, since winter. The 216,000 jobs eliminated in August is down from 276,000 cut in July and a peak of 741,000 lost in January.

Here’s what I find most interesting from in the current data. The unemployment rate’s recent rise may actually be a sign that the economy is beginning to recover. Recovery means growth in output, which should mean less unemployment. However, if workers who have been unemployed for a long time, and have therefore stop seeking employment suddenly feel more optimistic about the prospects of getting a job and begin seeking work again, then the nation’s unemployment rate actually rises! How’s that for “silver lining”? The 216,000 additional people added to the list of unemployed may have already been out of work but since they were notactively seeking employment they were not included in last month’s data.

The tricky thing about macroeconomic policy is this:  Monetary and fiscal policies can put billions of dollars into the nation’s banks and households’ and firms’ pockets through tax breaks, government bailouts, subsidies, infrastructure spending and “troubled asset swaps”… but all the money and income in the world will not lead the nation towards full-employment unless the nation’s consumers and producers feel confident. I teach my students that national income is made up of the sum of wages, interest, rent and profit; its spending consists of consumption, investment, government spending and net exports… but without the “big C” of confidence, expansionary policies aimed at increasing employment will come to nought. Confidence, according to John Maynard Keynes, is an animal spirit, a trait of humans beyond the assumption of rational behavior. Until confidence is restored, America’s output and employment levels will remain low.

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