When a government needs to borrow money to pay for its deficit, private savers (represented by Slf above) will find lending money to the government more attractive than saving in private banks, since the relative interest rate on government bonds is likely to rise. This should reduce the supply of loanable funds in the private sector, making them more scarce and driving up borrowing costs to households and firms. This can be seen below:

In the illustration above, a government’s deficit spending crowds-out private spending, as firms and households find higher interest rates less attractive and thus demand less funds for investment and consumption. Private expenditures fall from Qe to Q1; therefore any increase in economic output resulting from the increase in government spending may be off-set by the fall in private spending. Crowding-out has occured.

Another way to view the crowding-out effect is to think about the impact of increased government borrowing on the demand for loanable funds. Demand represents all borrowers in an economy: households, firms and the government. An increase in public debt requires the government to borrow funds from the private sector, so as the supply of loanable funds fall, the demand will also increase, although not from the private sector, rather from the government. The effect this has can be seen below:

In the graph above, both the reduced supply of loanable funds resulting from private savers lending more to the government and the increased demand for loanable funds resulting form the government’s borrowing from the private sector combine to drive the equilibrium interest rate up to IR2. The private quantity demanded now falls from Qe to Qp, while the total amount of funds demanded (from the private sector and the goverment) now is only Qp+g. This illustration thus shows how an increase in government borrowing crowds out private spending but also leads to an overall decrease in the amount of investment in the economy.

Based on the two graphs above, a deficit-financed government spending package will definitely crowd-out private spending to some extent, and in the case of the second graph will even lead to a decrease in overall expenditures in the economy. This analysis could be used to argue against government spending as a way to stimulate economic activity. But this analysis makes some assumptions that may not always be true about a nation’s economy, namely that the equilibrium level of private investment demand and the supply of loanable funds occurs at a positive real interest rate. There are two possibilities that may mean the crowding-out effect does not occur. They are:

Notice that due to the exceedingly low demand and high supply of loanable funds, 0% acts as a price floor in the market. In other words, since interest rates cannot fall below 0%, there will be an excess supply of funds available to the private sector. Such a scenario is known as a liquidity trap. The level of private investment will be very low at only Qd. Banks cannot loan out all their excess reserves, and even though borrowing money is practically free, borrowers aren’t willing to take the risk to invest in capital or assets that may have negative rates of return, a prospect that is not unlikely during a recession.

So what happens when government deficit spends during a “liquidity trap”, as seen above? First of all, the government need not offer a very high rate to borrow in such an economy. Private interest rates will be close to zero, so even a 0.1% return on government bonds will attract lenders. So the supply of loanable funds may decrease, and demand may increase, but crowding-out will not occur because there is almost no private investment spending to crowd out! Here’s what happens:

Here we see the same shifts in demand and supply for loanable funds as we saw in our first graph, except now there is no increase in the interest rate resulting from the government’s entrance into the market. Since private interest rates stay at 0%, the private quantity of funds demanded for investment remains the same (Qp), while the increased government borrowing leads to an increase in overall spending in the economy from Qp to Qp+g. Rather than crowding-out private spending, the increase in government spending has no impact on households and firms, and leads to a net increase in overall spending in the economy.

If the government spends its borrowed funds wisely, it is possible that private spending could be crowded-in, which means that the boost to total output resulting from the fiscal stimulus may increase firm and household confidence and shift the private demand for loanable funds outwards, increasing the level of private investment and consumption, further stimulating economic activity.

So what have we shown? We have seen that in a healthy economy, in which households and firms are eager to borrow money to finance their spending, and in which savings rates are not exceedingly high, government borrowing may drive up private interest rates and crowd-out private spending. But during a deep recession, in which consumer spending is depressed and firms are not investing due to uncertainty and savings rates are higher than what is historically normal, an increase in government spending financed by a deficit will have little or no impact on the level of private investment and consumption. In such a case, governments can borrow cheaply (at just above 0%), and increase the overall level of demand in the economy without harming the private sector.

Crowding-out is a valid economic theory, but its likelihood of occurring must be evaluated by considering the actual level of output and employment in the economy. In a deflationary setting, in which savings is high and private spending is low, government may have the opportunity to boost demand and stimulate growth without driving up borrowing costs in the private sector and decreasing the level of household and firm expenditures.

Related posts:

1. A must read for AP Macro teachers: Paul Krugman explains why deficit spending during a recession does NOT cause crowding-out
2. Sample IB Economics Internal Assessment Commentary – Understanding the ECB’s bond-purchasing program
3. Will the stimulus package “crowd-out” private investment and reduce long-run growth potential in America?

Once again, my IB Economics students are working on yet another Internal Assessment Commentary, this time on syllabus section 3, Macroeconomics. Since they found my sample Microeconomics commentary so helpful, I thought I’d punch out a quick sample of a macro commentary for them and for anyone else who is working on their IB Economcis Internal Assessment.

The commentary below (not including the selection from the article) is 749 words in length. This does NOT include words in the graphs, so let’s not have that debate in the comment section. The new IB economics internal assessment model (first examinations 2013) will not count words on graphs, so this sample commentary is perfectly suited for the new assessment model. If you’re a 2012 student, you would be wise to count words in graphs as part of your word count.

If you like what you see, or have any quesitons, please leave your comments below the post.

Article highlights:

An Impeccable Disaster – NYTimes.com

Paul Krugman clearly explains the problems faced by two or Europe’s largest economies today:

So why is Spain — along with Italy, which has higher debt but smaller deficits — in so much trouble? The answer is that these countries are facing something very much like a bank run, except that the run is on their governments rather than, or more accurately as well as, their financial institutions.

Here’s how such a run works: Investors, for whatever reason, fear that a country will default on its debt. This makes them unwilling to buy the country’s bonds, or at least not unless offered a very high interest rate. And the fact that the country must roll its debt over at high interest rates worsens its fiscal prospects, making default more likely, so that the crisis of confidence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. And as it does, it becomes a banking crisis as well, since a country’s banks are normally heavily invested in government debt.

Now, a country with its own currency, like Britain, can short-circuit this process: if necessary, the Bank of England can step in to buy government debt with newly created money. This might lead to inflation (although even that is doubtful when the economy is depressed), but inflation poses a much smaller threat to investors than outright default. Spain and Italy, however, have adopted the euro and no longer have their own currencies. As a result, the threat of a self-fulfilling crisis is very real — and interest rates on Spanish and Italian debt are more than twice the rate on British debt.

Commentary:

The European Central Bank (ECB) is engaging in a new form of monetary policy in which it buys government bonds directly from the Spanish and Italian governments. Essentially, the goal is to bring down the interest rates on Italian and Spanish government bonds, which should reassure private investors that Italy and Spain will be able to pay them back and thus reduce the upward pressure on interest rates in the Eurozone, a situation which threatens to reverse the already sluggish recovery from the recessions of 2008 and 2009.

Monetary policy refers to a central bank’s manipulation of the money supply and interest rates, aimed at either increasing interest rates (contractionary monetary policy) or reducing interest rates (expansionary monetary policy). The ECB is currently buying government bonds from European governments, effectively increasing the supply of money in Europe with the hope that more government and private sector spending will move the Eurozone economy closer to its full employment level of output, at which workers, land and capital resources are fully employed towards the production of goods and services.

If successful, the ECB’s “quantitative easing”, as the new type of monetary policy is known, should bring down interest rates on government bonds and thereby reallocate loanable funds towards Italy and Spain’s public and private sectors.  The increase in supply of loanable funds should bring down the private interest rates available to borrows (businesses and households), making private investment more attractive.

The ECB’s bond purchases make it cheaper for Italy and Spain to borrow, lowering the interest rates on their bonds, restoring confidence among international investors, who may be more willing to save their money in Italy in Spain. The inflow of loanable funds into these economies (seen as an increase in the supply of loanable funds from S1 to S2) should bring down private borrowing costs (the real interest rate), encouraging more firms to invest in capital and more households to finance the consumption of durable goods, increasing aggregate demand and moving the Eurozone economy back towards its full employment level of output, from AD1 to AD2 in the graph on the right.

In certain circumstances, monetary easing like this could be inflationary, but in reality inflation is unlikely to occur given the large output gap in Europe at present (represented above as the distance between Y1 and the dotted line, signifying the full employment level of output). Any increase in aggregate demand will lead to economic growth (an increase in output), but little or no inflation due to the excess capacity of unemployed labor, land and capital resources in the European economy today.

With private sector borrowing costs increasing due to growing uncertainty over their deficits and debts, the Italian and Spanish governments will find expansionary fiscal policies (tax cuts and increased government expenditures) are unrealistic options for achieving the goal of full employment. The ECB, however, as Krugman argues, should continue to play an increasing role in the expansion of credit to cash strapped European governments, with the aim of keeping interest rates low to prevent the crowding-out of private spending that often occurs in the face of large budget deficits. Inflation, always a concern for central bankers, should be a low priority in Europe’s current recessionary environment. Only when consumer and investor confidence is restored, a condition that requires low borrowing costs, will private sector spending resume and the Euro economies can begin creating jobs and increasing their output again.

In the short-term, Italy and Spain should take advantage of the ECB’s bond-buying initiative, and make meaningful, productivity-enhancing investments in infrastructure, education and job training. If their economies are to grow in the future, Eurozone countries must become more competitive with the rapidly expanding economies of Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in the developing world.

In the medium-term, the Eurozone countries must demonstrate a commitment to fiscal restraint and more balanced budgets. Eliminating loopholes that allow businesses and wealthy individuals to avoid paying taxes, for example, is of utmost importance. Also, increasing the retirement age, downsizing some of the more generous social welfare programs and increasing marginal tax rates on the highest income earners would all send the message to investors that these countries are commited to fiscal discipline. Then, in time, their dependence on ECB lending will decline and private lenders will once again be willing to buy Eurozone government bonds at lower interest rates, allowing for continued growth in the private sector.

Related posts:

1. The almighty bond market: Niall Ferguson’s concerns about the US deficit explained
2. A closer look at the crowding-out effect
3. Economics in plain English: Understanding Argentina’s budget woes

Harvard Economist Niall Ferguson appeared on CNN’s GPS with Fareed Zakaria over the weekend. Ferguson has stood out among mainstream economists lately in his opposition to the US fiscal stimulus package, an $880 billion experiment in expansionary Keynesian policy. While economists like Paul Krugman argue that Obama’s plan is not big enough to fill America’s “recessionary gap”, Ferguson warns that the long-run effects of current and future US budget deficits could lead the US towards economic collapse. This blog post will attempt to explain Ferguson’s views in a way that high school economics students can understand.

Government spending in the US is projected to exceed tax revenues by $1.9 trillion this year, and trillions more over the next four years. An excess of spending beyond tax revenue is known as a budget deficit, and must be paid for by government borrowing. Where does the government get the funds to finance its deficits? The bond market. The core of Ferguson’s concerns about the future stability of the United States economy is the situation in the market for US government bonds. According to Ferguson:

One consequence of this crisis has been an enormous explosion in government borrowing, and the US federal deficit… is going to be equivelant to 1.9 trillion dollars this year alone, which is equivelant to nearly 13% of GDP… this is an excessively large deficit, it can’t all be attributed to stimulus, and there’s a problem. The problem is that the bond market… is staring at an incoming tidal wave of new issuance… so the price of 10-year treasuries, the standard benchmark government bond… has taken quite a tumble in the past year, so long-term interest rates, as a result, have gone up by quite a lot. That poses a problem, since part of the project in the mind of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke is to keep interest rates down“

There’s a lot of information in Ferguson’s statements above. To better understand him, some graphs could come in handy. Below is a graphical representation of the US bond market, which is where the US government supplies bonds, which are purchased by the public, commercial banks, and foreigners. Keep in mind, the demanders of US bonds are the lenders to the US government, which is the borrower. The price of a bond represents the amount the government receives from its lenders from the issuance of a new bond certificate. The yield on a bond represents the interest the lender receives from the government. The lower the price of a bond, the higher the yield, the more attractive bonds are to investors. Additionally, the lower the price of bonds, the greater the yield, thus the greater the amount of interest the US government must pay to attract new lenders.

Ferguson says that the price of US bonds has “taken a tumble”. The increase of supply has lowered bond prices, increasing their attractiveness to investors who earn higher interest on the now cheaper bonds. Below we can see the impact of an increase in the quantity demanded for government bonds on the market for private investment.

Financial crowding-out can occur as a result of deficit financed government spending as the nation’s financial resources are diverted out of the private sector and into the public sector. Granted, during a recession the demand for loanable funds from firms for private investment may be so low that there is no crowding out, as explained by Paul Krugman here.

But crowding out is not Ferguson’s only concern. The increase in interest rates caused by the US government’s issuance of new bonds could lead to a decrease in private investment in the US economy, inhibiting the nation’s long-run growth potential. But the bigger concern is one of America’s long-run economic stability. If the Obama administration does not put forth a viable plan for balancing its budget very soon, the demand for US government bonds could fall, which would further excacerbate the crowding-out effect, and eliminate the country’s ability to finance its government activities. In other words, such a loss of faith could plunge the United States into bankruptcy.

Fareed Zakaria asks Ferguson:

“Is it fair to say that this bad news, the fact that we can’t sell our debt as cheaply as we thought, overshadows all the good news that seems to be coming?”

Ferguson’s reply:

The green shoots that are out there (referring to the phrase economists and politicians have been using to describe the signs of recovery in the US economy) seem like tiny little weeds in the garden, and what’s coming in terms of the fiscal crisis in the United States is a far bigger and far worse story.

Finally Fareed asks the question everyone wants to know:”What the hell do we do?”

Ferguson:

One thing that can be done very quickly is for the president to give a speech to the American people and to the world explaining how the administration proposes to achieve stabilization of American public finance… the administration doesn’t have that long a honeymoon period, it has very little time in which it can introduce the American public to some harsh realities, particularly about entitlements and how much they are going to cost. If a signal could be sent really soon to the effect that the administration is serious about fiscal stabilization and isn’t planning on borrowing another $10 trillion between now and the end of the decade, then just conceivably markets could be reassured.

Ferguson is saying that only if the Obama administration begins taking serious steps towards balancing the US government’s budget can it hope to stave off an eventual loss of faith among America’s creditors (and thus a fall in demand for US bonds). It will be a while before tax revenues are high enough to finance the US budget. But if the country does not begin working towards such an end immediately, it may find itself unable to raise the funds to pay for such public goods as infrastructure, education, health care, national defense, medical research, as well as the wages of the millions of government employees. In other words, the US government could be bankrupt, and its downfall could mean the end of American economic power.

The power of the bond market should not be underestimated. America’s very future depends on continued faith in its financial stability and fiscal responsibility.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why do you think the US government has such a huge budget deficit this year? ($1.9 trillion) Previously, the largest budget deficit on record was only around $400 billion.
2. How does the issuance of new bonds by the US government lead to less money being available to private households and firms?
3. Do you think investors will ever totally lose faith in US government bonds? Why or why not?
4. In what way is the government’s huge budget deficit a “tax on teenagers”? In other words, how will today’s teenagers end up suffering because of the federal budget deficit?

To learn more about the power of the bond market, watch Niall Ferguson’s documentary, The Ascent of Money. The section on the bond market can be viewed here:

Related posts:

1. A must read for AP Macro teachers: Paul Krugman explains why deficit spending during a recession does NOT cause crowding-out
2. Sample IB Economics Internal Assessment Commentary – Understanding the ECB’s bond-purchasing program
3. “The Ascent of Money” – Economic historian Niall Ferguson on the Colbert Report

Liquidity preference, loanable funds, and Niall Ferguson (wonkish) – Paul Krugman Blog – NYTimes.com

Below is the loanable funds market at its current equilibrium, according to Krugman (I is investment demand for funds, S is the supply of loanable funds):

In Krugman’s words:

In effect, we have an incipient excess supply of savings even at a zero interest rate. And that’s our problem.

So what does government borrowing do? It gives some of those excess savings a place to go — and in the process expands overall demand, and hence GDP. It does NOT crowd out private spending, at least not until the excess supply of savings has been sopped up, which is the same thing as saying not until the economy has escaped from the liquidity trap.

In AP Macroeconomics, we teach that deficit-financed government expenditure decreases the supply of loanable funds as savers take their money out of commercial banks and invest in the bond market due to the attractive interest rates on government debt. Less funds available for the private sector drives up interest rates and crowds out private investment.

If the economy is producing close to the full-employment level and interest rates are positive, the decrease in supply of loanable funds can indeed drive up equilibrium interest rates and lead to the “crowding-out” of private investment. Krugman points out in this article that when the economy is at the “zero-bound” (i.e. when nominal interest rates are as low as they can go) and the quantity supplied of savings is still greater than the quantity demanded for investment, the government can effectively borrow from the public, decreasing the supply and correcting the surplus of savings without driving up interest rates in the private market. Put another way, the equilibrium interest rate is below zero, but the “zero-bound” acts as a price floor in the loanable funds market, resulting in a surplus of savings.

Government borrowing crowding out private investment is not something we can worry about during a recession, when low confidence and expectations have driven the supply of savings up and the demand for investment down. Public spending will divert funds from the private sector to the public sector, that’s true. But in today’s case, savings are sitting idle in the private sector, so government borrowing is putting those fund to use when the private sector has failed to do so.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why does the supply of loanable funds (S in the graph above) slope upwards? Why does the demand for loanable funds (I in the graph) slope downwards?
2. Deficit financed government spending decreases the supply of loanable funds. Why?
3. Crowding-out is not the only possible down-side of deficit spending by the government. What are some other long-term effects of governments running budget deficits year after year?

Related posts:

1. A closer look at the crowding-out effect
2. How big is the government spending multiplier in America? Well, it depends on which economist you ask…
3. The almighty bond market: Niall Ferguson’s concerns about the US deficit explained

CBO Director’s Blog » Macroeconomic Effects of the Senate Stimulus Legislation

The February 9th edition of the excellent NPR show, Planet Money reported on a letter sent from the director of the Congressional Budget Office to the Senate, forecasting the short-run and long-run macroeconomic effects of the House Stimulus Package.

It turns out the director of the CBO has his own blog on which he published his letter to the Senate. Here are some highlights:

CBO estimates that the Senate legislation would raise output by between 1.4 percent and 4.1 percent by the fourth quarter of 2009; by between 1.2 percent and 3.6 percent by the fourth quarter of 2010; and by between 0.4 percent and 1.2 percent by the fourth quarter of 2011. CBO estimates that the legislation would raise employment by 0.9 million to 2.5 million at the end of 2009; 1.3 million to 3.9 million at the end of 2010; and 0.6 million to 1.9 million at the end of 2011…

Most of the budgetary effects of the Senate legislation would occur over the next few years. Even if the fiscal stimulus persisted, however, the short-run effects on output that operate by increasing demand for goods and services would eventually fade away. In the long run, the economy produces close to its potential output on average, and that potential level is determined by the stock of productive capital, the supply of labor, and productivity. Short-run stimulative policies can affect long-run output by influencing those three factors, although such effects would generally be smaller than the short-run impact of those policies on demand.

In contrast to its positive near-term macroeconomic effects, the Senate legislation would reduce output slightly in the long run, CBO estimates, as would other similar proposals. The principal channel for this effect is that the legislation would result in an increase in government debt.  To the extent that people hold their wealth in the form of government bonds rather than in a form that can be used to finance private investment, the increased government debt would tend to “crowd out” private investment—thus reducing the stock of private capital and the long-term potential output of the economy.

The negative effect of crowding out could be offset somewhat by a positive long-term effect on the economy of some provisions—such as funding for infrastructure spending, education programs, and investment incentives, which might increase economic output in the long run. CBO estimated that such provisions account for roughly one-quarter of the legislation’s budgetary cost. Including the effects of both crowding out of private investment (which would reduce output in the long run) and possibly productive government investment (which could increase output), CBO estimates that by 2019 the Senate legislation would reduce GDP by 0.1 percent to 0.3 percent on net.

The fascinating thing about this letter from the Congressional Budget Office to the Senate is that it mentions so many of the Macroeconomic principles we teach in both AP and IB Economics.

• The nation’s potential output (PPC) is “determined by the stock of productive capital, the supply of labor, and productivity”.
  
• Fiscal stimulus’ effects, while possibly significant in the short-run, may result in less long-run growth due to “crowding-out” of private investment as the public puts its savings into government debt and takes it out of the market for loanable funds.
• A stimulus package should be made up of “funding for infrastructure spending, education programs, and investment incentives, which might increase economic output in the long run.” The negative effects of crowding-out could be offset through responsible government spending.

I find this letter to be surprisingly positive. The short-run forecast seems optimistic: as much as 3.6% GDP growth and as many as 3.9 million new jobs by the end of 2010. The negative growth effects of the stimulus resulting from increased government debt and the subsequent “crowding-out” of private investment are not predicted to set in until 2019.

I always tell my students that humans are “short-run creatures living in a long-run world”. I have to admit, this short-run creature is inclined to think that a stimulus package that puts nearly 4 million people to work and turns the US Economy back onto a path towards growth within two years is probably worth the long-run risk of sluggish growth ten years down the road due to the decline in private investment resulting from the debt-financed spending today.

This letter from the CBO also seems to address a debate recently undertaken in the AP Economics teacher email list: whether deficit-financed government spending affects the supply of or the demand for loanable funds in the economy.

To the extent that people hold their wealth in the form of government bonds rather than in a form that can be used to finance private investment, the increased government debt would tend to “crowd out” private investment—thus reducing the stock of private capital and the long-term potential output of the economy.

This passage from the director’s letter indicates that it is the supply, not the demand for loanable funds that shifts, driving up real interest rates in the economy. Savers will take their money out of banks and other lending institutions and put it in government bonds, reducing the amount of capital available for private investment. This can be illustrated as a leftward shift of the supply of loanable funds.

Discussion questions:

1. In evaluating the use of expansionary fiscal policy, we learn in IB Economics that the crowding-out of private investment will reduce the expansionary effect of increased government spending. Is crowding-out a problem during a recession? Why or why not?
2. Discuss the following statement: “In order to finance its budget deficit, the US government must borrow from the private sector.” How does the government borrow from the American people?
3. Will fiscal stimulus in the short-run lead to increased growth or decreased growth in the long-run? Discuss.

Related posts:

1. From the Help Desk: Long-run vs. short-run economic growth, consupmtion and investment…
2. Fiscal Stimulus package passes in Congress – here comes $170 billion, America!
3. Walking the fine line between good growth and bad growth in China

Update: Once again I have updated this post with a few minor changes. Notably, I have added to graphs illustrating a separate shift in supply and demand for loanable funds. Based on discussions with readers via email, it appears that my previous graph illustrating in one diagram the shifts of both supply and demand was confusing and could be considered double counting the effect of an increase in deficit spending. Thanks again to Professor Chuck Orvis for his valuable input.

*Click on a graph to see the full-sized version

Two markets for money, right? Yes… so do they show the same thing? NO! You must know the distinction between these two markets. First let’s talk about the Money Market diagram.

This market refers to the Money Supply (M1 and M2). The Money Supply curve is vertical because it is determined by the Fed’s (or central bank’s) particular monetary policy. On the X axis is the Quantity of money supplied and demanded, and on the Y axis is the nominal interest rate. A tight monetary policy (selling of bonds by the Fed) will shift Money Supply in, raising the federal funds rate, and subsequently the interest rates commercial banks charge their best customers (prime interest rate). On the other hand, an easy money policy (buying of bonds by the Fed) shifts Sm out, lowering the Federal Funds rate and thus the prime interest rate.

You should also know why a tight money policy is considered contractionary and why an easy money policy is considered expansionary monetary policy. Higher nominal interest rates resulting from tight money policy will discourage investment and consumption, contracting aggregate demand. On the other hand, an easy money policy will encourage more investment and consumption as nominal rates fall, expanding aggregate demand.

Government deficit spending and the money market: Does an increase in government spending without a corresponding increase in taxes affect the money market? You may be inclined to say yes, since the Treasury must issue new bonds to finance deficit spending. After all, when the Fed sells bonds, money is taken out of circulation and held by the Fed, thus it’s no longer part of the money supply.

When the Treasury issues and sells new bonds, however, the money the public uses to buy the bonds is put back into circulation as the government spending is increased. Therefore, any leftward shift of the money supply curve caused by the buying of bonds by the public is offset by the injection of cash in the economy initiated the government’s fiscal stimulus package takes effect (be it a tax rebate or an increase in spending). Therefore, money supply should remain stable when the government deficit spends.

Now to the loanable funds market. Loanable funds represents the money in commercial banks and lending institutions that is available to lend out to firms and households to finance expenditures (investment or consumption). The Y-axis represents the real interest rate; the loanable funds market therefore recognizes the relationships between real returns on savings and real price of borrowing with the public’s willingness to save and borrow.

Since an increase in the real interest rate makes households and firms want to place more money in the bank (and more money in the bank means more money to loan out), there is a direct relationship between real interest rate and Supply of Loanable Funds. On the other hand, since at lower real interest rates households and firms will be less inclined to save and more inclined to borrow and spend, the Demand for loanable funds reflects an inverse relationship. At higher interest rates, households prefer to delay their spending and put their money in savings, since the opportunity cost of spending now rises with the real interest rate.

Government deficit spending and the loanable funds market: We learned above that only the Fed can shift the money supply curve, but what factors can affect the Supply and Demand curves for loanable funds? Here’s a few key points to know about the loanable funds market.

• When the government deficit spends (G>tax revenue), it must borrow from the public by issuing bonds.
• The Treasury issues new bonds, which shifts the supply of bonds out, lowering their prices and raising the interest rates on bonds.
• In response to higher interest rates on bonds, investors will transfer their money out of banks and other lending institutions and into the bond market. Banks will also lend out fewer of their excess reserves, and put some of those reserves into the bond market as well, where it is secure and now earns relatively higher interest.
• As households, firms and banks buy the newly issued Treasury securities (which represents the public’s lending to the government), the supply of private funds available for lending to households and firms shifts in. With fewer funds for private lending banks must raise their interest rates, leading to a movement along the demand curve for loanable funds.
• This causes crowding out of private investment.

Another, simpler way to understand the effect of government deficit spending on real interest rates is to look at it from the demand side.

• Deficit spending by the government requires the government to borrow from the public, increasing the demand for loanable funds. In essence, the government becomes a borrower in the country’s financial sector, demanding new funds for investment, driving up real interest rates.
• Increased demand from the government pushes interest rates up, causing banks to supply a greater quanity of funds for lending. The private, however, now has fewer funds available to borrow as the government soaks up some of the funds that previously would have gone to private borrowers.
• This leads to the crowding out of private investment, in which private borrowers face higher real interest rates due to increased deficit spending by the government.

What could shift the supply of loanable funds to the right? Easy, anything that increases savings by households and firms, known as the determinants of consumption and saving. These include increases in wealth, expectations of future income and price levels, and lower taxes. If savings increases, supply of loanable funds shifts outward, increasing the reserves in banks, lowering real interest rates, encouraging firms to undertake new investments. This is why many economists say that “savings is investment”. What they mean is increased increased savings leads to an increase in the supply of loanable funds, which leads to lower interest rates and increased investment.

On the other hand, an increase in demand for investment funds by firms will shift demand for loanable funds out, driving up real interest rates. The determinants of investment include business taxes, technological change, expectations of future business opportunities, and so on (follow link to our wiki page on Investment).

It is important to be able to distinguish between the money market and the market for loanable funds, as both the AP and IB syllabi xpect students to understand and explain the difference between these concepts.

Related posts:

1. From the Help Desk – more on loanable funds and the money market
2. 2007 AP FRQ #2 – Tax credits and the loanable funds market
3. A common error – confusing the money market and market for foreign exchange

Carmen submitted the following through the “Econ Help Desk“

Please help me with a student question. If the FED pursues expansionary monetary policy, lowering the nominal interest rate in hopes of spurring investment and increasing aggregate demand, how does this connect to the loanable funds market? If nominal interest rates are down, won’t real ones go down too, causing people to save less? In this case, where will the supply of loanable funds to meet investment demand come from?

Below is my reply to Carmen:

Good question… here’s my understanding, so take it as you will…

To expand the money supply the Fed will buy bonds on the open market. This increases demand for bonds, raises their prices, lowering the effective interest rate on bonds, making these securities less attractive to investors, who will sell them back to the Fed in exchange for liquid money that is now part of the money supply.

Investors will put some of their new money into banks, where interest rates are now relatively more attractive than the declining rates on government bonds. Some of the new money created by the Fed’s purchase of bonds therefore ends up in the loanable funds market, shifting the supply of loanable funds out, lowering real interest rates, increasing the quantity demanded of funds for investment and consumption, hence the expansionary impact on Aggregate Demand.

If any readers has another take on the transition from expansionary monetary policy to a decline in the real interest rate in the LF market, please leave your ideas in a comment below.

~Jason Welker

Related posts:

1. Loanable Funds vs. Money Market: what’s the difference?
2. From the Help Desk – crowding out, money market and new money creation
3. 2007 AP FRQ #2 – Tax credits and the loanable funds market

Molly Saso, AP Econ teacher at the International School of the Sacred Heart in Tokyo, asked in an email to the AP Econ email list about Free Response Question #2 from the International exam (form B). The question reads:

2. (a) Assume that businesses are granted a tax credit on spending for machinery. Using a correctly labeled graph of the loanable funds market, show the effect of the business sector’s response on the real interest rate.

Here’s Molly’s email:

“The loanable funds market, in spite of its apparent simplicity, continues to throw up some ambiguities–or perhaps it’s just me who is perplexed.

What would be the impact on the market of a tax credit for spending on machinery? (Q2 on Form B, 2007–all the FRQs are already on AP Central.)

While the intent is indeed to increase planned investment, would firms increase or decrease their demand for loanable funds? To the extent that the tax credit means that there is a greater amount of post-tax profits available for investment, then the demand for loanable funds could decrease; but wouldn’t many firms need to supplement their post-tax profits with a greater demand for loanable funds?

Perhaps, if the impact on demand is indeterminate, the shift would be in supply, since firms would have a greater store of “savings” (retained profits). However, since a shift in supply was the answer to the second part of Q2, I somehow doubt that the examininer would be expecting a supply shift in part (a) as well.

The trouble is that the question asked for no explanation–only a graph to “show the effect”. I wonder what kind of shift was expected?

In perplexity,
Molly”

Molly’s question is a good one, and although I hadn’t spent much time reflecting on this question, her email got me thinking more about this interesting and challenging question. Here’s what I came up with and replied to Molly with. I don’t know if it’s correct or not, but I’d be interested to hear what others thought about this question:

Hi Molly,I’m in Shanghai, so my students also took form B (the international questions). I too found this to be a bit confusing. But as I teach my students, “don’t make the questions more complicated than they have to be, look for the most obvious answer.” Unfortunately, this one had no immediately obvious answer, as you explain below. I think what made it difficult was the term “tax credit on spending for machinery”. I don’t know about you, but this specific term never came up in my class!

Here’s how the question begins: “Assume that businesses are granted a tax credit on spending for machinery”. I interpret this tax credit as an amount deducted from federal income tax, calculated as a fixed percentage of expenditures on, in this case, machinery. In other words, the tax credit is not granted unless the firm undertake investments in new machinery. Your suggestion that the tax credit results in a “greater amount of post-tax profits available for investment” may be mistaking the credit indicated with a reduction in corporate profit taxes. I think if this were a corporate profit tax question then perhaps demand for loanable funds would go down since new investment could come from the now higher profit margins firms receive; in fact, the tax credit is not granted until new investment is undertaken by the firms in the first place.

I would explain this to my students by saying that essentially, the expected rate of return on investments goes up (since fewer taxes will be paid once new machinery is bought), shifting the Investment Demand curve out, thus the Demand for loanable funds, increasing the real interest rate.

That said, I cannot be certain that this is what the AP was looking for, so don’t hold me to it! Writing this email allowed me to really clear this one up, though, so thanks for the inquiry!

Jason

Anyone else have a better answer or something to add?

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Related posts:

1. From the Help Desk – more on loanable funds and the money market
2. Loanable Funds vs. Money Market: what’s the difference?
3. A must read for AP Macro teachers: Paul Krugman explains why deficit spending during a recession does NOT cause crowding-out