The most important graph used in Macroeconomics today is almost certainly the Aggregate Demand / Aggregate Supply (AD/AS) model. This graph can be used to illustrate most macroeconomic indicators, including those objectives that policymakers are most interested in achieving:

• Price level stability
• Full employment, and
• Economic growth

source: http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/

 

As yet another school year begins, we once again find ourselves returning to an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, sluggish growth, and heated debate over how to return the economies of the United States and Europe back onto a growth trajectory. In the last couple of weeks alone the US government has barely avoided a default on its national debt, ratings agencies have downgraded US government bonds, global stock markets have tumbled, confidence in the Eurozone has been pummeled over fears of larger than expected deficits in Italy and Greece, and the US dollar has reached historic lows against currencies such as the Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen.

What are we to make of all this turmoil? I will not pretend I can offer a clear explanation to all this chaos, but I can offer here a little summary of the big debate over one of the issues above: the debate over the US national debt and what the US should be doing right now to assure future economic and financial stability.

There are basically two sides to this debate, one we will refer to as the “demand-side” and one we will call the “supply-side”. On the demand-side you have economists like Paul Krugman, and in Washington the left wing of the Democratic party, who believe that America’s biggest problem is a lack of aggregate demand.

Supply-siders, on the other hand, are worried more about the US national debt, which currently stands around 98% of US GDP, and the budget deficit, which this year is around $1.5 trillion, or 10% of GDP. Every dollar spent by the US government beyond what it collects in taxes, argue the supply-siders, must be borrowed, and the cost of borrowing is the interest the government (i.e. taxpayers) have to pay to those buying government bonds. The larger the deficit, the larger the debt burden and the more that must be paid in interest on this debt. Furthermore, increased debt leads to greater uncertainty about the future and the expectation that taxes will have to be raised sometime down the road, thus creating an environment in which firms and households will postpone spending, prolonging the period of economic slump.

The demand-siders, however, believe that debt is only a problem if it grows more rapidly than national income, and in the US right now income growth is almost zero, meaning that the growing debt will pose a greater threat over time due to the slow growth in income. Think of it this way, if I owe you $98 and I only earn $100, then that $98 is a BIG DEAL. But if my income increases to $110 and my debt grows to $100, that is not as big a deal. Yes, I owe you more money, but I am also earning more money, so the debt burden has actually decreased.

In order to get US income to grow, say the demand-siders, continued fiscal and monetary stimulus are needed. With the debt deal struck two weeks ago, however, the US government has vowed to slash future spending by $2.4 trillion, effectively doing the opposite of what the demand-siders would like to see happen, pursuing fiscal contraction rather than expansion. As government spending grows less in the future than it otherwise would have, employment will fall and incomes will grow more slowly, or worse, the US will enter a second recession, meaning even lower incomes in the future, causing a the debt burden to grow.

Now let’s consider the supply-side argument. The supply-siders argue that America’s biggest problem is not the lack of demand, rather it is the debt itself. Every borrowed dollar spent by the goverment, say the supply-siders, is a dollar taken out of the private sector’s pocket. As government spending continues to grow faster than tax receipts, the government must borrow more and more from the private sector, and in order to attract lenders, interest on government bonds must be raised. Higher interest paid on government debt leads to a flow of funds into the public sector and away from the private sector, causing borrowing costs to rise for everyone else. In IB and AP Economics, this phenomenon is known as  the crowding-out effect: Public sector borrowing crowds out private sector investment, slowing growth and leading to less overall demand in the economy.

Additionally, argue the supply-siders, the increase in debt required for further stimulus will only lead to the expectation among households and firms of future increases in tax rates, which will be necessary to pay down the higher level of debt sometime in the future. The expectation of future tax hikes will be enough to discourage current consumption and investment, so despite the increase in government spending now, the fall in private sector confidence will mean less investment and consumption, so aggregate demand may not even grow if we do borrow and spend today!

This debate is not a new one. The demand-side / supply-side battle has raged for nearly a century, going back to the Great Depression when the prevailing economic view was that the cause of the global economic crisis was unbalanced budgets and too much foreign competition. In the early 30′s governments around the world cut spending, raised taxes and erected new barriers to trade in order to try and fix their economic woes. The result was a deepening of the depression and a lost decade of economic activity, culminating in a World War that led to a massive increase in demand and a return to full employment. Let’s hope that this time around the same won’t be necessary to end our global economic woes.

Recently, CNN’s Fareed Zakaria had two of the leading voices in this economic debate on his show to share their views on what is needed to bring the US and the world out of its economic slump. Princeton’s Paul Krugman, a proud Keynesian, spoke for the demand-side, while Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff represented the supply-side. Watch the interview below (up to 24:40), read my notes summarizing the two side’s arguments, and answer the questions that follow.

Summary of Krugman’s argument:

• Despite the downgrade by Standard & Poor’s (a ratings agency) there appears to be strong demand for US government bonds right now, meaning really low borrowing costs (interest rates) for the US government.
• This means investors are not afraid of what S&P is telling them to be afraid of, and are more than happy to lend money to the US government at low interest rates.
• Investors are fleeing from equities (stocks in companies), and buying US bonds because US debt is the safest asset out there. The market is saying that the downgrade may lead to more contractionary policies, hurting the real economy. Investors are afraid of contractionary fiscal policy, so are sending a message to Washington that it should spend more now.
• The really scary thing is the prospect of another Great Depression.
• Can fiscal stimulus succeed in an environment of large amounts of debt held by the private sector? YES, says Krugman, the government can sustain spending to maintain employment and output, which leads to income growth and makes it easier for the private sector to pay down their debt.
• With 9% unemployment and historically high levels of long-term unemployment, we should be addressing the employment problem first. We should throw everything we can at increasing employment and incomes.
• Is there some upper limit to the national debt? Krugman says the deficit and debt are high, but we must consider costs versus benefits: The US can borrow money and repay in constant dollars (inflation adjusted) less than it borrowed. There must be projects the federal government could undertake with at least a constant rate of return that could get workers employed. If the world wants to buy US bonds, let’s borrow now and invest for the future!
• If we discovered that space aliens were about to attack and we needed a massive military buildup to protect ourselves from invasion, inflation and budget deficits would be a secondary concern to that and the recession would be over in 18 months.
• We have so many hypothetical risks (inflation, bond market panic, crowding out, etc…) that we are afraid to tackle the actual challenge that is happening (unemployment, deflation, etc..) and we are destroying a lot of lives to protect ourselves from these “phantom threats”.
• The thing that’s holding us back right now in the US is private sector debt. Yes we won’t have a self-sustaining recovery until private sector debt comes down, at least relative to incomes. Therefore we need policies that make income grow, which will reduce the burden of private debt.
• The idea that we cannot do anything to grow until private debt comes down on its own is flawed… increase income, decrease debt burden!
• Things that we have no evidence for that are supposed to be dangerous are not a good reason not to pursue income growth policies.
• When it comes down to it, there just isn’t enough spending in the economy!

Summary of Rogoff’s argument:

• The downgrade was well justified, and the reason for the demand for treasuries is that they look good compared to the other options right now.
• There is a panic going on as investors adjust to lower growth expectations, due to lack of leadership in the US and Europe.
• This is not a classical recession, rather a “Great Contraction”: Recessions are periodic, but a financial crisis like this is unusual, this is the 2nd Great Contraction since the Depresssion. It’s not output and employment, but credit and housing which are contracting, due to the “debt overhang”.
• If you look at a contraction, it can take up to 4 or 5 years just to get back where you started.
• This is not a double dip recession, because we never left the first one.
• Rogoff thinks continued fiscal stimulus would worsen the debt overhang because it leads to the expectation of future tax increases, thus causing firms and households increased uncertainty and reduces future growth.
• If we used our credit to help facilitate a plan to bring down the mortgage debt (debt held by the private sector), Rogoff would consider that a better option than spending on employment and output. Fix the debt problem, and spending will resume.
• Rogoff thinks we should not assume that interest rates of US debt will last indefinitely. Infrastructure spending, if well spent, is great, but he is suspicious whether the government is able to target its spending so efficiently to make borrowing the money worthwhile.
• Rogoff thinks if government invests in productive projects, stimulus is a good idea, but “digging ditches” will not fix the economy.
• Until we get the debt levels down, we cannot get back to robust growth.
• It’s because of the government’s debt that the private sector is worried about where the country’s going. If we increase the debt to finance more stimulus, there will be more uncertainty, higher interest rates, possibly inflation, and prolonged stagnation in output and incomes.
• When it comes down to it, there is just too much debt in the economy!

Discussion Question:

1. What is the fundamental difference between the two arguments being debated above? Both agree that the national debt is a problem, but where do the two economists differ on how to deal with the debt?
2. The issues of “digging ditches and filling them in” comes up in the discussion. What is the context of this metaphor? What are the two economists views on the effectiveness of such projects?
3. Following the debate, Fareed Zakaria talks about the reaction in China to S&P’s downgrade of US debt. What does he think about the popular demands in China for the government to pull out of the market for US government bonds?
4. Explain what Zakaria means when he describes the relationship between the US and China as “Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)”.
5. Should the US government pursue a second stimulus and directly try to stimulate employment and income? Or should it continue down the path to austerity, cutting government programs to try and balance its budget?

1. Why does Hayek’s “classical” aggregate supply curve always lead to an equilibrium level of national output equal to the full-employment level of
   

   real GDP?

2. The vertical AS curve above is sometimes referred to as the “flexible-wage and flexible-price” model of the macroeconomy. Why must wages and prices be perfectly flexible for this model to be an accurate representation of a nation’s economy.
3. Hayek was an advocate for free markets, he felt that government intervention in a nation’s economy would only interfere and disrupt the efficient allocation of resources. How does the model above reflect his belief that governments cannot improve a nation’s level of output beyond what the free market is able to achieve?
4. Do you believe that the classical model of aggregate supply is representative of the real world? Why or why not? What evidence is there from recent history that the model is or is not accurate?

Figure 2: The Keynesian AD/AS model

1. Based on the model above, which level of aggregate demand corresponds with the macroeconomic goals of “full-employment and stable
   

   prices”?

2. Changes in which factors could cause aggregate demand to shift from AD2 to AD3? If AD falls to AD3, what happens to the price level in the economy? What happens to the level of output of goods and services? What happens to employment and unemployment?
3. Sometimes the Keynesian AS model is known as the “sticky-wage and sticky-price model”. How does the model reflect the idea that wages are downwardly inflexible, in other words, will not fall even if demand for goods and services fall? For what reasons might wages in an economy be downwardly inflexible (in other words, not fall even as total demand in the economy falls)?
4. How realistic is the Keynsian model of aggregate supply in the real world?
   1. Can you point to any evidence from the last few years that it might be correct (in other words, that a fall in AD will lead to decrease in national output?) Find data on the GDP’s of two Western European countries from 2008 and 2009 to support your findings.
   2. Can you point to any evidence from the last few years that the model might be flawed (in other words, that a fall in AD actually does lead to a fall in the price level)? Find data on inflation in the same two Western European countries to examine whether or not wages and prices are completely inflexible downwards as the model suggests.

1. How does the above model represent a compromise between Keynes’ and Hayek’s view of aggregate supply?
2. Why are there two aggregate supply curves? What is the difference between the two?
3. What happens in the (In macroeconomics): The period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible. A fall in aggregate demand will lead to unemployment and recession in the short-run. Due to the inability of the nation's producers to reduce wages paid to worker, they must lay workers off to reduce costs as demand falls.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">SHORT-RUN when AD falls from AD2 to AD3 to the price level and output? What will happen in the long-run? In macroeconomics, the short-run is known as the “fixed-wage period” and the long-run the “flexible-wage period”. The main factor that can shift the SRAS curve is the level of wages in the economy (in other words, a change in wages will shift the SRAS). How does this help explain the adjustment from the short-run equilibrium and the long-run equilibrium following a fall in AD?
4. What happens in the SHORT-RUN when AD increases from AD2 to AD1? What will happen in the long-run? How does the long-run flexibility of wages explain why output always seems to return to its full employment level of output in the long-run?
5. What does the model above indicate about the possible need for government intervention to help an economy achieve its macroeconomic goals of full-employment and price level stability in the short-run?

In the seemingly endless and currently ongoing debate over the role of the government in the macroeconomy, there are two main camps: Those who think the governments of the developed economies have not done enough to get their economies out of recession, and those who think they have already done too much, and therefore need to start rolling back stimulus and reducing deficits.

At the heart of this debate are the two macroeconomic schools of thought, the  Keynesian demand-side theories and the classical, supply-side theories. Two intellectuals have emerged in the last several years representing the two sides of the macroeconomic debate. On the demand-side, representing the Keynesian school of thought, is 2008 Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman. Representing the classical, supply-side school of thought is Harvard economic historian Niall Ferguson. These two have squared off in many forums over the last three years, Krugman arguing for more and continued fiscal stimulus to prop up and increase demand in the economy, Ferguson arguing for smaller deficits, lower taxes and less government spending to increase private sector confidence and thereby supply in the economy.

During our long summer break the two squared off once again in the aftermath of a G20 meeting in which the governments of several major economies from Europe and North America announced plans to begin rolling back the stimulus spending they embarked on throughout 2008 and 2009. The reason for increased “austerity measures” (policies that reduce the budget deficit and slow the growth of national debt), argue global leaders, is to reduce the chances of more countries experiencing debt crises like that experienced in Greece this spring.

International investors realized earlier this year that Greece’s budget deficits were a much larger percentage of its GDP than previously thought, and very quickly decided that Greek government bonds were an unsafe investment. Almost overnight the cost of borrowing in Greece shot up above 20%, bringing investment in the economy to a halt and forcing the government to cut its budget, leading to higher unemployment and reduced social benefits for the people of Greece.  If investors were to look at the growing budget deficits in other developed countries and  then suddenly lose faith in other government’s ability to pay back their debts, then a similar crisis could occur in much larger economies, including the UK, Germany and the United States. Hence these country’s apparent desire to begin reducing deficits and rolling back stimulus spending; measures that may just plunge these economies into an even deeper recession than that which they have experienced over the last two years.

The videos below show the leading intellectuals on both sides of the stimulus/austerity debate presenting their arguments. Below each video are discussion questions to help guide your understanding of their views. Watch the videos and respond to the discussion questions in the comment section below.

Video 1 - Krugman argues for continued stimulus:

Discussion Questions:

1. What are the two “profoundly different views of economics” that are being tested as governments begin rolling back the fiscal stimulus packages of the last two years?
2. What are three characteristics of an economy in a “depression” according to Krugman?
3. What is “budget austerity” and why does Krugman think this should not be the first priority of policymakers in the G20 nations?
4. Why is deflation dangerous according to Krugman?
5. What is the additional annual cost to the US government of borrowing and spending an additional trillion dollars now? What is the potential additional benefit of more stimulus?

Video 2 - Ferguson argues for austerity and “fiscal regime change”:

Discussion Questions:

1. Why might the US have to pass spending cuts and tax increases to maintain its “credibility in international bond markets”?
2. Why would fiscal tightening “choke off the recovery”?
3. How is the financial crisis in Europe a warning to the US?
4. How could the “costs” exceed the “benefits” of deficit financed expansionary fiscal policy.
5. Ferguson proposes a new type of policy that “boosts confidence”. Why will expansionary fiscal and monetary policies fail if private sector confidence remains depressed?

Dear year 2 IB Economics students,

Welcome back and I hope you enjoyed your time off. Before breaking for summer we were in the midst of our unit on Macroeconomics, just beginning our debate on whether or not government intervention in the economy in order to kick start activity during a deep recession was a good or bad idea. In other words, would the economy correct itself or would government stimulus be necessary to get our economy moving again.

As you all know, exactly a year and a half ago, the US government decided that in order to a avoid a recession as potentially devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930’s, government interaction into the economy was necessary. 787 billion dollars was put aside for government sponsored projects, transfer payments and decreases in taxes. The hope was that this spending would not only help people maintain their current jobs but also create jobs for those who had recently become unemployed. A year and a half later, proponents of the stimulus package, Keynsians if you will, believe that this great experiment has been a success and that if nothing had been done the economy would be in much worse shape. Opponents of the spending believe that the bill has simply postponed the self correcting forces in the economy and has instead created what economists call a double dip recession where the increase in government spending only creates a temporary, unsustainable increase in economic activity. In fact many of these opponents say that we are worse off now as the government is now further in debt due to the spending.

Has the great experiment thought up by John Maynard Keynes over half a century ago been a success or was it a solution that has caused more harm than good, potentially making the recession worse than it would have been? The radio show Plant Money recently dedicated a show to addressing this very issue. In order to get a balanced look, they interviewed two prominent economists, Tyler Cowen, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University and Mark Zandi, Chief Economist at Moody’s Analytics. Cowen, a skeptic of Keynesian spending, believes that we would now be better off if the government had not intervened in the economy. Zandi, on the other hand, is adamant that the US economy would be much worse off if the government had done nothing. Two economists analyzing similar data and coming up with very different conclusions. This is where economics becomes both complex and fascinating.

Click play on the podcast player below, listen to the whole podcast, and then answer the following questions.

The Great Stimulus Experiment - NPR Planet Money [ 0:01 ] Play Now | Play in Popup | Download (61)

Discussion Questions:

1. How does an economy “self correct” itself once it has entered a recession?
2. What are the arguments put forth by Tyler Cowen and Mark Zandy about the effectiveness of government stimulus? Is one more convincing than the other? Why?
3. What are automatic stabilizers and why does Tyler Cowen believe they are better solutions than the government creating new jobs?
4. According to Tyler Cowen, why is it dangerous for economists to become “wed to only one theory”?
5. What does this podcast teach you about the importance of being able to evaluate economic theory and its effectiveness? Can we ever have an economic theory that is true under any circumstances? Why or why not?

Singapore is an economy which is operating at a level which is very close to its full potential. The island has no natural resources, very little spare land and a small but educated workforce. The recent global financial crisis, highlighted Singapore’s vulnerability to changes in the global economy. Singapore is very export dependent country with a large positive trade balance.

The latest government budget was announced here last week and the focus has shifted towards improving productivity in the economy to make it more resilient to these external shocks in the future. The shift has been from Demand Side Policies a year ago, at the depths of the recession, to Supply Side policies in the recovery phase.

Singapore has always been considered one of the original Four Asian Tigers. The four tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore) were economies, which shared the free market policies and outward looking, export orientated philosophies. All four countries were newly industrialized, and throughout the period between the 1960’s and 1990’s  they all experienced exceptionally high rates of economic growth. More recently other countries tried to follow this model on a road to development.

A picture of the CBD from near my apartment.

A full description of the budget is here. Most of this is copied below, along with my comments. When you read the article think about the four discussion questions at the end of this post.

S’pore unveils Budget aimed at helping country become advanced economy: By Imelda Saad, Channel NewsAsia | Posted: 22 February 2010 link

SINGAPORE: Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam has unveiled a Budget aimed at helping Singapore become an advanced economy.

A key theme of the Budget: raising the quality of jobs, skills and the workforce so that workers can continue to earn higher incomes, and the economy, grow.

Singapore emerged from the global financial crisis better than expected, with an overall budget deficit of S$2.9 billion for FY 2009 – much lower than the original S$8.7 billion shortfall projected a year ago.  This year, it is expecting a deficit of S$3 billion, as it spends on areas to boost productivity. The government’s key focus is to raise productivity by 2 to 3 per cent a year over the next decade. This will allow Singapore to maintain a healthy rate of economic growth of 3 to 5 per cent a year, even with a slower growth in the labour force.

The government has therefore managed its spending and revenues in the previous 12 months so is now in a position to spend money to boost the future prospects of the economy. This is unlike some other nations such as the United Kingdom which is searching to cut spending to reduce future budget deficits.

The finance minister said the Budget 2010 set out ways to help Singapore succeed with new growth strategies. Hence the plans seemed to focus more on the long-term growth and health of the economy, and not just the short-term position. The government has set aside S$5.5 billion over the next five years to help enterprises and workers raise productivity.

Mr Tharman said: “Raising skills and productivity is the only viable way we can achieve higher wages and is the best way to help citizens with low incomes. If we achieve this goal, we can raise real incomes by one-third in 10 years.”

The Finance Minster is focusing on long-term growth and the health of the economy. This suggests that Singapore is using supply side policies to increase the potential capacity of the economy and shift the Long Run Aggregate Supply curves towards the right. From a Keynesian perspective, supply side policies are effective when the economy is approaching it’s full potential. The policies are considered ineffective when the economy is a recession with depressed aggregate demand. This idea is illustrated below. (note: the same policies can also be illustrated slightly differently, using a neoclassical perspective of LRAS)

The minister signalled that some painful decisions may have to be taken. Less-efficient industries may have to exit Singapore, as the economy continues to restructure. Mr Tharman said the government must rely on the market to achieve this restructuring. Industries and companies will be given help to upgrade through tax benefits and grants to help to innovate and raise productivity, and invest in R&D and automation.

More will be pumped into raising the skills and tapping the potential of every worker. But this will have to be offset by reducing Singapore’s dependence on cheap foreign labour. To encourage companies to rely less on foreign workers, the government is imposing higher levies on foreign workers in phases over the next three years.

The government will pump in S$2.5 billion in over 5 years to enhance Continuing Education and Training.

It will also set up a high-level National Productivity and Continuing Education Council – to be headed by Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean – to develop a comprehensive system for lifelong learning. In addition, there will be help for older and low-wage workers in a new Workfare Training Scheme. The scheme is aimed at incentivising employers to send older workers for training by providing companies with up to 95 per cent funding for absentee payroll and course fee outlays.

For companies, there will be a Productivity and Innovation Credit so they can get tax deductions for investments in R&D and automation. There are also a slew of measures to help grow more globally competitive Singapore companies. These include tax deductions for angel investors, growth capital for SMEs and incentives to expand sectors with high growth potential.

The government also wants to ensure that no one is left out as it pushes for more inclusive growth, by taking care of the lower and middle income. For example, property tax will be tweaked to be more reflective of the annual values of homes.

Mr Tharman said: “Taking all our measures together, we will be spending S$1.4 billion this year in direct transfers for households. While most Singaporeans will receive some benefits, more will go to those with lower and middle incomes.”

In wrapping up the nearly two-hour speech, Mr Tharman said while the government will commit substantial resources to support the national effort of restructuring the economy and improving the quality of jobs, the success of this will depend very much on the ingenuity and drive of Singaporeans and companies here.

Discussion Questions:

1. Explain why in Singapore demand side policies were favoured during the recession, but now Supply Side policies are being introduced.
2. Explain how one of the suggested policies will affect the labour market and therefore the level of aggregate supply in the economy.
3. What does the finance minister mean by the phrase “no one is left out as we push for inclusive growth” and how does the government support inclusive growth?
4. Evaluate the short run and long run effectiveness of supply side policies to increase the level of Real GDP in Singapore.

John Maynard Keynes was an economist whose opinions have shaped government policies throughout the 20^th century. Joseph Sternberg of the Wall Street Journal explained an interesting link this week, between Keynesian policies and the fate of bankrupted Japan Airlines.

Keynesian policies suggest that during a period of depressed economic growth, a chronic lack of the demand is a core problem that couldn’t be solved with supply side policies. Instead he advocated for demand stimulus packages including infrastructure developments.

The Japanese economy has experienced a turbulent past. Throughout the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s the level for GDP grew at impressive rates, but growth began to slow in the 1990’s due to the effects of an asset bubble. An asset bubble was caused by an abundance of cheap credit caused by exceptionally low interest rates. This lead to the prices of shares, houses and land rising very quickly as buyers speculated and outbid each other. The government responded by sharply raising interest rates in 1989, which crushed the bubble and stalled the economy.  Depressed wealth caused spending to stall, and the Japanese thrift and savings culture to return.

In the 1990’s the government attempted to stimulate the economy but this was largely unsuccessful. The result was low real growth (compared to the past), zero percent interest rates set by the Central Bank and a deflationary spiral. Politicians used a variety of policies, including Keynesian ideas to boost aggregate demand.

During the economic boom, the development of the aviation industry was an important pillar of the countries infrastructure development as Joseph Sternberg of the Wall Street Journal explains.

Starting in the 1960s, successive governments concocted aviation plans focused on building new airports. Perhaps this was justifiable back then, when Japan was an Asian tiger economy with a growing population. But in 1964, even before the bulk of the airport construction, the bullet train appeared. At that point, and especially as the shinkasen high-speed-rail network developed, it might have been prudent to ask whether air would invariably be the most efficient way to connect domestic destinations.

Unfortunately, by then the airport boom had taken on a life of its own. During the lost decade of the 1990s, airport construction popped up in many stimulus plans. National and local politicians, not to mention the politically powerful construction lobby, wanted to put an airport in every prefecture. And ordinary airports wouldn’t do. Because Japan’s relatively small flat surface area is in such high demand, one airport after another was built on reclaimed land in the middle of the ocean at enormous expense. Despite periodic public fulminations about out-of-control costs, in practice “expensive” seemed to be viewed as a net positive.

Boosters touted airports as creators of short-term construction jobs and longer-term boons to their areas. This airport binge has continued right up to today. Japan’s 98th airport opened last year: Shizuoka-Mt. Fuji, roughly 50 miles from the famous mountain. California, with a larger land area, has around one-third as many airports in regular commercial service, with another 35 or so “reliever airports” to handle business jets and general aviation.

The author reflects on the cost of the Keynesian stimulus. Whilst in the short term, development of the airport network provided jobs and helped the construction industry; in the long term the projects have created an inefficient and expensive transport network. Japan Airlines has been forced to offer flights from each of these 98 regional airports, often paying high landing charges, and operating flights at below capacity. Overtime this pressure may have caused Japan Airlines to slide into bankruptcy.  Perhaps this is a unique one off case, but the author predicts some interesting links to current developments in China.

Lest anyone think this is a uniquely Japanese problem, consider all the other places in the world currently undergoing their own Keynesian infrastructure booms—and especially China. For instance, a new high-speed rail line is due to connect Beijing to a station an inconvenient 45 minutes from the downtown commercial center of Guangzhou in southern China. The train will take somewhat less than eight hours to connect cities reachable in under three by air. Will enough passengers ever make that trek for the train to operate in the black?

Discussion Questions:

1. Why does John Maynard Keynes suggest that demand stimulus is an appropriate response, for a country stuck in a deep recession, with depressed demand?
2. If central bank interest rates are very close to zero, what other policies could the government use to stimulate growth?
3. How could supply side policies actually make the recession worse in Japan?
4. Outline the advantages and disadvantages of demand-side policies used in Japan.

Econstories.tv – A new resource for Econ teachers and students, from Russ Roberts and John Papola

The long awaited rap video from George Mason University’s Russ Roberts featuring the theories of John Maynard Keynes and F. A. Hayek has been released at last!

We’ve heard some decent Econ raps before (remember “Demand, Supply” by Rhythm, Rhyme, Results?) But this song covers all bases in the predominant macroeconomic schools of thought. Keynes and Hayek are brought back to life and their theories pitted against one another in an all out liquor fueled debate on the streets of New York City.

The video was just released this week. It is packed full of theory from the Classical, supply-side school of macroeconomics (represented by Hayek) and the demand-side school (represented, of course, by Keynes). The video includes cameos from Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, whose role as bartenders filling Keynes glass reflects their role in the real economy at keeping the money supply and government spending at high levels, fueling economic booms and the eventual busts that result.

Stay tuned to this blog for more feedback on the video, including some graphical analysis and discussion questions for Macro teachers to use in class!

Keynes vs. Hayek: Late Economists Hip-Hop Legacy | PBS NewsHour | Dec. 16, 2009 | PBS.

A major theme of both the AP and IB Economics courses is the long-running debate between the Keynesian, demand-side theories of macroeconomic policy and those of the Classical, supply-side school. Today’s “Great Recession” has revived this debate, which itself dates back to the Great Depression of the 1930′s, when an Englishman and an Austrian could be found at the ideological centers of two different philosophies of the role government should play in the macroeconomy.

John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek were close friends whose views on government’s role differed greatly. Hayek was a classical, laissez faire libertarian who believed that any intervention by government in a nation’s economy disrupted the efficient functioning of the free market and threatened to stifle private enterprise. Keynes, the father, of course, of modern Keynesian economics, believed that free markets left unchecked were vulnerable to the volotile animal spirits of investors and speculators whose often irrational behaviors could create externalities such as unemployment and credit crunches, thereby harming society as a whole.

Paul Solman of PBS (who I recently met at an Economics teachers conference in Washington DC) interviews a modern Keynesian, Robert Skidelsky (Keynes’ biographer) and a neo-classical economist, Russ Roberts (who I also recently met in Richmond, VA).

Economics focus: Much ado about multipliers | The Economist

What is the goal of fiscal stimulus during a recession? Is it simply to increase nation’s total income by a certain amount determined by how much a government increases its own spending by? If this were the case, then an $800 billion stimulus package, like the one begun this year in the US, would lead to a total increase in national income of, well, exactly $800 billion.

While such an outcome is possible, it is not the desired outcome of the Obama administration and the economists who have supported the use of expansionary fiscal policy during economic downturns (i.e. the Keynesian school of economists). Keynesians expect that an initial increase in government spending (or a decrease in taxes) will result in households and firms increasing their own consumption and investment, meaning successive increases in spending. The initial change in spending ultimately gets multiplied through further rounds of spending. The total change in national income resulting from an initial change in government spending or taxes depends on the size of the fiscal multiplier. Now, this is where things get tricky! From the Economist:

The size of the multiplier is bound to vary according to economic conditions. For an economy operating at full capacity, the fiscal multiplier should be zero. Since there are no spare resources, any increase in government demand would just replace spending elsewhere. But in a recession, when workers and factories lie idle, a fiscal boost can increase overall demand. And if the initial stimulus triggers a cascade of expenditure among consumers and businesses, the multiplier can be well above one.

The above scenario, where an economy is operating below full-employment and government spending puts the nation’s idle resources to work, creates new income and further increases private spending, is precisely what the Obama team and its economists hope will happen in the US economy soon. A multiplier of above one means the $800 billion will ultimately increase America’s national income by something greater than $800 billion!

The multiplier is also likely to vary according to the type of fiscal action. Government spending on building a bridge may have a bigger multiplier than a tax cut if consumers save a portion of their tax windfall. A tax cut targeted at poorer people may have a bigger impact on spending than one for the affluent, since poorer folk tend to spend a higher share of their income.

Crucially, the overall size of the fiscal multiplier also depends on how people react to higher government borrowing. If the government’s actions bolster confidence and revive animal spirits, the multiplier could rise as demand goes up and private investment is “crowded in”. But if interest rates climb in response to government borrowing then some private investment that would otherwise have occurred could get “crowded out”. And if consumers expect higher future taxes in order to finance new government borrowing, they could spend less today. All that would reduce the fiscal multiplier, potentially to below zero.

Herein lies the controversy about the effectiveness of deficit-financed fiscal stimulus. Several posts on this blog have focused on the neo-classical, supply-side economists’ fears that expansionary fiscal policy financed by government borrowing will drive up interest rates to private borrowers, thereby “crowding-out” private investment, off-setting any expansion in output achieved through government spending. In the Keynesian model, however, it is precisely because interest rates have bottomed out at the “zero bound” (according to Paul Krugman) that government borrowing and spending will not lead to crowding-out, rather could actually increase investors’ willingness to spend (their “animal spirits”) on new capital, actually “crowding-in” private investment.

Alas, the debate continues. The ironic thing is that even years from now, after all of Obama’s stimulus money has been spent, and the US economy is either fully recovered or it is not, we still won’t know how large the fiscal multiplier was, since tomorrow’s economists will find it nearly impossible to isolate the variable of the $800 billion of government spending and determine just how much of America’s growth in income can be attributed to government spending, and how much resulted from automatic stabilizers built-in to help the economy recover on its own during recessions.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why do tax cuts for the rich tend to have a smaller multiplier effect than tax cuts for lower income households?
2. How can government borrowing drive up interest rates, and why is this a concern to policy makers deciding on the size of a fiscal stimulus package?
3. What are the animal spirits the article mentions? Where have you heard this expression before?
4. Do you think borrowing trillions of dollars and spending it to put people back to work and try to dig the US economy out of recession is wise, or should the US government be practicing better fiscal responsibility?