A theory of fiscal policy: Self-sustaining stimulus | The Economist

Expansionary fiscal policy is a tool governments often turn to when the economy is facing high unemployment and sluggish or negative economic growth. Cutting taxes and increasing government spending can contribute to the overall demand in the economy and thereby lead to job creation and economic growth.

One of the oldest arguments against stimulus, however, is that which says when a government borrows money to pay for such a policy, it can lead to a decrease in private investment and a decrease in future demand as the higher level of debt must be paid back in the future. Short-term stimulus, therefore, is counter-productive since any debts incurred must be paid back in the future, leading to lower levels of spending and therefore higher unemployment sometime down the road.

The crowding-out effect of fiscal policy is explained in detail in the following video from The Economics Classroom:

A recent study by two leading American economists provides an argument against this view of the crowding-out effect of fiscal policy:

In a new paper* written with Brad DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley, Mr Summers, now at Harvard after a stint as Barack Obama’s chief economic adviser, says that in the odd circumstances America faces today temporary stimulus “may actually be self-financing”…

Mr DeLong and Mr Summers are careful to say stimulus almost never pays for itself. When the economy is near full employment, deficits crowd out private spending and investment. In a recession the central bank will respond to fiscal stimulus by keeping interest rates higher than they would otherwise be. Both effects mean that in normal times the fiscal “multiplier”—the amount by which output rises for each dollar of government spending or tax cuts—is probably close to zero.

The “multiplier” referred to here is what economist refer to as the Keynesian spending multiplier, which is based on the theory that any increase in spending in an economy (say, through a new government spending package), will lead to further increases in spending (as households feel more confident and firms start to hire workers again), therefore the final change in national income resulting from a fiscal policy will be greater than the initial change in spending itself. This multiplier effect has formed the basis of the argument for expansionary fiscal policy since Keynes articulated it in the 1930’s.

The multiplier effect is explained in detail in the following video lesson:

If the multiplier is ZERO, there is no point in engaging in expansionary fiscal policies since there will be no additional increase in output as a government goes into debt to pay for a tax cut or an increase in spending. In the US today, argue Summers and Delong, the multiplier is probably not zero. Additionally, crowding-out is unlikely to occur.

Such constraints are not present now (meaning in the United States in 2012). Investment and demand are deeply depressed and the central bank, having cut interest rates to zero, is not about to raise them. The multiplier is higher than usual as a result…

Basically, Summers and Delong are trying to argue that the US government should engage in another round of fiscal stimulus, to offer additional support to the economy beyond 2009’s “Obama stimulus” and the current bill being debated in Washington, the American Jobs Act, a $470 billion tax cut and spending bill aimed at keeping unemployment from rising in America.

On one side of this debate are those like Summers and Delong who argue fiscal stimulus can pay for itself since it can leads to a larger increase in GDP than the increase in the government’s budget deficit needed to finance the stimulus. On the other side are those “deficit hawks” who believe that any increase in government debt will lead to a fall in current and future aggregate demand from the private sector, and therefore expansionary fiscal policies will just be crowded out by declining private sector spending.

By understanding the circumstances in which crowding-out is most likely and unlikely to occur, we should be able to make a more informed decision about future fiscal policy decisions. As these two economists argue, and as I have tried to present in this post and in a previous post A Closer Look at the Crowding-out Effect, today’s economy provides policy-makers with the perfect opportunity to stimulate aggregate demand by increasing the deficit and providing the US economy with the boost in demand it needs to get America back to full employment.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why is crowding-out more likely to occur when an economy is already producing at or near its full employment level of output than when an economy is in recession?
2. How are the theories of crowding-out and the multiplier effect used to argue for two different sides in the debate over the use of expansionary fiscal policy?
3. Why might a government deficit, paid for with borrowed money, lead to an expectation of a future increase in taxes?
4. Do you believe the government should take action during periods of economic hardship, or should it just get out of the way and let the economy “correct itself”?

Related posts:

1. The “teenager tax” – why expansionary fiscal policy just ain’t fair!
2. How big is the government spending multiplier in America? Well, it depends on which economist you ask…
3. The Multiplier Effect as it applies to the Obama camp’s fiscal stimulus proposal

When a government needs to borrow money to pay for its deficit, private savers (represented by Slf above) will find lending money to the government more attractive than saving in private banks, since the relative interest rate on government bonds is likely to rise. This should reduce the supply of loanable funds in the private sector, making them more scarce and driving up borrowing costs to households and firms. This can be seen below:

In the illustration above, a government’s deficit spending crowds-out private spending, as firms and households find higher interest rates less attractive and thus demand less funds for investment and consumption. Private expenditures fall from Qe to Q1; therefore any increase in economic output resulting from the increase in government spending may be off-set by the fall in private spending. Crowding-out has occured.

Another way to view the crowding-out effect is to think about the impact of increased government borrowing on the demand for loanable funds. Demand represents all borrowers in an economy: households, firms and the government. An increase in public debt requires the government to borrow funds from the private sector, so as the supply of loanable funds fall, the demand will also increase, although not from the private sector, rather from the government. The effect this has can be seen below:

In the graph above, both the reduced supply of loanable funds resulting from private savers lending more to the government and the increased demand for loanable funds resulting form the government’s borrowing from the private sector combine to drive the equilibrium interest rate up to IR2. The private quantity demanded now falls from Qe to Qp, while the total amount of funds demanded (from the private sector and the goverment) now is only Qp+g. This illustration thus shows how an increase in government borrowing crowds out private spending but also leads to an overall decrease in the amount of investment in the economy.

Based on the two graphs above, a deficit-financed government spending package will definitely crowd-out private spending to some extent, and in the case of the second graph will even lead to a decrease in overall expenditures in the economy. This analysis could be used to argue against government spending as a way to stimulate economic activity. But this analysis makes some assumptions that may not always be true about a nation’s economy, namely that the equilibrium level of private investment demand and the supply of loanable funds occurs at a positive real interest rate. There are two possibilities that may mean the crowding-out effect does not occur. They are:

Notice that due to the exceedingly low demand and high supply of loanable funds, 0% acts as a price floor in the market. In other words, since interest rates cannot fall below 0%, there will be an excess supply of funds available to the private sector. Such a scenario is known as a liquidity trap. The level of private investment will be very low at only Qd. Banks cannot loan out all their excess reserves, and even though borrowing money is practically free, borrowers aren’t willing to take the risk to invest in capital or assets that may have negative rates of return, a prospect that is not unlikely during a recession.

So what happens when government deficit spends during a “liquidity trap”, as seen above? First of all, the government need not offer a very high rate to borrow in such an economy. Private interest rates will be close to zero, so even a 0.1% return on government bonds will attract lenders. So the supply of loanable funds may decrease, and demand may increase, but crowding-out will not occur because there is almost no private investment spending to crowd out! Here’s what happens:

Here we see the same shifts in demand and supply for loanable funds as we saw in our first graph, except now there is no increase in the interest rate resulting from the government’s entrance into the market. Since private interest rates stay at 0%, the private quantity of funds demanded for investment remains the same (Qp), while the increased government borrowing leads to an increase in overall spending in the economy from Qp to Qp+g. Rather than crowding-out private spending, the increase in government spending has no impact on households and firms, and leads to a net increase in overall spending in the economy.

If the government spends its borrowed funds wisely, it is possible that private spending could be crowded-in, which means that the boost to total output resulting from the fiscal stimulus may increase firm and household confidence and shift the private demand for loanable funds outwards, increasing the level of private investment and consumption, further stimulating economic activity.

So what have we shown? We have seen that in a healthy economy, in which households and firms are eager to borrow money to finance their spending, and in which savings rates are not exceedingly high, government borrowing may drive up private interest rates and crowd-out private spending. But during a deep recession, in which consumer spending is depressed and firms are not investing due to uncertainty and savings rates are higher than what is historically normal, an increase in government spending financed by a deficit will have little or no impact on the level of private investment and consumption. In such a case, governments can borrow cheaply (at just above 0%), and increase the overall level of demand in the economy without harming the private sector.

Crowding-out is a valid economic theory, but its likelihood of occurring must be evaluated by considering the actual level of output and employment in the economy. In a deflationary setting, in which savings is high and private spending is low, government may have the opportunity to boost demand and stimulate growth without driving up borrowing costs in the private sector and decreasing the level of household and firm expenditures.

Related posts:

1. A must read for AP Macro teachers: Paul Krugman explains why deficit spending during a recession does NOT cause crowding-out
2. Sample IB Economics Internal Assessment Commentary – Understanding the ECB’s bond-purchasing program
3. Will the stimulus package “crowd-out” private investment and reduce long-run growth potential in America?

Parliament gives green light to government economic boost plan. – swissinfo

In the last two weeks, both my countries, America and Switzerland, have put forward stimulus packages aimed at helping their economies avoid entering a second recession. The US American Jobs Act, announced by President Obama to the US people two weeks ago today, will provide relief to American businesses and households mostly in the form of tax cuts. Some new spending on infrastructure, primarily schools and transportation, is provided, as is continued relief for unemployed Americans.

The chart below shows how the American Jobs Act plans to spend the proposed $447 billion. 

Clearly, the largest single category of spending proposed by the AJA is in the form of tax cuts for American households and firms (a combined 54.8% of the total). The purpose of tax cuts, of course, is to provide households with more disposable income with the hope that household consumption will increase, thereby increasing demand for goods, services, and ultimately labor, which would bring down unemployment. Businesses will also enjoy a cut in the taxes they pay when employing workers, so the costs to firms that hire new workers will be lower if the bill is passed. Extending benefits to workers who are already unemployed makes up a relatively small component of the American stimulus plan, while infrastructure and education spending, both which contribute to the long-run growth potential of the US economy, make up less than a third of the $447 billion package.

Let’s now look at the Swiss stimulus package, approved by the Swiss parliament today following a debate that lasted just seven hours. (For comparison, the American Jobs Act will require months of deliberation and when it is ultimately passed will likely have been completely modified by the American congress). The chart below shows where the $950 million of spending announced by Switzerland will be spent.

The biggest difference, as can be seen, is that a full 57.5% of the Swiss stimulus comes as relief for unemployed Swiss workers, compared to just 14% of America’s package. The 24.4% spent on research and development will go towards “a research and innovation programme, helping to translate ideas into successful business plans.” The subsidies for Switzerland’s tourist industry will come in the form of low-interest loans to businesses in the hotel and travel industry, which has been adversely affected by the recent appreciation of the Swiss franc, which has reduced tourism in Switzerland as Europeans and others have found it more expensive to travel to the country in recent months. Tourism is one of the largest sectors in the Swiss job market, so the spending on unemployment benefits will bring direct relief to individuals affected by that industry.

To compare the two country’s stimulus packages (America’s is only in the proposal stage, while Switzerland’s has been approved and will begin being implemented soon), is a study in two different economic philosophies. One major difference is the obvious lack of tax cuts in the Swiss plan. Such cuts were proposed by the conservative party in Switzerland, but the country’s finance minister, supported by the center-left party, argued that “tax policy should not be shaped by the current monetary situation.” She is referring to the fact that Switzerland’s stimulus in needed in response to the strong Swiss franc, not due to any underlying problems in the Swiss economy. The Swiss plan targets relief directly at those industries affected by the strong currency, tourism and high skilled manufacturing, which stands to benefit from increased spending on R&D. 

The US plan, on the other hand, includes over $240 billion (almost 55% of the total) in tax cuts, which while they do increase households’ disposable incomes, do very little to guarantee an increase in total spending in the economy. The last two rounds of stimulus in the United States, the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and the 2008 tax rebate program under George W. Bush, both included significant tax cuts to Americans (all of the Bush stimulus was a tax refund). Neither of these packages produced much growth for the United States, although the ARRA likely prevented unemployment from rising higher than it would have without a stimulus.

Switzerland’s plan includes no tax cuts, instead it offers direct support to particular industries in the form of government spending, and helps unemployed workers continue to spend and contribute to aggregate demand by maintaining their incomes during their period of unemployment. Switzerland’s stimulus, it could be argued, is more of a demand-side fiscal stimulus than America’s, which, due to its large tax cuts, places more of the responsibility for increased aggregate demand on the private sector. However, the 31% of the American plan that goes towards school and transportation infrastructure, and the 14% that goes towards continued unemployment benefits, should have positive demand-side effects, and should help increse employment and output in America if the bill is passed.

Discussion Questions:

1. What is meant by the claim that Switzerland’s stimulus package is more of a demand-side policy than the United States’? How will the various types of spending in the Swiss plan contribute to the country’s aggregate demand?
2. Another difference between the two plans is how they will be paid for. In Switzerland, “the money is to be taken from an expected 2011 budget surplus,” while the US budget for 2012 is expected to have a deficit of around 10% of the country’s GDP. How does the budget situation in the two country’s impact the ability to use fiscal expansionary fiscal policy to promote the macroeconomic objective of full employment?
3. Which is more likely to have a direct expansionary effect on aggregate demand, tax cuts of a certain size or government spending of the same size? Explain your answer.

Related posts:

1. Fiscal Stimulus package passes in Congress – here comes $170 billion, America!
2. Another insightful economic discsussion on the Daily Show: how to make fiscal stimulus work
3. The Multiplier Effect as it applies to the Obama camp’s fiscal stimulus proposal

Once again, my IB Economics students are working on yet another Internal Assessment Commentary, this time on syllabus section 3, Macroeconomics. Since they found my sample Microeconomics commentary so helpful, I thought I’d punch out a quick sample of a macro commentary for them and for anyone else who is working on their IB Economcis Internal Assessment.

The commentary below (not including the selection from the article) is 749 words in length. This does NOT include words in the graphs, so let’s not have that debate in the comment section. The new IB economics internal assessment model (first examinations 2013) will not count words on graphs, so this sample commentary is perfectly suited for the new assessment model. If you’re a 2012 student, you would be wise to count words in graphs as part of your word count.

If you like what you see, or have any quesitons, please leave your comments below the post.

Article highlights:

An Impeccable Disaster – NYTimes.com

Paul Krugman clearly explains the problems faced by two or Europe’s largest economies today:

So why is Spain — along with Italy, which has higher debt but smaller deficits — in so much trouble? The answer is that these countries are facing something very much like a bank run, except that the run is on their governments rather than, or more accurately as well as, their financial institutions.

Here’s how such a run works: Investors, for whatever reason, fear that a country will default on its debt. This makes them unwilling to buy the country’s bonds, or at least not unless offered a very high interest rate. And the fact that the country must roll its debt over at high interest rates worsens its fiscal prospects, making default more likely, so that the crisis of confidence becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. And as it does, it becomes a banking crisis as well, since a country’s banks are normally heavily invested in government debt.

Now, a country with its own currency, like Britain, can short-circuit this process: if necessary, the Bank of England can step in to buy government debt with newly created money. This might lead to inflation (although even that is doubtful when the economy is depressed), but inflation poses a much smaller threat to investors than outright default. Spain and Italy, however, have adopted the euro and no longer have their own currencies. As a result, the threat of a self-fulfilling crisis is very real — and interest rates on Spanish and Italian debt are more than twice the rate on British debt.

Commentary:

The European Central Bank (ECB) is engaging in a new form of monetary policy in which it buys government bonds directly from the Spanish and Italian governments. Essentially, the goal is to bring down the interest rates on Italian and Spanish government bonds, which should reassure private investors that Italy and Spain will be able to pay them back and thus reduce the upward pressure on interest rates in the Eurozone, a situation which threatens to reverse the already sluggish recovery from the recessions of 2008 and 2009.

Monetary policy refers to a central bank’s manipulation of the money supply and interest rates, aimed at either increasing interest rates (contractionary monetary policy) or reducing interest rates (expansionary monetary policy). The ECB is currently buying government bonds from European governments, effectively increasing the supply of money in Europe with the hope that more government and private sector spending will move the Eurozone economy closer to its full employment level of output, at which workers, land and capital resources are fully employed towards the production of goods and services.

If successful, the ECB’s “quantitative easing”, as the new type of monetary policy is known, should bring down interest rates on government bonds and thereby reallocate loanable funds towards Italy and Spain’s public and private sectors.  The increase in supply of loanable funds should bring down the private interest rates available to borrows (businesses and households), making private investment more attractive.

The ECB’s bond purchases make it cheaper for Italy and Spain to borrow, lowering the interest rates on their bonds, restoring confidence among international investors, who may be more willing to save their money in Italy in Spain. The inflow of loanable funds into these economies (seen as an increase in the supply of loanable funds from S1 to S2) should bring down private borrowing costs (the real interest rate), encouraging more firms to invest in capital and more households to finance the consumption of durable goods, increasing aggregate demand and moving the Eurozone economy back towards its full employment level of output, from AD1 to AD2 in the graph on the right.

In certain circumstances, monetary easing like this could be inflationary, but in reality inflation is unlikely to occur given the large output gap in Europe at present (represented above as the distance between Y1 and the dotted line, signifying the full employment level of output). Any increase in aggregate demand will lead to economic growth (an increase in output), but little or no inflation due to the excess capacity of unemployed labor, land and capital resources in the European economy today.

With private sector borrowing costs increasing due to growing uncertainty over their deficits and debts, the Italian and Spanish governments will find expansionary fiscal policies (tax cuts and increased government expenditures) are unrealistic options for achieving the goal of full employment. The ECB, however, as Krugman argues, should continue to play an increasing role in the expansion of credit to cash strapped European governments, with the aim of keeping interest rates low to prevent the crowding-out of private spending that often occurs in the face of large budget deficits. Inflation, always a concern for central bankers, should be a low priority in Europe’s current recessionary environment. Only when consumer and investor confidence is restored, a condition that requires low borrowing costs, will private sector spending resume and the Euro economies can begin creating jobs and increasing their output again.

In the short-term, Italy and Spain should take advantage of the ECB’s bond-buying initiative, and make meaningful, productivity-enhancing investments in infrastructure, education and job training. If their economies are to grow in the future, Eurozone countries must become more competitive with the rapidly expanding economies of Asia, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in the developing world.

In the medium-term, the Eurozone countries must demonstrate a commitment to fiscal restraint and more balanced budgets. Eliminating loopholes that allow businesses and wealthy individuals to avoid paying taxes, for example, is of utmost importance. Also, increasing the retirement age, downsizing some of the more generous social welfare programs and increasing marginal tax rates on the highest income earners would all send the message to investors that these countries are commited to fiscal discipline. Then, in time, their dependence on ECB lending will decline and private lenders will once again be willing to buy Eurozone government bonds at lower interest rates, allowing for continued growth in the private sector.

Related posts:

1. The almighty bond market: Niall Ferguson’s concerns about the US deficit explained
2. A closer look at the crowding-out effect
3. Economics in plain English: Understanding Argentina’s budget woes

As yet another school year begins, we once again find ourselves returning to an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, sluggish growth, and heated debate over how to return the economies of the United States and Europe back onto a growth trajectory. In the last couple of weeks alone the US government has barely avoided a default on its national debt, ratings agencies have downgraded US government bonds, global stock markets have tumbled, confidence in the Eurozone has been pummeled over fears of larger than expected deficits in Italy and Greece, and the US dollar has reached historic lows against currencies such as the Swiss Franc and the Japanese Yen.

What are we to make of all this turmoil? I will not pretend I can offer a clear explanation to all this chaos, but I can offer here a little summary of the big debate over one of the issues above: the debate over the US national debt and what the US should be doing right now to assure future economic and financial stability.

There are basically two sides to this debate, one we will refer to as the “demand-side” and one we will call the “supply-side”. On the demand-side you have economists like Paul Krugman, and in Washington the left wing of the Democratic party, who believe that America’s biggest problem is a lack of aggregate demand.

Supply-siders, on the other hand, are worried more about the US national debt, which currently stands around 98% of US GDP, and the budget deficit, which this year is around $1.5 trillion, or 10% of GDP. Every dollar spent by the US government beyond what it collects in taxes, argue the supply-siders, must be borrowed, and the cost of borrowing is the interest the government (i.e. taxpayers) have to pay to those buying government bonds. The larger the deficit, the larger the debt burden and the more that must be paid in interest on this debt. Furthermore, increased debt leads to greater uncertainty about the future and the expectation that taxes will have to be raised sometime down the road, thus creating an environment in which firms and households will postpone spending, prolonging the period of economic slump.

The demand-siders, however, believe that debt is only a problem if it grows more rapidly than national income, and in the US right now income growth is almost zero, meaning that the growing debt will pose a greater threat over time due to the slow growth in income. Think of it this way, if I owe you $98 and I only earn $100, then that $98 is a BIG DEAL. But if my income increases to $110 and my debt grows to $100, that is not as big a deal. Yes, I owe you more money, but I am also earning more money, so the debt burden has actually decreased.

In order to get US income to grow, say the demand-siders, continued fiscal and monetary stimulus are needed. With the debt deal struck two weeks ago, however, the US government has vowed to slash future spending by $2.4 trillion, effectively doing the opposite of what the demand-siders would like to see happen, pursuing fiscal contraction rather than expansion. As government spending grows less in the future than it otherwise would have, employment will fall and incomes will grow more slowly, or worse, the US will enter a second recession, meaning even lower incomes in the future, causing a the debt burden to grow.

Now let’s consider the supply-side argument. The supply-siders argue that America’s biggest problem is not the lack of demand, rather it is the debt itself. Every borrowed dollar spent by the goverment, say the supply-siders, is a dollar taken out of the private sector’s pocket. As government spending continues to grow faster than tax receipts, the government must borrow more and more from the private sector, and in order to attract lenders, interest on government bonds must be raised. Higher interest paid on government debt leads to a flow of funds into the public sector and away from the private sector, causing borrowing costs to rise for everyone else. In IB and AP Economics, this phenomenon is known as  the crowding-out effect: Public sector borrowing crowds out private sector investment, slowing growth and leading to less overall demand in the economy.

Additionally, argue the supply-siders, the increase in debt required for further stimulus will only lead to the expectation among households and firms of future increases in tax rates, which will be necessary to pay down the higher level of debt sometime in the future. The expectation of future tax hikes will be enough to discourage current consumption and investment, so despite the increase in government spending now, the fall in private sector confidence will mean less investment and consumption, so aggregate demand may not even grow if we do borrow and spend today!

This debate is not a new one. The demand-side / supply-side battle has raged for nearly a century, going back to the Great Depression when the prevailing economic view was that the cause of the global economic crisis was unbalanced budgets and too much foreign competition. In the early 30′s governments around the world cut spending, raised taxes and erected new barriers to trade in order to try and fix their economic woes. The result was a deepening of the depression and a lost decade of economic activity, culminating in a World War that led to a massive increase in demand and a return to full employment. Let’s hope that this time around the same won’t be necessary to end our global economic woes.

Recently, CNN’s Fareed Zakaria had two of the leading voices in this economic debate on his show to share their views on what is needed to bring the US and the world out of its economic slump. Princeton’s Paul Krugman, a proud Keynesian, spoke for the demand-side, while Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff represented the supply-side. Watch the interview below (up to 24:40), read my notes summarizing the two side’s arguments, and answer the questions that follow.

Summary of Krugman’s argument:

• Despite the downgrade by Standard & Poor’s (a ratings agency) there appears to be strong demand for US government bonds right now, meaning really low borrowing costs (interest rates) for the US government.
• This means investors are not afraid of what S&P is telling them to be afraid of, and are more than happy to lend money to the US government at low interest rates.
• Investors are fleeing from equities (stocks in companies), and buying US bonds because US debt is the safest asset out there. The market is saying that the downgrade may lead to more contractionary policies, hurting the real economy. Investors are afraid of contractionary fiscal policy, so are sending a message to Washington that it should spend more now.
• The really scary thing is the prospect of another Great Depression.
• Can fiscal stimulus succeed in an environment of large amounts of debt held by the private sector? YES, says Krugman, the government can sustain spending to maintain employment and output, which leads to income growth and makes it easier for the private sector to pay down their debt.
• With 9% unemployment and historically high levels of long-term unemployment, we should be addressing the employment problem first. We should throw everything we can at increasing employment and incomes.
• Is there some upper limit to the national debt? Krugman says the deficit and debt are high, but we must consider costs versus benefits: The US can borrow money and repay in constant dollars (inflation adjusted) less than it borrowed. There must be projects the federal government could undertake with at least a constant rate of return that could get workers employed. If the world wants to buy US bonds, let’s borrow now and invest for the future!
• If we discovered that space aliens were about to attack and we needed a massive military buildup to protect ourselves from invasion, inflation and budget deficits would be a secondary concern to that and the recession would be over in 18 months.
• We have so many hypothetical risks (inflation, bond market panic, crowding out, etc…) that we are afraid to tackle the actual challenge that is happening (unemployment, deflation, etc..) and we are destroying a lot of lives to protect ourselves from these “phantom threats”.
• The thing that’s holding us back right now in the US is private sector debt. Yes we won’t have a self-sustaining recovery until private sector debt comes down, at least relative to incomes. Therefore we need policies that make income grow, which will reduce the burden of private debt.
• The idea that we cannot do anything to grow until private debt comes down on its own is flawed… increase income, decrease debt burden!
• Things that we have no evidence for that are supposed to be dangerous are not a good reason not to pursue income growth policies.
• When it comes down to it, there just isn’t enough spending in the economy!

Summary of Rogoff’s argument:

• The downgrade was well justified, and the reason for the demand for treasuries is that they look good compared to the other options right now.
• There is a panic going on as investors adjust to lower growth expectations, due to lack of leadership in the US and Europe.
• This is not a classical recession, rather a “Great Contraction”: Recessions are periodic, but a financial crisis like this is unusual, this is the 2nd Great Contraction since the Depresssion. It’s not output and employment, but credit and housing which are contracting, due to the “debt overhang”.
• If you look at a contraction, it can take up to 4 or 5 years just to get back where you started.
• This is not a double dip recession, because we never left the first one.
• Rogoff thinks continued fiscal stimulus would worsen the debt overhang because it leads to the expectation of future tax increases, thus causing firms and households increased uncertainty and reduces future growth.
• If we used our credit to help facilitate a plan to bring down the mortgage debt (debt held by the private sector), Rogoff would consider that a better option than spending on employment and output. Fix the debt problem, and spending will resume.
• Rogoff thinks we should not assume that interest rates of US debt will last indefinitely. Infrastructure spending, if well spent, is great, but he is suspicious whether the government is able to target its spending so efficiently to make borrowing the money worthwhile.
• Rogoff thinks if government invests in productive projects, stimulus is a good idea, but “digging ditches” will not fix the economy.
• Until we get the debt levels down, we cannot get back to robust growth.
• It’s because of the government’s debt that the private sector is worried about where the country’s going. If we increase the debt to finance more stimulus, there will be more uncertainty, higher interest rates, possibly inflation, and prolonged stagnation in output and incomes.
• When it comes down to it, there is just too much debt in the economy!

Discussion Question:

1. What is the fundamental difference between the two arguments being debated above? Both agree that the national debt is a problem, but where do the two economists differ on how to deal with the debt?
2. The issues of “digging ditches and filling them in” comes up in the discussion. What is the context of this metaphor? What are the two economists views on the effectiveness of such projects?
3. Following the debate, Fareed Zakaria talks about the reaction in China to S&P’s downgrade of US debt. What does he think about the popular demands in China for the government to pull out of the market for US government bonds?
4. Explain what Zakaria means when he describes the relationship between the US and China as “Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)”.
5. Should the US government pursue a second stimulus and directly try to stimulate employment and income? Or should it continue down the path to austerity, cutting government programs to try and balance its budget?

Related posts:

1. The U.S. National Debt: How Bad is the Problem?
2. McCain and the Republicans: fiscal conservatives? Think again…
3. Does expansionary fiscal policy “pay for itself”?

As the United States enters its mid-term election period, one of the major issues being discussed in Washington D.C. is whether or not the “Bush Tax Cuts” of 2001 and 2003 should be extended. In essence, the tax cuts under the previous president lowered America’s marginal tax rates at all income brackets. From the Wikipedia article on the “Bush tax cuts”:

• a new 10% bracket was created for single filers with taxable income up to $6,000, joint filers up to $12,000, and heads of households up to $10,000.
• the 15% bracket’s lower threshold was indexed to the new 10% bracket
• the 28% bracket would be lowered to 25% by 2006.
• the 31% bracket would be lowered to 28% by 2006
• the 36% bracket would be lowered to 33% by 2006
• the 39.6% bracket would be lowered to 35% by 2006

To be clear, the White House and president Obama do not want to repeal all of the tax cuts above, only those enjoyed by those in the highest income bracket. The 35% marginal tax rate only applies to households earning above $250,000 in the United States. This bracket includes less than 2% of American households. So what Obama wants to do is raise the marginal tax rate by 4% on income earned above and beyond $250,000. Only a couple of million Americans will be affected by this tax increase, while more than 98% of American households will experience no increase in income taxes.

The backlash against Obama has been fierce. The main argument against raising taxes on the richest Americans comes from the Republican party, who argue that higher taxes on the rich will decrease the incentive for workers to produce more output and increase productivity to earn higher incomes. In addition, say the Republicans, it is the rich who are the investors, the capitalists, the firm owners in an economy. Increasing income taxes on the rich will decrease their incentive to invest and thus decrease the overall demand for labor in the nation, leading to lower overall levels of employment and national output. This supply-side argument claims that higher taxes may in fact lead to less taxable income, thus lower tax revenues for the government.

The Economist’s Free Exchange Blog wrote a piece last year on supply-side economics and the Laffer Curve, a popular graphic used by the supply-side to argue against increases in taxes.

“The basic reasoning behind the so-called “Laffer curve” is plain, uncontroversial, and by no means was discovered by Arthur Laffer. There is nothing to tax if no one produces anything. But taxes affect the return and therefore the motive to supply labour to economic production. An increase in the tax rate can reduce the pool of wealth to tax — the tax base — by reducing the supply of labour. No taxes, no revenue. Also, 100 percent tax rates, no revenue. Somewhere in between — exactly where depends on, among other things, the responsiveness of labour supply to after-tax wages — there will be a point at which an increase in rates delivers a decrease in revenue. If the tax rate is already past that point, a tax cut delivers more revenue.

…labour supply is just one of many ways in which an increase in tax rates may reduce the effective tax base. In addition to working less, individuals may alter their savings and investment patterns, bargain to shift more of their labour compensation to untaxable perks and benefits, move to a different tax jurisdiction, consume more tax-deductible goods, or simply hide income from the tax authorities.”

As Laffer’s model shows, at certain tax rates, a tax cut will lead to an increase in tax revenue. So how can policy makers be sure whether the United States is currently at a point on its Laffer curve that an increase in taxes won’t result in a decrease in tax revenue?

“Supply-siders” who oppose Obama’s plan to repeal the tax cut, and even argue further tax cuts would benefit the US economy, need to look more carefully at where America is on the Laffer curve.

Republican politicians of late have exhibited a dismaying lack of respect for basic science, and it is not much of a surprise that many are also cavalier about fiscal economics. At current tax rates, new cuts will not “pay for themselves” in the short run. Emphasizing this point, however, does not begin to imply that raising tax rates is smart or harmless.

In a separate piece on the Economist’s blog, the relationship between tax rates and long-run economic growth is further analyzed.  The blog presents the main point of the supply-side argument:

Our baseline specification suggests that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly three percent.

On the other hand…

…we find that a tax cut of one percent of GDP increases real output by approximately three percent over the next three years.

So do tax cuts “pay for themselves” as some politicians in the United States have argued in opposition to Obama’s desire to let Bush’s tax cuts expire?

Tax cuts don’t exactly “pay for themselves”, but they also don’t diminish revenue after about two years. That is, after about two years, the government receives revenues equal to what it would have received at the higher rate, but taxpayers enjoy a lower burden. It is an important advance to discover that because cuts do lead to an immediate dip in revenue, they often inspire offsetting tax increases that retard the growth effect of the origina cut. Nevertheless, the effect of cuts on output is generally strong enough to bring revenue back to where it would have been otherwise.

So it’s possible that keeping taxes lower may indeed lead to higher growth and more taxable income down the road in the United States. But all the above analysis neglects to take into account one other VERY important consideration that the US government must consider at this point in time. In a year in which several European nations, most notably Greece, have encountered debt crises, the need to generate tax revenues to finance government spending is as important as ever.

Ironically, some of the same people who oppose ending the Bush tax cuts on the rich also oppose deficit financed fiscal stimulus. People like Niall Ferguson argue that continued deficits threaten to “bring down the US bond market” as foreign and domestic investors lose faith in the US government’s ability to pay off its ever growing national debt. These “deficit hawks” argue that the US should take drastic steps to balance its federal budget, much as several European governments have begun to do, to reduce the likelihood that investors will begin demand higher interest rates for investing in government bonds, which in turn could drive up interest rates for the private sector, crowding out private investment and plunging the US economy into another recession.

The tradeoff may come down to this. Higher taxes now, or higher interest rates AND higher taxes  in the future. Raising taxes on the rich now will allow the US to achieve a more balanced budget in the future. This means less government borrowing, less government debt, and lower interest rates on government bonds and in the private sector. It also means that there will be less debt to pay interest on, which makes debt repayment (currently almost 10% of the government’s non-discretionary budget),  less of a burden in the future. A more balanced budget now (achievable if we repeal the tax cuts for the riches Americans) means less debt in the future, lower taxes in the future, and lower interest rates in the future.

I’ve always said that humans are (In macroeconomics): The period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible. A fall in aggregate demand will lead to unemployment and recession in the short-run. Due to the inability of the nation's producers to reduce wages paid to worker, they must lay workers off to reduce costs as demand falls.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">short-run creatures living in a long-run world. I think Americans epitomize this reality. American voters can always be convinced to vote against new taxes, or vote for the guy who promises to lower their taxes. But in this case, over 98% of Americans will not even be affected in the short-run, however in the long-run the majority stands to gain from tax increases on the rich in the form of less debt to be repaid and more private investment as government borrowing and the resulting crowding-out of interest sensitive spending by the private sector is reduced.

By the way, one of the most prominent supply-side economists of the last half century agrees with me on this one. Here’s former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan arguing for a repeal of the Bush tax cuts:

Discussion questions:

1. Under what circumstances would a tax increase harm not only workers and firms, but reduce government tax revenue as well?
2. What would a Keynesian say about the wisdom of raising taxes at a time when unemployment is as high as it is in the United States right now?
3. How does achieving a more balanced budget now assure that Americans will have to pay less in taxes in the future?
4. Do you believe that asking the riches Americans to pay 4% more in marginal taxes now will lead to more unemployment in America? Why or why not?

Related posts:

1. Obama – probably not a “supply-sider”
2. Supply – side economists: “lower taxes, more growth, more tax revenue!”
3. Macroeconomy a major focus in Bush’s final State of the Union address

This is a follow up to a recent post to this blog, Hey, what are you Laffing at? The relationship between tax rate and tax revenue

The unbearable lightness of being Martin Feldstein | Free exchange | Economist.com

Supply-side economics, advocated by most Republican politicians, including presidential candidate John McCain, places great emphasis on the idea that investment is the main engine of economic growth, price level stability, and low unemployment. To encourage firms to invest, government should play a minimal role in the economy; taxes should be sufficiently low to incentivize firms to invest, while at the same time government spending should be reduced to avoid crowding-out of private investment.

Without a healthy level of investment, a country’s capital stock wears out and is not replaced, raising costs of production and shifting (In macroeconomics): The period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible. A fall in aggregate demand will lead to unemployment and recession in the short-run. Due to the inability of the nation's producers to reduce wages paid to worker, they must lay workers off to reduce costs as demand falls.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">short-run (and maybe even long-run) aggregate supply leftward. If investment remains sufficiently low, over time an economy’s output could even begin to shrink.

In the article below, The Economist’s Free Exchange explores the relationship between tax rates and long-run economic growth. The Economist takes the position of “supply-siders” who study the impact of tax rates on the level of output. The idea of supply-side economics is that lower taxes encourage more investment and thus higher growth rates.

Here’s the gist of the supply-side argument:

Our baseline specification suggests that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly three percent.

On the other hand…

…we find that a tax cut of one percent of GDP increases real output by approximately three percent over the next three years.

In the case of the Laffer Curve, which shows the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue, the article concludes that:

Tax cuts don’t exactly “pay for themselves”, but they also don’t diminish revenue after about two years. That is, after about two years, the government receives revenues equal to what it would have received at the higher rate, but taxpayers enjoy a lower burden. It is an important advance to discover that because cuts do lead to an immediate dip in revenue, they often inspire offsetting tax increases that retard the growth effect of the origina cut. Nevertheless, the effect of cuts on output is generally strong enough to bring revenue back to where it would have been otherwise.

Supply-side economics, folks. Understanding the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on not only aggregate demand, but on aggregate supply (both short-run and long-run) is a crucial skill in  answering AP free response questions.

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Related posts:

1. Walking the fine line between good growth and bad growth in China
2. Obama – probably not a “supply-sider”
3. Obama versus the supply-siders – to extend the Bush tax cuts or not? That is the question…

Over a year has gone by since the 2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) was passed and put into action by the Obama Administration. Supporters of the program say that it has been successful, arguing that the economy would be in much worse shape if no stimulus had been introduced at all. In fact, some are arguing that government spending has not been sufficient for a full economic recovery and that more direct government spending is necessary. Economists on the other side argue that the stimulus package has done little for the economy except to delay the inevitable, self correcting forces of the economy needed to pave the road back to recovery. Some actually say that we are in a worse situation now due to the massive increase in government debt which will eventually have to be paid back.

So the question is, are we better off as an economy a year after the stimulus package was introduced? With growth still sluggish and unemployment at 9.5%, many people have begun to question the success of the ARRA. Again, some say the $784 billion was insufficient while others say less regulation and more tax cuts should have been utilized.

In a recent Washington Post article, Neil Irwin argues that the obstacles towards economic growth may not be solved by more stimulus, lower interest rates or tax cuts for corporations. The problem, he claims, is not a lack of funds for investment, but in the uncertainty businesses have in future conditions. He writes:

Corporate profits are soaring. Companies are sitting on billions of dollars of cash. And still, they’ve yet to amp up hiring or make major investments — the missing ingredients for a strong economic recovery. Many Democrats say the economy needs more stimulus. Business lobbyists and their Republican allies say it needs less regulation and lower taxes. But here in the heartland of America, senior executives say neither side’s assessment fits.

They blame their profound caution on their view that U.S. consumers are destined to disappoint for many years. As a result, they say, the economy is unlikely to see the kind of almost unbroken prosperity of the quarter-century that preceded the financial crisis.

With consumers choosing to save or pay off their debts now rather than spend, many businesses find it in their interest to hold off on investments into new capital until consumers begin spending again. With no planned investment and no incentive to hire workers, unemployment stays high and economic growth remains stagnant. With inflation rates low and economists predicting deflation, it makes more sense to hold onto money as it is not losing its value.

So is there a solution? In this situation, expansionary monetary policy through lower interest rates will not have the desired effect as demand for loanable funds is low. As stated in the article:

For large companies such as Illinois Tool Works, the price of borrowed money isn’t the problem. The company had $1.3 billion in cash on its balance sheet at the end of June, up from $743 million at the end of 2008. Lower interest rates wouldn’t make much of a difference, either.

“I could borrow $2 billion tomorrow for 3 1/2 percent,” said Speer. “But what am I going to do with it?””

Other executives claim that an increase in government spending would only provide a temporary fix but have no effect on long term consumer spending.

David Speer is chief executive of the company, which has 60,000 employees worldwide in more than 800 business units and $14 billion in sales. He said an additional burst of fiscal stimulus from Washington might help boost economic growth for a period of months. But that is unlikely to affect his decisions about hiring and expansion, which Speer said are based on expectations for sales over years to come, not just the immediate future. As long as U.S. consumers remain deeply strained, he is unlikely to undertake aggressive expansion.

More fiscal stimulus “might help make things a little better for a couple of quarters, but I’m not sure it would get at the underlying economic issue,” Speer said. “The core question is: How do you get consumers back on their feet. We need growth in a sustainable way, not another Band-Aid.”

Another solution would be for the government to implement supply side measures such as less market regulation and lower corporate taxes. Again, without the much needed consumer spending and confidence, its difficult to say whether or not this will materialize into increased investment and employment.

The rest of the Washington Post article can be read here. Once you’ve read the article, answer discuss the questions below and share your thoughts in a comment on this post.

Discussion Questions:

Related posts:

1. It may not be a recession, but it sure feels like one…
2. The Great Economic Experiment – for all year 2 IB Econ students
3. A must read for AP Macro teachers: Paul Krugman explains why deficit spending during a recession does NOT cause crowding-out

In the seemingly endless and currently ongoing debate over the role of the government in the macroeconomy, there are two main camps: Those who think the governments of the developed economies have not done enough to get their economies out of recession, and those who think they have already done too much, and therefore need to start rolling back stimulus and reducing deficits.

At the heart of this debate are the two macroeconomic schools of thought, the  Keynesian demand-side theories and the classical, supply-side theories. Two intellectuals have emerged in the last several years representing the two sides of the macroeconomic debate. On the demand-side, representing the Keynesian school of thought, is 2008 Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman. Representing the classical, supply-side school of thought is Harvard economic historian Niall Ferguson. These two have squared off in many forums over the last three years, Krugman arguing for more and continued fiscal stimulus to prop up and increase demand in the economy, Ferguson arguing for smaller deficits, lower taxes and less government spending to increase private sector confidence and thereby supply in the economy.

During our long summer break the two squared off once again in the aftermath of a G20 meeting in which the governments of several major economies from Europe and North America announced plans to begin rolling back the stimulus spending they embarked on throughout 2008 and 2009. The reason for increased “austerity measures” (policies that reduce the budget deficit and slow the growth of national debt), argue global leaders, is to reduce the chances of more countries experiencing debt crises like that experienced in Greece this spring.

International investors realized earlier this year that Greece’s budget deficits were a much larger percentage of its GDP than previously thought, and very quickly decided that Greek government bonds were an unsafe investment. Almost overnight the cost of borrowing in Greece shot up above 20%, bringing investment in the economy to a halt and forcing the government to cut its budget, leading to higher unemployment and reduced social benefits for the people of Greece.  If investors were to look at the growing budget deficits in other developed countries and  then suddenly lose faith in other government’s ability to pay back their debts, then a similar crisis could occur in much larger economies, including the UK, Germany and the United States. Hence these country’s apparent desire to begin reducing deficits and rolling back stimulus spending; measures that may just plunge these economies into an even deeper recession than that which they have experienced over the last two years.

The videos below show the leading intellectuals on both sides of the stimulus/austerity debate presenting their arguments. Below each video are discussion questions to help guide your understanding of their views. Watch the videos and respond to the discussion questions in the comment section below.

Video 1 - Krugman argues for continued stimulus:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Discussion Questions:

1. What are the two “profoundly different views of economics” that are being tested as governments begin rolling back the fiscal stimulus packages of the last two years?
2. What are three characteristics of an economy in a “depression” according to Krugman?
3. What is “budget austerity” and why does Krugman think this should not be the first priority of policymakers in the G20 nations?
4. Why is deflation dangerous according to Krugman?
5. What is the additional annual cost to the US government of borrowing and spending an additional trillion dollars now? What is the potential additional benefit of more stimulus?

Video 2 - Ferguson argues for austerity and “fiscal regime change”:

Click here to view the embedded video.

Discussion Questions:

1. Why might the US have to pass spending cuts and tax increases to maintain its “credibility in international bond markets”?
2. Why would fiscal tightening “choke off the recovery”?
3. How is the financial crisis in Europe a warning to the US?
4. How could the “costs” exceed the “benefits” of deficit financed expansionary fiscal policy.
5. Ferguson proposes a new type of policy that “boosts confidence”. Why will expansionary fiscal and monetary policies fail if private sector confidence remains depressed?

Related posts:

1. Will the stimulus package “crowd-out” private investment and reduce long-run growth potential in America?
2. The almighty bond market: Niall Ferguson’s concerns about the US deficit explained
3. How big is the government spending multiplier in America? Well, it depends on which economist you ask…

Dear year 2 IB Economics students,

Welcome back and I hope you enjoyed your time off. Before breaking for summer we were in the midst of our unit on Macroeconomics, just beginning our debate on whether or not government intervention in the economy in order to kick start activity during a deep recession was a good or bad idea. In other words, would the economy correct itself or would government stimulus be necessary to get our economy moving again.

As you all know, exactly a year and a half ago, the US government decided that in order to a avoid a recession as potentially devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930’s, government interaction into the economy was necessary. 787 billion dollars was put aside for government sponsored projects, transfer payments and decreases in taxes. The hope was that this spending would not only help people maintain their current jobs but also create jobs for those who had recently become unemployed. A year and a half later, proponents of the stimulus package, Keynsians if you will, believe that this great experiment has been a success and that if nothing had been done the economy would be in much worse shape. Opponents of the spending believe that the bill has simply postponed the self correcting forces in the economy and has instead created what economists call a double dip recession where the increase in government spending only creates a temporary, unsustainable increase in economic activity. In fact many of these opponents say that we are worse off now as the government is now further in debt due to the spending.

Has the great experiment thought up by John Maynard Keynes over half a century ago been a success or was it a solution that has caused more harm than good, potentially making the recession worse than it would have been? The radio show Plant Money recently dedicated a show to addressing this very issue. In order to get a balanced look, they interviewed two prominent economists, Tyler Cowen, a Professor of Economics at George Mason University and Mark Zandi, Chief Economist at Moody’s Analytics. Cowen, a skeptic of Keynesian spending, believes that we would now be better off if the government had not intervened in the economy. Zandi, on the other hand, is adamant that the US economy would be much worse off if the government had done nothing. Two economists analyzing similar data and coming up with very different conclusions. This is where economics becomes both complex and fascinating.

Click play on the podcast player below, listen to the whole podcast, and then answer the following questions.

Discussion Questions:

1. How does an economy “self correct” itself once it has entered a recession?
2. What are the arguments put forth by Tyler Cowen and Mark Zandy about the effectiveness of government stimulus? Is one more convincing than the other? Why?
3. What are automatic stabilizers and why does Tyler Cowen believe they are better solutions than the government creating new jobs?
4. According to Tyler Cowen, why is it dangerous for economists to become “wed to only one theory”?
5. What does this podcast teach you about the importance of being able to evaluate economic theory and its effectiveness? Can we ever have an economic theory that is true under any circumstances? Why or why not?

Related posts:

1. The Big “C” – America’s crisis of confidence and the Great Recession
2. Obama’s stimulus is “the first real test of Keynesian economic policy”
3. A 17 year old’s critique of Washington’s “fiscal stimulus” package

With more than four million Spanish people out of work this week, the eighth largest economy in the world finds itself once more in a perilous position. In the last twelve months the number of unemployed people in Spain has doubled. Spain now has as many unemployed people as France and Italy combined, and the unemployment rate is nearing the historic highs of 1993.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The type of unemployment in an economy can be classified in different ways. The main types are cyclical or demand deficient unemployment but other forms exist such as real-wage unemployment and equilibrium unemployment. Some economists also refer to unemployed people as structural, frictional, seasonally or cyclically unemployed.

From the graph below we can see that unemployment in Spain has been high for at least the last 20 years, compared to other countries within the European Union.

Source: OECD Factbook 2009: Economic, Environmental and Social Statistics

The cause of growing Spanish unemployment in 2008 to 2010 is related to the collapse of the domestic building boom and the wider global recession. In 2006, Spain enjoyed low interest rates and therefore cheap loans, this allowed developers to build new apartment blocks, houses and commercial buildings with a relatively low cost of borrowing. Spanish people could afford mortgages at low interest rates and therefore purchased houses contributing to the building boom. However, when the flow of “cheap money” ran out in mid 2008 the building stopped and the flow on effects of spending dried up. Falling tourism receipts and less foreign investment have also exacerbated the issue leading to unemployment doubling between 2008 – 2010.

We can classify the form of unemployment, illustrated in the Spanish example as demand-deficient unemployment. It is related to a downturn in the economic cycle. This concept is explained below.

#2aEffects and Solutions

The social and economic impacts of 20.7% unemployment are obvious, but the solutions are less so. Climbing unemployment creates two evils; falling tax revenue as workers no longer earn wages and the increased burden of paying benefits to the four million unemployed citizens. In addition, a series of social problems are often intertwined with high unemployment, these include depression; lose of skills, poverty and higher crime rates. Spain therefore has a few problems to solve this summer. Whilst Spanish people may enjoy a summer by the beach, and a glass of sangria, the government will be hitting the books to find a solution to the problem. Here are a few suggests to get the politicians thinking.

• Use fiscal stimulus to boost consumer and government spending, thereby increasing the demand for jobs. Spain could plan for a budget deficit (expansionary fiscal policy) and fund spending increases though increased government borrowing. Spain’s current level of public debt is 67% of GDP, which is well below stricken Greece at 124%. However, Spain now has to borrow money from international bond markets, which are skeptical about Spain’s ability to pay back this debt. This is despite assurances and favourable rates offered from the European Union this week. Increasing government debt in a period of European financial crisis is a risky option.

• Use loose monetary policy (lowering central bank interest rates) to encourage Spanish people to increase their consumer spending through increased borrowing. If you understand the complexities of the European Union, you understand that all 21-member countries use the same currency and follow the lead of one central bank. Despite one country wishing to lower interest rates, other countries may think differently. Europe can be compared to a train rolling along on a set of rails, with 21 separate carriages. Each European country must follow behind the big engine, there is no room to deviate from the central banks interest rates and all of the countries must move together. Many people have wondered how long the European train would run, before one of the carriages derailed.

• Force Spanish firms to employ more people. Firms have no requirement to hire more people. They may choose to employ more people but will logically offer everyone lower wages to maintain profitability.

• Use supply side policies to bring greater efficiencies to firms though increased on the job training and worker education. This is a long-term solution, which will require large structural adjustments, how Spain produces goods and services and exactly what is does produce. A startling statistic is that the average Spanish university graduate will find their first job at the age of 27, long after they have graduated.

Discussion Questions:

1. How do economists measure unemployment?
2. Explain the causes of increased unemployment in Spain?
3. Explain in a few sentences how expansionary fiscal policy could reduce the rate of unemployment?
4. How could supply side policies be used to reduce the level of unemployment in Spain?

Related posts:

1. The business cycle rears its ugly head!
2. Unemployment and inflation: understanding the Fed’s balancing act
3. The U.S. National Debt: How Bad is the Problem?

Argentina’s reserves and its debts: Central Bank robbery | The Economist

I received the following email from an Econ teacher who wonders if I had any insight on a question posed by one of his students:

The email reads: “I have alittle query i was hoping you could help clear up for me..a year 13 student has asked a question relating to Argentina’s prime minister, Cristina Fernandezde De Kirchner’s, decision to sell the central bank’s dollar reserves to fund part of the country’s decifit against the advice of the director of the central bank who resigned.”

The student’s question is on the following passage from the Economist article above:

Fernández (Argentina’s president”) justified her raid on the reserves by saying that the Central Bank had more than it needed, because they exceeded the size of the monetary base. Economists disagree about what is an appropriate target for the reserves, but Mr Redrado’s view is that a highly dollarised emerging economy like Argentina’s needs an abundance of Treasury bonds (the form in which most reserves are held) as insurance. Even if Ms Fernández might find support from some economists for her argument, her plan to swap the dollar reserves for a non-transferable government bond would not.

The student’s question is: “I do not know what a monetary base is, nor why Argetina needs treasury bonds.”

This article really caught me off guard at first as well. One thing I love about the Economist newspaper is its use of economic jargon that requires a real understanding of the subject to be able to interpret. The first time I read the article, I will be honest I was completely confused as to what the Argentinean president was up to. But after some reflection and rough sketches of graphs on scrap paper, I think I have “translated” the article’s jargon into plain English.

Below is my reply to the teacher and his student:

Hello,

The president of Argentina wants to sell the country’s US dollar reserves, which are held in the form of US treasury bonds, and then use the US dollars she receives to buy Argentinean government bonds in order to finance her own government’s budget deficit. In essence she wants to swap Argentina’s central bank reserves of US debt (considered a very stable and safe asset due to America’s low inflation rate and relative solvency of the US government) for Argentinean government debt (less stable and safe, especially in the wake of the country’s 2002 default on its debt). Argentina’s central bank would then hold fewer transferable, stable US bonds and more “non-transferable”, Argentinean government bonds. And since the bonds represent Argentina’s government debt, the country as a whole reduces its assets and increases its liabilities.

It is important for a developing country like Argentina to keep large reserves of US dollar-denominated assets (i.e. US treasury bonds) in reserve in order to assure foreign investors that the country would be able to stabilize its currency’s value in the face of a currency crisis such as that which Argentina experienced in 2001-2002. If the value of the peso began to decline on foreign exchange markets (due, for instance, to a decline in international investor confidence in the government’s ability to pay the interest on its foreign debt or inflation fears caused by excessive monetary growth or government spending) then the central bank could use its large dollar reserves to intervene in the forex market and stabilize the value of the peso, reestablishing investor confidence and maintaining the government’s ability to attract foreign creditors in the Argentinean bond market. A collapse of the peso would have ripple effects throughout Argentina, driving up imported products and raw materials and causing spiraling inflation, forcing the government to print more money to finance its budget in the face of falling demand for its debt in domestic and international bond markets.

Argentina must be sure to keep its balance sheet (i.e. its liability to asset ratio) in check. Its assets are US government bonds, its liabilities are the Argentinean bonds it issues to finance its budget deficits. If this ratio become too heavy on the liability side, foreign investors and speculators will lose confidence in the both peso and the Argentinean government’s solvency and dump their holdings of Argentinean currency, assets, and bonds, driving interest rates through the roof and the exchange rate through the floor, grinding the economy to a halt.

The article says,

Argentina’s economy is on course to rebound this year and grow at 3-5%. But the government is spending money so fast that this growth will not finance current spending on its own, says Daniel Marx, a former finance minister. Ordinarily, a government faced with a shortfall would turn to domestic and international bond markets. But this has been difficult since Argentina defaulted in 2002.

The country cannot count on private creditors to make up its budget shortfall, so the president is planning to finance her country’s deficit by buying Argentinean bonds with the country’s own US dollar reserves. Such behavior concerns economists because it could send a message to international investors that the country is on the path towards another unsustainable build-up of debt that could culminate in another default and economic collapse. The article is a word of caution to the president that all leaders should heed: balanced budgets are a good idea, and debt is dangerous!

Related posts:

1. Sample IB Economics Internal Assessment Commentary – Understanding the ECB’s bond-purchasing program
2. Will the Fed’s easy money policy fuel global inflation?
3. China’s “silver bullet” – a strong RMB could solve her biggest economic woes…

Econstories.tv – A new resource for Econ teachers and students, from Russ Roberts and John Papola

The long awaited rap video from George Mason University’s Russ Roberts featuring the theories of John Maynard Keynes and F. A. Hayek has been released at last!

We’ve heard some decent Econ raps before (remember “Demand, Supply” by Rhythm, Rhyme, Results?) But this song covers all bases in the predominant macroeconomic schools of thought. Keynes and Hayek are brought back to life and their theories pitted against one another in an all out liquor fueled debate on the streets of New York City.

The video was just released this week. It is packed full of theory from the Classical, supply-side school of macroeconomics (represented by Hayek) and the demand-side school (represented, of course, by Keynes). The video includes cameos from Fed chairman Ben Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, whose role as bartenders filling Keynes glass reflects their role in the real economy at keeping the money supply and government spending at high levels, fueling economic booms and the eventual busts that result.

Stay tuned to this blog for more feedback on the video, including some graphical analysis and discussion questions for Macro teachers to use in class!

Related posts:

1. Keynesian/Classical debate enters the realm of hip hop
2. The battle of ideas: Hayek versus Keynes on Aggregate Supply
3. To continue stimulus or to pursue austerity, that is the question

Keynes vs. Hayek: Late Economists Hip-Hop Legacy | PBS NewsHour | Dec. 16, 2009 | PBS.

A major theme of both the AP and IB Economics courses is the long-running debate between the Keynesian, demand-side theories of macroeconomic policy and those of the Classical, supply-side school. Today’s “Great Recession” has revived this debate, which itself dates back to the Great Depression of the 1930′s, when an Englishman and an Austrian could be found at the ideological centers of two different philosophies of the role government should play in the macroeconomy.

John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek were close friends whose views on government’s role differed greatly. Hayek was a classical, laissez faire libertarian who believed that any intervention by government in a nation’s economy disrupted the efficient functioning of the free market and threatened to stifle private enterprise. Keynes, the father, of course, of modern Keynesian economics, believed that free markets left unchecked were vulnerable to the volotile animal spirits of investors and speculators whose often irrational behaviors could create externalities such as unemployment and credit crunches, thereby harming society as a whole.

Paul Solman of PBS (who I recently met at an Economics teachers conference in Washington DC) interviews a modern Keynesian, Robert Skidelsky (Keynes’ biographer) and a neo-classical economist, Russ Roberts (who I also recently met in Richmond, VA).

Related posts:

1. IB Review – Neo-classical vs. Keynesian views of inflation
2. Keynesian vs. Neo-classical Economics – and what is Heterodox Economics?
3. Obama’s stimulus is “the first real test of Keynesian economic policy”

YouTube - Chinas empty city – 10 Nov 09.

My buddy living in Shanghai posted this video to his Facebook profile today. It demonstrates how misaligned incentives in China lead local government officials to launch massive government infrastructure projects, all with the goal of meeting the growth targets handed down from Beijing.

Building roads to nowhere and cities that stand empty certainly creates jobs and new spending by the workers employed in their construction, so in that regard at least one goal of such projects is achieved. But whether or not all growth is good growth depends on whether efficiency in the economy is increase or decreased as a result of the growth strategies used.

Hundreds of billions of dollars worth of resources in China are currently being allocated by the government in Beijing towards massive public works projects such as this sparkling new city in remote Inner Mongolia. But it seems that government plans don’t always fall in line with the wishes of the nation’s people. A wise man once said, “build it… and they will come.” Apparently in China, that’s not always true.

I happen to have traveled in Inner Mongolia a few years ago with a group of students from my school in Shanghai. It was a sad thing in my opinion to witness the rampant development of the once pristine and culturally rich Inner Mongolian steppes. Ethnic Mongolians had been put on large reservations (not unlike the Native American people 150 years ago) and turned into tourist attractions. The cities were populated almost entirely with ethnic Han Chinese, there for the purpose of building more new cities, mining raw materials, and selling them to the rest of China’s industries.

Fiscal policy (the use of government spending and taxes to stimulate or reduce the overall level of demand in an economy) is a powerful tool for achieving the macroeconomic goals of full-employment, economic growth and price level stability. When used effectively, government spending can also improve efficiency in an economy by allocating society’s scarce resources towards socially and economically valuable projects. In China, it appears, the government’s incentives are aimed more towards pleasing the higher ups and continuing to inflate the speculative  bubble in real estate that has almost certainly formed, rather than pursuing socially desirable and allocatively efficient projects that actually help the Chinese people. Damn shame!

Discussion Questions:

1. What type of fiscal policy is the government in China pursuing? Expansionary or contractionary? What is the difference?
2. Why is government spending sometimes less efficient than private sector spending?
3. What would have been an alternative policy to allocating over $220 billion of public money into infrastructure projects that may have resulted in a more efficient allocation of China’s resources than projects such as the “empty city” in the video above?

Related posts:

1. Big trouble in little China – how slowing growth may mean major problems for the Chinese Communist Party
2. Does economic growth = economic development? Not for China’s rural poor…
3. Walking the fine line between good growth and bad growth in China