Archive for the 'Exports' Category

Dec 12 2008

The Marshall-Lerner Condition, the J-curve, and the US trade deficit

For a video lesson on the Marshall Lerner Condition and the J-curve, click here: The Marshall-Lerner Condition (HL Only) | The Economics Classroom

Read the following article before reading the blog post below:
Managing Globalization » Business Blog » International Herald Tribune » Blog Archive » Here’s that silver lining, finally

In IB Economics we’ve been studying concepts relating to balance of trade and exchange rates. The Marshall-Lerner Condition and the J-curve are two concepts that explain the relationship between a the exchange rate for a nation’s currency and the country’s balance of trade. (click on the graph to see a larger version)

Common sense might indicate that if a country’s currency (let’s say the US dollar) depreciates relative to other currencies, then this should lead to an improvement in the country’s balance of trade (economists call this the current account). The reasoning goes as such: a weaker dollar means foreigners will have to give up less of their money in order to get one dollar’s worth of American output. At the same time, since the dollar is worth less in foreign currency, imports become more expensive, as Americans have to fork over more dollars for a certain amount of another country’s output; hence, imports should decrease.

Fewer imports and more exports means an improvement in the country’s balance of trade, right? Well, not necessarily. What matters is not whether a country is importing less and exporting more, rather, whether the increase in income from exports exceeds the decrease in expenditures on imports. Here is where the Marshall-Lerner Condition can be applied.

The M-L condition examines the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports of a particular country. Say the US experiences a depreciation of its currency (as it has over the last year or so). If foreigners’ demand for exports from America is relatively elastic, then a slightly weaker dollar should cause a dramatic increase in foreign demand for American output, causing export income in the US to rise dramatically. On the other hand, if American’s demand for imports is highly price elastic, then a slightly weaker dollar should likewise cause Americans’ demand for imports to decrease drastically, reducing greatly American’s expenditures on imports. If the combined elasticities of demand for exports and imports is elastic (i.e. the coefficient is greater than 1), then a depreciation of a nations currency will shift its current account towards surplus. This is the Marshall-Lerner Condition.

Marshall-Lerner Condition: If PEDx + PEDm > 1, then a depreciation or a devaluation of a nation’s currency will shift the the balance on its current account towards surplus.

So what if the Marshall Lerner Condition is not met? Demand for exports and imports may not always be so responsive to changes in exchange rates. Imagine a scenario where a weaker dollar does little to change foreign demand for America’s output. In this case income from exports may actually decline (in real terms, since the dollar is weaker) as the dollar depreciates. Likewise, if Americans’ demand for imports is highly inelastic, then more expensive imports will only minimally affect Americans’ demand for imported goods, in which case expenditures on imports may actually rise as they become more expensive. In this case, where the elasticities of demand for exports and imports are highly inelastic, a depreciation of the currency will actually worsen a trade deficit. Americans’ import expenditures will go up while export income from abroad will decline shifting the current account further into deficit.

In the article above, some data is presented that points to evidence that in the US today, the Marshall-Lerner Condition is in fact being met:

“Exports in the year through September are up by 12 percent from 2006, while the dollar’s trade-weighted exchange rate dropped by only 6 percent. That means foreigners may actually be spending more – even in their own currencies – on American products. It’s a support that the American economy, and in turn the global economy, can really use right now.

Of course, this process isn’t helping the trade deficit too much, No one, it seems, can change Americans’ taste for foreign products. But it does show, for all to see, that the risks of an open economy are at least somewhat balanced by the benefits.”

An increase in exports of 12% in response to a 6% weakening of the dollar indicates a price elasticity of demand coefficient for America’s exports of 2, meaning foreigners are highly responsive to cheaper US goods.

We can assume that Americans’ demand for imports is highly inelastic, as the article hints at when it says, “imports to the United States, including oil, are still rising in volume and value.” If a 6% weaker dollar leads to an increase in expenditures on imports, then demand must be less than one. In order for M-L Condition to be met, PEDx+PEDm must be greater than 1. Clearly, with a PEDx of 2, the condition is met, and a weaker dollar in leading to an improvement in America’s balance of trade with the rest of the world.

Discussion Questions:

    1. What is the J-curve effect? Based on the evidence from the article, where on the J-curve is the US right now?
    2. Is America experiencing an improvement in or a worsening of its current account deficit?
    3. What determinants of demand are fueling America’s ever-increasing expenditures on imports?
    4. What should happen to the elasticity of demand for imports if the dollar remains weak in the long-run? How will this affect America’s position on the J-curve?

 

97 responses so far

Sep 25 2008

What’s Korea’s “beef” with the US on free trade?

“This post was originally published in April, 2008. It has been re-published today for the benefit of my year 2 IB Econ students, who are currently studying barriers to free trade.

Bloomberg.com: Economy – Korea Beef Deal Won’t Yield Trade Vote

Free trade: everyone either loves it or loves to hate it.
South Korea and the US have been in negotiations for a landmark free trade agreement for years. Korea, however, has had a “beef” with US beef imports since 2003, when a case of Mad Cow Disease gave Korean officials the jitters and all imports were halted.

Even though Mad Cow has disappeared from American beef, the ban has remained, making it difficult for negotiators to come to any major agreements on the reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade in other markets in which the US and Korea trade. Just last week, South Korea removed the beef ban, giving some analysts hope that a free trade deal may soon be agreed upon.

President Bush signed the agreement last year but has hesitated to pass it on to Congress; where certain Democratic politicians have refused to approve the agreement until S Korea removed the beef ban. Now that the ban has been lifted, however, it appears that the issues keeping an agreement from being reached may run deeper than the simple beef ban:

In addition, Ford Motor Co., unions and Democrats, including both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, all say the accord must be reworked to address what they call South Korea’s barriers to U.S. manufactured goods.

“I understand there are foreign policy considerations, but this is too important for us,” Stephen Biegun, vice president for government affairs at Ford said in an interview earlier this month. “We don’t see any sign that they are ready to change.”

Levin, who represents autoworkers in suburban Detroit, said the accord will need to be changed to address what he calls South Korea’s non-tariff barriers to U.S. manufactured goods, especially autos.

Clinton, in a response to questions from the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Coalition, said the agreement with South Korea “will cost America jobs.”

The S Korea / US Free Trade Agreement should bring a boost in trade between the two countries:

The U.S. is South Korea’s second-largest export market behind China, with shipments totaling $45.8 billion in 2007. Imports from the U.S. last year reached $37.2 billion. The trade agreement would eliminate or reduce tariffs on a wide range of goods including automobiles, vegetables and electronics.

Through free trade there are winners and losers. This is a theme we’ve explored in some depth already during our International Economics unit. The winners, in the case of the S Korea/US FTA will likely be manufacturers in S Korea and service industries in the US. Judging by Ford Motor Company’s response to the FTA, we can assume that American manufacturers will be losers from the accord.

Does this make it bad, however? According to macroeconomic theory, no. The removal of tariffs on imports from S Korea will force American manufacturers to become more competitive and achieve greater efficiency, both which will result in a more efficient allocation of resources in both S Korea and the US. If Ford, for example, sells fewer cars because of in influx of high quality, affordable Korean automobiles, then Ford may be forced to shut down some of its plants in the US. This will lead to the loss of American jobs, just as Hillary Clinton claims it will.

But in the long-run, America as a whole should be better off for it. Manufacturers in the US will focus more on capital intensive goods such as industrial equipment, the manufacture of which requires highly skilled labor, which America has in abundance. In addition to industrial equipment and other high skilled manufactured goods, the US service sector should benefit from freer trade with S Korea.

With beef being resolved, the U.S. banks, insurance companies and other services companies that stand to gain the most from this accord are gearing up their lobbying efforts.

Beef “has been our biggest obstacle in having a meaningful dialogue on the benefits of this agreement,” said Matt Niemeyer, vice president for the business insurer ACE Ltd. and a former U.S. trade official. “It’s now time to work with Congress to find a way to move this important agreement this year.”

As any student of economics knows by now, politics and economics don’t always mix well. The opposition to the S Korea/US FTA among Congressional Democrats is more political than it is economic. Jobs will be lost, that’s true, but overall trade between two technologically advanced, developed countries like the US and S Korea should do more for improvements in efficiency and in resource allocation than it will in harm for a handful of American workers who may find themselves out of work due to greater demand for imported automobiles.


*A tariff on Korean automobiles results in the following outcomes:

  • The quantity demanded of automobiles is less than it would be without a tariff (Q4 rather than Q3)
  • The quantity supplied by American auto manufacturers is greater than it would be without the tariff (Q2 rather than Q1)
  • The difference between Q2 and Q1 represents an overallocation of resources in America towards automobile manufacturing.
  • The domestic quantity demanded exceeds the domestic quantity supplied. The difference (Q4 - Q2) is made up for by imports from S Korea.
  • The government earns revenue equal to the area of the yellow rectangle (amount of tariff x number of cars imported)
  • Society experiences a loss of efficiency (deadweight loss) equal to the combined areas of the green triangles Y and X. This is consumer surplus lost, accounted for by the higher price paid by American consumers imposed by the tariff.

In the model above, the removal of a tariff on Korean automobiles will result in a decrease in output by American firms from Q2 to Q1, an increase in imports from Q4 – Q2 to Q3 – Q1, and an increase in consumer surplus, efficiency, and better overall allocation of resources in America.

Discussion questions:

  1. How does the graph illustrate the concept of “winners and losers from free trade”?
  2. Who gains and who loses from free trade with the US within Korea?
  3. Is it possible that a free trade agreement with Korea would actually create jobs in America? Explain…
  4. Why do politicians oppose free trade deals that would result in such improvements in efficiency, allocation of resources, and even in the employment opportunities for American workers?

143 responses so far

Sep 12 2008

“In-sourcing”: a new trend among US manufacturers?

U.S. companies are rethinking manufacturing in China – Sep. 11, 2008

As the US presidential campaign trudges ever forward, both Obama and McCain have had much to say about “job creation” in the USA. Elaborate plans aimed at retraining workers displaced by globalization, arming them with 21st century skills that will enable them to thrive in our advanced economy, and assure that the hardships imposed by free trade are minimal and all Americans have the skills they need to find employment. These are good goals for America, but even as they preach their job creation plans across the country, right under the candidates’ noses jobs are being created thanks to the invisible hand of the market economy.

Talk of a reverse migration of manufacturing from China to the U.S. has been buzzing across union halls and factory floors, corporate boardrooms and Wall Street.

The cost of shipping outsourced goods from China to U.S. customers has doubled in just two years thanks to high oil prices, and labor costs in China are rising sharply.

“There’s a shortage of technical and managerial talent,” reports Anand Sharma, CEO of TBM Consulting Group. “To attract managers Chinese companies are talking about salary increases of 15% to 30% year-over-year.”

The phenomenon of jobs being “in-sourced” to America after a decade or two of being done by Chinese workers may seem surprising. Certainly, wages are still lower in China than in the US labor market. This is true, however, the demand for highly skilled labor in China is driving wages up higher and higher, due to its relative scarcity in a country where reliable, well-educated factory managers are nearly fully employed by the thousands of foreign and Chinese firms operating plants there. Competition among producers means the only way to attract new managers is to continually offer higher wages. This leads to a form of “wage-spiral inflation” where rising costs lead to higher priced output.

Despite its much smaller work force, the percentage of American workers with the managerial and technical skills needed to run a plant is much higher than in China, and the weak manufacturing sector growth in the US has meant relative wages between the US and China are closer than ever before.

Take into consideration the rising cost of fuel and the fact that China’s economy is producing at or beyond full employment, and it becomes clear why manufacturing certain products in China has become less attractive to American firms. To be sure, not all manufacturing jobs are being “in-sourced” back to the US. As Chinese wages climb and skilled labor becomes more scarce, the giant’s Asian neighbors are beginning to enjoy the re-allocative effects of the “invisible hand”.

…plenty of manufacturers will continue looking for ever cheaper places to produce. In fact, as the cost of doing business in China rises, many companies – including Chinese firms – are shifting their production to less expensive markets, such as Vietnam.

Discussion questions:

  1. What is the “invisible hand” referred to in the post above?
  2. How do higher wages in China benefit Americans? How do they harm Americans?
  3. Some critics of free trade argue that multi-national corporations exploit workers in developing countries. Does the article above illustrate give an example of exploitation? Discuss…

9 responses so far

May 19 2008

China’s “silver bullet” – a strong RMB could solve her biggest economic woes…

Asia Sentinel – The Answer for China’s Inflation
Two goals recently voiced by the Chinese leadership: increased consumer spending and reduced inflation. These are worthy goals for policymakers to pursue; if accomplished, they will mean increased well-being for the average Demand-pull inflation caused by increase in consumptionChinese household, which will enjoy more goods and services at lower prices.

The problem is, increased consumption usually means rising prices, as can be clearly illustrated in an aggregate demand / aggregate supply diagram. Household spending makes up somewhere around 40% of China’s GDP, exports, government spending and investment account for the rest. Whenever one component of total expenditures increase in the economy, all other things equal, the price level will rise.

Only two things could happen to make the Chinese leadership’s goal of increased consumer spending and stable prices a reality: either productivity in the economy must increase more rapidly than consumer spending, shifting aggregate supply outward, or another component of aggregate demand must be reduced more rapidly than consumption increases, offsetting the increase in overall expenditures cause by rising consumption.

So what magical combination of fiscal and monetary policy can be employed to both increase consumption and stabilize the price level? The answer may not rest purely in the realm of domestic macroeconomic policy-making, but rather in the foreign exchange markets, where a weak RMB has kept domestic consumption low and net exports (thus the price level) high. Allowing the RMB to appreciate should make “magic” happen and lead to rising domestic consumption and disinflation simultaneously:

A stronger currency, commensurate with China’s increased economic strength, would both tamp down inflation and allow Chinese consumers to buy more goods and services. However, for reasons not entirely clear to me, or few others for that matter, China’s leaders are resisting this simple and beneficial solution.

The Chinese leadership’s stated goal in prodding their citizens to spend more is to decrease their economy’s dependence on exports. If the Chinese, who currently save 50 percent of their incomes, saved less, more of their production would be consumed locally. As a result, China would be less vulnerable to economic downturns abroad. Without a vibrant domestic market, over-leveraged Americans will apparently remain China’s most important customers.

A strengthened yuan would lower the real costs of goods for domestic consumers and allow the Chinese themselves to compete more evenly with consumers in other nations to whom they currently send the fruits of their labor. As goods become more affordable in China, the Chinese would naturally consume more. A rising yuan would therefore kill two birds with one stone: it would reverse recent consumer price increases and it would induce Chinese consumers to buy their own products.

Some members of the US Congress estimated sometime last year that the Chinese currency was undervalued by 27%, leading certain politicians to call for an across the board tariff on all Chinese imports to the United States. Such protectionist sentiment was not uncommon 12 months ago, but as America faces its own economic slowdown, compounded by rising inflation and the falling value of the dollar, such calls for more taxes on imports have disappeared from Washington.

The sensible action for the Chinese to take in response to its own overheating economy (letting the RMB appreciate in order to relieve inflation and encourage domestic consumption) could spell economic doom for the US. As China adopts a “strong yuan” policy, its demand for US dollar-denominated financial assets, including government debt, will decline, reducing demand in the US bond market, lowering bond prices and driving up interest rates in the US. Higher US rates will discourage investment and consumption, exacerbating the slowdown already underway in America. Furthermore, reduced demand for US assets by China will cause demand for the dollar to slide in foreign exchange markets. Since much of American’s household spending is on imports, inflation will rise in America as not only Chinese goods, but all imports, are now more expensive to Americans.

Usually in economics class, we adopt the frame of mind that economics is not a zero-sum game. In other words, through free trade based on comparative advantage and specialization, individuals and nations will benefit due to increased total output, increased productivity, higher incomes, and greater variety of goods and services produced within and among communities and nations. In the case of China and the US today, on the other hand, we appear to be in a situation where increased consumption by Chinese may be achievable only at the expense of American consumers, who because of rising interest rates and a falling dollar, may be forced to live “within their means” for the first time in decades.

Discussion questions:

  1. Why is a strong RMB necessary to simultaneously increase consumption and reduce inflation in China?
  2. Why would interest rates in the US rise if China adopted a “strong RMB” policy?
  3. Would Americans be better off without trade with China? What about the statement that Americans will be worse off if China is to achieve greater levels of domestic consumption?

One response so far

Apr 24 2008

Dominican Republic struggles to find its “comparative advantage” as it faces new competition from Asia

FT.com / World / Americas – US economy threatens Dominican Republic

Trade based on comparative advantage… the theory originally articulated by Adam Smith, later fine-tuned by David Ricardo, the theory that suggests that if each nation specializes its economic activity on the products for which it faces the lowest opportunity cost, then trades with its neighbors, total world output and efficiency can be maximized: today this theory represents the philosophical underpinning of all free trade agreements signed between and among the nations of the world.

Through trade, countries can exchange their extra output with other nations for the goods specialized in by others, enabling all nations to enjoy a level of consumption beyond what they’d be able to achieve if they tried to produce all goods domestically.

For many developing countries, with their abundance of either land or labor, comparative advantages tend to lie in either agricultural goods or low-skilled manufactured goods. Since global prices for food are highly unstable and dependency on healthy harvests, good weather, and stable rainfall are all highly risky endeavors for a poor country, developing nations prefer to foster the growth of manufacturing sectors in their path towards economic development.

Strategies for economic growth available to developing nations include export-oriented and inward-oriented growth. A country like the Dominican Republic, the largest economy in the Caribbean, has pursued a predominantly export-oriented growth strategy, promoting through “free zones” the growth of a textile industry aimed at producing goods for consumers in developed countries, primarily the US.

To the Domincans, producing textiles for export to America has successfully given the people of this poor nation a grip on a rung of the ladder towards economic development. The import of capital has taken previously unproductive workers out of agriculture and put them into an industry where productivity, thus income, has risen, leading to improvements in living standards. Export-led growth, however, runs some serious risks of its own, as is being realized by the people of the Dominican Republic today.

It had been clear for some time that Luis Caraballo’s textile factory, in one of the Dominican Republic’s largest “free zones”, was struggling.

Finally, last December, he closed the factory gates for the last time: cut-throat competition from China and Vietnam, a weakening US dollar and unsustainable costs had become too much.

Once a hot destination for American companies looking for a cheap place to “off-shore” production of labor intensive textiles, the Dominican Republic today faces new competition, and is finding its comparative advantage slip slowly away from textiles…

The Dominican Republic depends heavily on the US, which is the destination of more than 85 per cent of exports. But textile exports – these days accounting for less than a third of total exports – fell by 32 per cent over 2007.

Although other countries in the Caribbean are also suffering from Asian competition – with Chinese textile exports to the US tripling between 2000 and 2005, while Vietnam’s multiplied almost 117 times – the Dominican Republic has been worst hit.

Here’s the thing: a nation’s comparative advantage may shift over time (from land to labor to capital intensive goods) as the structure of the global economy evolves. Once an economy like the Dominican Republic’s has undergone a period of structural adjustment, away from agriculture and towards industry, the flow of low wage workers from farm to factory begins to slow to a trickle, leading to rising wages and increased competition from countries with more abundant supplies of cheap labor.

The challenge for policy makers is to manage the structural changes as they come, minimizing the deleterious impact such global shifts of productive resources has on the citizens of a country like the D.R. Clearly, it is in the country’s interest to prepare its citizens for a “new economy”, one in which skilled labor will play a larger role. The problem is, this requires a solid education system, which the D.R., it turns out, does not yet have:

There is widespread acceptance of the need to develop a better-educated workforce, but so far education spending has been inadequate.

“The government simply doesn’t have enough resources,” said Mr Montás. About 40 per cent of its budget goes on debt obligations and another 15 per cent is dished out through subsidies. Just 1.5 per cent goes towards education.

It also turns out that this is a balance of payments story:

Mr Montás calculated that for every percentage point the US economy contracted, the Dominican Republic’s GDP would shrink by 0.4 per cent.

Not only will exporters be hit, but also the huge tourism sector and remittance flows…

One possible result of the decline in exports and flows of remittances from the US will be a depreciation of the D.R. peso, as demand for pesos by Americans falls. A weaker peso might make the country’s exports attractive once again, assuming the exchange rate is allowed to adjust on foreign exchange markets. A weaker peso should help slow the decline in the D.R.’s exports to the US, at least until new competition emerges, perhaps elsewhere in Asia, maybe even from Africa or other Latin American countries.

In all likelihood, given the increased competition from Asian textile manufacturers, continued economic growth in the Dominican Republic will depend on the country’s ability to educate and train its workforce to adapt to a more capital, technology and information-based economy, which, if successful, will eventually lead to rising incomes and higher standards of living for the people of the this rising Caribbean nation.

Comparative advantages evolve with the emergence of new competition among developing and developed countries. The negative impacts this evolution has on a particular economy can be managed if wise policy actions are taken to assure a country’s workforce is educated and trained to participate in tomorrow’s economy, rather than yesterday’s or today’s.

30 responses so far

Mar 31 2008

Politics, priorities, and the Phillips Curve

FT.com / Asia-Pacific / China – Weak dollar troubles Beijing

Inflation, with its erosive effects on wealth and income, has plagued China at increasing rates since mid-2007. In February it reached an annualized rate of 8.7%, threatening to undermine China’s GDP growth rate, which has been predicted in the 8% range for this year.

As we have discussed in our our AP Econ class here in Shanghai, China’s inflation is caused by a combination of demand and supply-side factors. On the demand-side, a growing middle class has driven consumer spending to record levels recently, surpassing investment as the largest component of China’s GDP in 2007. Of course, as always, high inflation (thus low real interest rates), optimism about rising consumption in the future, and a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing (albeit a diminishing one as wages continue to rise) all combine to keep investment extremely high. Furthermore, cheap exports have helped keep demand for China’s output from abroad strong. The combination of increasing consumption, strong investment, and its trade surplus have resulted in demand-pull inflation.

On the supply-side, China has encountered additional inflationary pressures of late. Rising energy prices (mostly due to coal and oil shortages) combined with record rises in food prices (24% increase in the last year), have driven costs to firms up, shifting the aggregate supply curve leftward, further fueling inflation.

Knowing the damaging effects inflation has on income and wealth, it might be assumed that Beijing would place the utmost emphasis on taming the country’s rising prices. This, however,is not at the top of the government’s macroeconomic goals, according to premier Wen Jiabao:

On the issue of whether he would sacrifice economic output to bring down inflation, at the risk of increasing unemployment, Mr Wen indicated that growth re­mained the overarching priority. “We must ensure that our economy will grow…in order to ensure employment,” he said. “China is a developing country with 1.3bn people. We have to maintain a certain degree of fast economic growth to provide enough jobs.

”He said China needed to add about 10m jobs a year for the next five years, a lower figure than in the past whenPC the aim was growth of 15m-20m jobs a year.

The tradeoff between inflation and unemployment to which Mr. Wen refers is a text book example of the challenges faced by macroeconomic policymakers everywhere. This trade-off is illustrated in the Phillips Curve model, which shows that in the (In macroeconomics): The period of time over which wages and prices are relatively inflexible. A fall in aggregate demand will lead to unemployment and recession in the short-run. Due to the inability of the nation's producers to reduce wages paid to worker, they must lay workers off to reduce costs as demand falls.');" onmouseout="tooltip.hide();">short-run, there exists an inverse relationship between the price level and the unemployment rate.

In his words above, Mr. Wen demonstrates Beijing’s preference in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment: He’ll take inflation… Here’s why.

In case you haven’t heard, China is not a democracy. Nor is it a, ehem, “free” country. According to Alan Greenspan in his book “The Age of Turbulence”, democracy and freedom of speech act as “safety valves” in Western countries; in other words, in times of economic or political unrest, the right to gather in the streets, the right to vent frustrations through a free press and the opportunity to advocate political and economic change through the various media, all combine to prevent violent and revolutionary uprisings when times get tough economically.

Take the US for example. Times are certainly tough right now. Inflation’s approaching 4-5%, while nominal growth has nearly stagnated. Unemployment, while it has technically fallen recently, in reality has risen as hundreds of thousands of workers have given up searching for work. The bursting of the housing bubble represents one of the most massive losses of wealth in recent history. A weak dollar has meant that even cheap imports don’t seem so cheap anymore. Throw in the desperate war in Iraq, the nuclear threat from Iran, rising food prices, $110 oil and an incredibly unpopular national leader, and by some measures the country would appear ripe for revolution. However, a revolution is about the least likely thing to occur in America, because it enjoys the “safety valve” of democracy. Rather than overthrowing their government, Americans have the right to go to the pole and vote for a new one, which in all likelihood will occur this November when it seems either Barrack or Hillary stand the greatest chance and winning the White House.

Now let’s look at China. The picture’s not quite so gloomy for the Chinese right now. Yes, inflation is high, as in the US. But unlike America, China is still growing at a very healthy pace, unemployment is probably still below its natural level, the real estate markets in China’s cities are still booming, meaning the middle class residents there are experiencing leaps and bounds in terms of personal wealth. Demand for its exports remains strong, and ever more poor Chinese are finding jobs in high paying factories across the country. Investments in capital, infrastructure and education point towards a bright future of continued growth for the foreseeable future.

But wait, 8.4% is something to worry about, especially when we take into account the 24% increase in food prices. Shouldn’t Wen and Beijing be taking drastic steps to reign in this high rate of inflation? In short, NO, they shouldn’t. Because as can be seen in the Phillips Curve, to reduce inflation could result in another, far more serious problem for Beijing; rising unemployment.

It appears that Beijing’s greatest fear is a population out of work. Its goal of creating 10 million new jobs is ambitious, but in the eye’s of the government, necessary. The Chinese people do not enjoy the “safety valve” of democracy through which economic frustrations and hardships can be channeled were the country to experience a slowdown in growth and an increase in unemployment. The last time the economy faced high inflation AND high unemployment, students, workers, soldiers and tanks all gathered for an afternoon of urban warfare under Mao’s somber gaze in Beijing. To avoid such massive revolutionary movements in the future, Beijing must do all it can to insure job creation continues and growth remains strong, even if the trade-off is record high inflation.

This one passage spoken by Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, tells a vivid story about the reality of Communist dictatorship in China. Sound economic policy may go on the back burner in times of political uncertainty. Price controls, such as those on petrol in Shanghai (speaking of, the long lines at gas stations are back!), were a microeconomic example of bad economics; Beijings hesitance to seriously tackle inflation is a macroeconomic example. Holding on to power seems to be more important than stabilizing prices, at least for now.

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8 responses so far

Feb 27 2008

China: formerly the world’s factory, now a nation of consumers…

Economics focus | From Mao to the mall | Economist.comChina - a nation of consumers

China, long acknowledged as the world’s factory, could suffer if falling demand for its exports in the US results in a decline in aggregate demand and GDP here as some economists believe it will. But not all economists agree on the importance of exports to China’s domestic economy:

The increase in net exports (exports minus imports) has never been the main source of China’s growth. It contributed two to three percentage points to annual GDP growth between 2005 and 2007, whereas domestic demand (consumption and investment) added eight to nine percentage points.

But the latest figures show that exports have become even less important as a driver of growth. The World Bank’s latest China Quarterly Update suggests that net exports contributed only 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth in the year to the fourth quarter of 2007 (see left-hand chart). Overall GDP growth slowed only modestly (to 11.2%) because of faster growth in domestic demand, which contributed an impressive 10.8 percentage points.

Continue Reading »

27 responses so far

Feb 19 2008

Weak dollar to the rescue – how exports may save the US economy

Defining the macroeconomic problem – Paul Krugman – Op-Ed Columnist – New York Times Blog

Paul Krugman, economics columnist for the NYT, shares his views the true problem with the US macroeconomy. Krugman thinks that the source of instability today is too much consumer spending and too few exports in the last decade.

Basically, I’d say, the problem is twofold. First, in the mid-00s the U.S. economy got badly unbalanced — too much dependence on housing and housing-inflated consumer spending, too big a trade deficit.

The table here (from Krugman’s piece) shows the net change in consumer spending, investment (non-residential or business investment, and residential investment) and net exports between 2007 and the average for the last 20 years of the last century. Continue Reading »

13 responses so far

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