U.S. Trade Gap Widens on Oil Imports – WSJ.com

Terms of trade is a term that is often misunderstood by IB Economics students. Simply put, a nation’s terms of trade refers to the relative price of a country’s exports to its imports.

When a country’s imports increase in price, while the value of its exports stays the same, the country’s terms of trade are said to deteriorate. As a nation experiences deteriorating terms of trade, it finds itself moving towards a deficit in its current account, meaning that expenditures on imports are growing more than income from exports, also called a trade deficit.

The United States has run trade deficits for most years since 1970. Since 2004 the US has annually spent over $600 billion MORE on imports than it earned from the sale of its exports. (Balance of trade data going back to 1960 can be found here).

Usually, when a country enters a recession, it would be expected that its balance of trade would improve, since households demand fewer imports and domestic inflation decreases making the country’s products more attractive to foreign households. In fact, in 2008, when the US entered its current recession, its trade deficit actually decreased. Recently, however, due to the weakness of many of its trading partners and a deterioration in terms of trade, America’s recession is accompanied by a deepening trade deficit:

The U.S. trade deficit widened for the first time in eight months during March, as the price and use of imported oil both climbed.

The U.S. deficit in international trade of goods and services increased to $27.58 billion from February’s revised $26.13 billion, the Commerce Department said Tuesday. Originally, the February deficit was estimated at $25.97 billion.

U.S. exports in March slipped by 2.4% to $123.62 billion from $126.63 billion as trading partners bought less consumer goods and cars from the U.S. U.S. imports fell at a lower rate, dropping 1.0% to $151.20 billion from February’s $152.76 billion

Discussion Questions:

1. How did rising oil prices lead to an increase in America’s trade deficit?
2. What determines demand for American exports in the rest of the world? Why is demand for American goods and services falling even as their prices decline due to deflation in the US?
3. Where does America get the money to buy hundreds of dollars more in imports than it sells in exports? What do foreigners do with all the US dollars they earn from their enormous trade surplus with the US?
4. Why doesn’t the US government simply place tariffs or quotas on imports to try and achieve more balanced trade with the rest of the world? Is this an appropriate response to a trade deficit?

One of the greatest “ah-ha” moments in all of economics is when an economics’ student or citizen learns for the first time that every time a domestic buyer purchases a foreign product or import that those same U.S. dollars spent on the foreign product go to a U.S.-based company, not a foreign company. Yes, I am telling you that when you (or Wal-Mart) buy Chinese shirts, your same U.S. dollars spent quickly end up in the hands of, say, Apple, Microsoft, Garmin, or General Electric to increase U.S. employment, profits, and U.S. stock prices!

I decided to write this particular blog because of the fact that the recently passed $800 Billion U.S. stimulus bill has some “buy American” provisions within it. Based on an intuitive hunch, I believe that over 99% of adult Americans believe that these “protectionist” clauses somehow help our economy. Yes, the vast majority of U.S. adults believe that it is clearly more advantageous to “buy American” in order to keep the money or wealth within America in order to increase U.S. employment, profits, and U.S. stock prices. In true economic fact, however, if U.S. citizens “buy American” solely out of patriotism (and not because they think it is a superior product) they actually HURT America because the U.S. dollars spent out of patriotism on that American company are, therefore, unintentionally withheld from another more efficient and deserving American country via the “trade loop”.

Let me try to explain this “trade loop” in more detail so that I may actually be able to convince you of this amazing “180 degree” revelation: “Buy American” is Un-American

Let’s say that the United States (we’ll say Wal-Mart) decides to buy many shirts costing $400 from a Chinese shirt manufacturer, in lieu of buying those same shirts from, say, a shirt manufacturer in Elon, North Carolina (USA). The first key point is that when Wal-Mart buys the shirts from China for $400 it can only pay China with US dollars. Why? Because Wal-Mart has only US dollars! It has no Chinese currency (Yuan). It literally drains its bank account of US dollars that are transferred/paid to China! The second key point is that when China receives that same $400 US dollars for the shirts, China cannot, unfortunately, spend any of the $400 in its own economy since only the Yuan is accepted as a medium of exchange in China! China is now forced to either throw the U.S. currency away (not advised!), or immediately spend the money back to the USA (advised!).

In summary, China has initially traded a product (shirts!) for paper (US dollars!), and those US dollars cannot be spent in China. For China to receive any value at all for the shirts it sent to America, China must now spend the $400 back into the US economy for, say, a global positioning system (GPS) from FleetMatics out of Waverly, Massachusetts (USA). Cutting through to simplicity, in essence, it’s almost as if Wal-Mart (USA) just paid FleetMatics (USA) $400 directly!

Yes, the economic “punch line” is that all spending by the domestic nation on foreign products (imports), in turn, are spent immediately back to the domestic nation increasing the domestic nation’s employment, income, and standard of living. (Note; this is also shown and reported in a nation’s balance of payments schedule if you are skeptical about what you are reading!)

And, yes, let’s not forget about that Elon, North Carolina shirt maker that did not get the original $400 from Wal-Mart in our above example! Any good economy promotes competition and I am excited to see if that North Carolina shirt manufacturer can “raise their game” (increase productivity and/or quality), and hopefully get the next shirt contract from Wal-Mart! If not, well, that North Carolina firm may just have to close down. But remember, the key point, the $400 spent for the shirts went to Fleetmatics in Waverly, Massachusetts, in lieu of the Elon, North Carolina shirt manufacturer. If you would have “bought American” even though the Chinese shirts were preferable, you would have prevented the more effective U.S. business in Waverly from getting your U.S. dollars by giving them to the less efficient Elon manufacturer. In short, you would have contributed to American inefficiency and slowing productivity, hurting our country! And that is un-American!

Now, you may be thinking the following if you have a little economics’ background: “But the US has a growing trade deficit with China, so China may not immediately buy that GPS system from FleetMatics for $400. And, you are correct, but that is also not a problem for either the United States or China. What China is really doing right now is deciding to temporarily save or invest a minority percentage of their US dollars received form U.S. import purchases. Said another way, China is not buying as many GPS’ as the US is buying shirts and, of course, we call that phenomenon the US trade deficit which immediately seems to speak “problem”. But it is really not as big a problem as most people think! China is still spending their “saved” US dollars back into the US economy, but in different ways. China is saving and investing some of those US dollars directly into the United States economy by building plants in America, buying US stock to fund American companies’ expansions, and temporarily saving some of their dollars, for future US purchases, by buying US bonds to help the US government pay for other US government initiatives necessitating borrowing. Eventually, China will sell these US bonds and be forced to use those U.S. dollars to buy that GPS system or build more plants to employ more Americans!

In summary, when citizens of any country in the world buy the product that is best for them based on a combination of quality and price, they will be taking the most patriotic action possible to help their own country they love so much! If a domestic citizen sees the foreign product as a better alternative to the domestic product, buy it! Your money spent will immediately find its way back through the “trade loop” to another business within your country!

Of course, this is why all economists from around the world know that international trade, and not protectionism, helps a country’s standard of living and promotes efficiency and rising standard of livings!

This post was originally published in November of 2007. While the analysis is still relevant, data is out of date.

Managing Globalization » Business Blog » International Herald Tribune » Blog Archive » Here’s that silver lining, finally

In IB Economics we’ve been studying concepts relating to balance of trade and exchange rates. The Marshall-Lerner Condition and the J-curve are two concepts that explain the relationship between a the exchange rate for a nation’s currency and the country’s balance of trade. (click on the graph to see a larger version)

Common sense might indicate that if a country’s currency (let’s say the US dollar) depreciates relative to other currencies, then this should lead to an improvement in the country’s balance of trade (economists call this the current account). The reasoning goes as such: a weaker dollar means foreigners will have to give up less of their money in order to get one dollar’s worth of American output. At the same time, since the dollar is worth less in foreign currency, imports become more expensive, as Americans have to fork over more dollars for a certain amount of another country’s output; hence, imports should decrease.

Fewer imports and more exports means an improvement in the country’s balance of trade, right? Well, not necessarily. What matters is not whether a country is importing less and exporting more, rather, whether the increase in income from exports exceeds the decrease in expenditures on imports. Here is where the Marshall-Lerner Condition can be applied.

The M-L condition examines the price elasticities of demand for exports and imports of a particular country. Say the US experiences a depreciation of its currency (as it has over the last year or so). If foreigners’ demand for exports from America is relatively elastic, then a slightly weaker dollar should cause a dramatic increase in foreign demand for American output, causing export income in the US to rise dramatically. On the other hand, if American’s demand for imports is highly price elastic, then a slightly weaker dollar should likewise cause Americans’ demand for imports to decrease drastically, reducing greatly American’s expenditures on imports. If the combined elasticities of demand for exports and imports is elastic (i.e. the coefficient is greater than 1), then a depreciation of a nations currency will shift its current account towards surplus. This is the Marshall-Lerner Condition.

Marshall-Lerner Condition: If PEDx + PEDm > 1, then a depreciation or a devaluation of a nation’s currency will shift the the balance on its current account towards surplus.

So what if the Marshall Lerner Condition is not met? Demand for exports and imports may not always be so responsive to changes in exchange rates. Imagine a scenario where a weaker dollar does little to change foreign demand for America’s output. In this case income from exports may actually decline (in real terms, since the dollar is weaker) as the dollar depreciates. Likewise, if Americans’ demand for imports is highly inelastic, then more expensive imports will only minimally affect Americans’ demand for imported goods, in which case expenditures on imports may actually rise as they become more expensive. In this case, where the elasticities of demand for exports and imports are highly inelastic, a depreciation of the currency will actually worsen a trade deficit. Americans’ import expenditures will go up while export income from abroad will decline shifting the current account further into deficit.

In the article above, some data is presented that points to evidence that in the US today, the Marshall-Lerner Condition is in fact being met:

“Exports in the year through September are up by 12 percent from 2006, while the dollar’s trade-weighted exchange rate dropped by only 6 percent. That means foreigners may actually be spending more – even in their own currencies – on American products. It’s a support that the American economy, and in turn the global economy, can really use right now.

Of course, this process isn’t helping the trade deficit too much, No one, it seems, can change Americans’ taste for foreign products. But it does show, for all to see, that the risks of an open economy are at least somewhat balanced by the benefits.”

An increase in exports of 12% in response to a 6% weakening of the dollar indicates a price elasticity of demand coefficient for America’s exports of 2, meaning foreigners are highly responsive to cheaper US goods.

We can assume that Americans’ demand for imports is highly inelastic, as the article hints at when it says, “imports to the United States, including oil, are still rising in volume and value.” If a 6% weaker dollar leads to an increase in expenditures on imports, then demand must be less than one. In order for M-L Condition to be met, PEDx+PEDm must be greater than 1. Clearly, with a PEDx of 2, the condition is met, and a weaker dollar in leading to an improvement in America’s balance of trade with the rest of the world.

Discussion Questions:

1. What is the J-curve effect? Based on the evidence from the article, where on the J-curve is the US right now?
2. Is America experiencing an improvement in or a worsening of its current account deficit?
3. What determinants of demand are fueling America’s ever-increasing expenditures on imports?
4. What should happen to the elasticity of demand for imports if the dollar remains weak in the long-run? How will this affect America’s position on the J-curve?

How high is China’s jobless rate? | The great wall of unemployed | The Economist

China Faces Unemployment Woes

Unemployment in China is a big deal. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party hinges on its ability to assure  stable jobs and income growth for the 300 million “middle class” Chinese who live in the country’s cities. When the urbanites are unhappy, trouble ensues.

So a dip in economic growth rate into single digits, while we in the West may think of it as silly to fret about, is a major deal for China. Interestingly, according to the Economist newspaper, unemployment data in China is notoriously unreliable; in fact analysts have no clear idea of just how much unemployment there is:

Until the 1990s, the government more or less guaranteed full employment by providing every worker with an “iron rice bowl”—a job for life. But when soaring losses at state-owned firms forced the government to lay off about one-third of all state employees between 1996 and 2002, the official unemployment rate rose only slightly. Today it is 4% in urban areas, up from 3% in the mid-1990s.

But the official rate excludes workers laid off by state-owned firms. Thus at the start of this decade, when lay-offs peaked, it hugely understated true unemployment. Over time, as laid-off workers have found jobs or left the labour force, the distortion will have shrunk. Another flaw is that the official unemployment statistics cover only people who are registered as urban dwellers. An estimated 130m migrant workers have moved from the country to the cities, but there is no formal record that they live there, so they are ignored by the statisticians. After adjusting the official figures for these two factors, several studies earlier this decade concluded that the true unemployment rate was above 10%—and might be even as high as 20%.

The textbook definition of unemployment is the percentage of the labor force actively seeking but unable to find a job. In China, however, the “labor force” only includes the 25% of the country’s population that lives in cities, and the massive number of workers who were fired from state-owned enterprises over the last decade are mysteriously excluded from official figures. 4% unemployment, the official number, puts most developed countries to shame, as it represents extremely low levels of unemployment.

Despite the fuzziness in the figures, one thing is for sure, slower economic growth, even though it is still expected to be between 8-9% this year, means fewer new jobs in China, hence the government’s recent slashing of interest rates to re-invigorate investment and spending in the economy.

…on November 26th the People’s Bank of China slashed rates by more than a percentage point—the most in 11 years—to boost growth. The slowing economy has led factories to cut jobs, and there are mounting fears that the swelling ranks of the unemployed might one day take to the streets and disrupt China’s economic miracle.

An interesting point made in this article is that even continued economic growth in China does not guarantee continued job growth. Basic economic theory holds that when a nation’s output is increasing, employment is also increasing, since growth in output implies increase demand for labor. China, however, is experiencing a different type of growth today than that of years past:

China is creating fewer new jobs than it used to. In the 1980s, each 1% increase in GDP led to a 0.3% rise in employment. Over the past decade, 1% GDP growth has yielded, on average, only a 0.1% gain in jobs. Growth has become less job-intensive, so the economy needs to grow faster to hold down unemployment.

One reason for this is that the government has favoured capital-intensive industries, such as steel and machinery, rather than services which create more jobs… China needs to shift the mix of its growth from industry, investment and exports to services and consumption. To adjust the structure of production requires a further strengthening of the yuan, raising the price of energy, scrapping distortions in the tax system which favour manufacturing, and removing various shackles on the services sector.

More labour-intensive growth would also boost incomes and consumption and so help to reduce China’s embarrassingly large trade surplus. But most important, by allowing more workers to enjoy the rewards of rapid growth, it could help to prevent future social unrest.

Discussion Questions:

1. How does China’s current account surplus result in fewer new jobs than a growth strategy based on domestic consumption would?
2. Why would a stronger RMB contribute to greater domestic job creation?
3. “More labour-intensive growth would boost incomes and consumption and so help to reduce China’s embarrassingly large trade surplus” Discuss this statement.
4. Philosophically speaking, why is there more pressure on the Chinese Communist Party to maintain high growth and low unemployment than there might be on a democratically elected party such as the Republicans in the United States?

The $1.4 Trillion Question – James Fallows – the Atlantic

What’s the deal with American consumers? How, exactly, does a nation’s average savings rate fall to 2%, then 1%, and then become negative, like in the US over the last couple of years? What does negative savings actually mean? It means that Americans consumer more than they actually produce.

On the micro level, the only way to consume beyond ones income is to borrow from someone else to pay for the additional consumption. In other words, savings must be negative for one to consume beyond his or her income. The US is a nation of borrowers, but from whom do we borrow? China, for one…

China is a nation of “savers”, where national savings averages 50% of income. What exactly does this mean? Well, just the opposite what negative savings means; rather than consuming more than it produces, the Chinese consume only about half of what it produces. Here’s how James Fallows, a Shanghai-based journalist, explains the China/US dilemma:

Any economist will say that Americans have been living better than they should—which is by definition the case when a nation’s total consumption is greater than its total production, as America’s now is. Economists will also point out that, despite the glitter of China’s big cities and the rise of its billionaire class, China’s people have been living far worse than they could. That’s what it means when a nation consumes only half of what it produces, as China does.

What happens to the rest of China’s output? Naturally, it’s shipped overseas for Americans and others in the West to consume. The irony is that the consumption of China’s products has been kept affordable and cheap thanks to the actions the Chinese government has taken to suppress the value of the RMB, thus keeping its products cheap and attractive to American consumers.

When the dollar is strong, the following (good) things happen: the price of food, fuel, imports, manufactured goods, and just about everything else (vacations in Europe!) goes down. The value of the stock market, real estate, and just about all other American assets goes up. Interest rates go down—for mortgage loans, credit-card debt, and commercial borrowing. Tax rates can be lower, since foreign lenders hold down the cost of financing the national debt. The only problem is that American-made goods become more expensive for foreigners, so the country’s exports are hurt.

When the dollar is weak, the following (bad) things happen: the price of food, fuel, imports, and so on (no more vacations in Europe) goes up. The value of the stock market, real estate, and just about all other American assets goes down. Interest rates are higher. Tax rates can be higher, to cover the increased cost of financing the national debt. The only benefit is that American-made goods become cheaper for foreigners, which helps create new jobs and can raise the value of export-oriented American firms (winemakers in California, producers of medical devices in New England).

Clearly, a strong dollar is good for America in many ways. The dollar’s strength in the last decade can be credited partially to the Chinese, who have been buying dollar denominated assets in record numbers over the last seven years.

By 1996, China amassed its first $100 billion in foreign assets, mainly held in U.S. dollars. (China considers these holdings a state secret, so all numbers come from analyses by outside experts.) By 2001, that sum doubled to about $200 billion… Since then, it has increased more than sixfold, by well over a trillion dollars, and China’s foreign reserves are now the largest in the world.

China’s purchase of American assets keeps demand for dollars on foreign exchange markets strong, thus the value of the dollar high relative to other currencies, allowing American firms and consumers the benefits of a strong dollars described above.

As we learn in AP Economics, a nation’s balance of payments consists of the current account, which measures the difference between a country’s expenditures on imports and its income from exports (China last year had a $232 billion current account surplus with the US, meaning the US bought more Chinese goods than China bought of American goods), and the capital account, which measures the difference between the inflows of foreign money for the purchase of real and financial assets at home and the outflows of currency for the purchase of foreign assets abroad. In the capital account, China maintains a deficit (meaning China holds more American financial and real assets than America does of China’s), to off-set its current account surplus.

The two accounts together, by definition, balance out… usually. Any deficit in the China’s capital account that does not cover the surplus in its current account can be held as foreign exchange reserves by the People’s Bank of China. The PBOC, however, prefers not to hold excess dollars in reserve, as the dollar’s value is continually eroded by inflation and depreciation; therefore it invests the hundreds of billions of excess dollars it receives from Americans’ purchase of Chinese goods back into the American economy, buying up American assets, with the aim of earning interest on these assets that exceed the inflation rates.

The “assets” the Chinese are using their large influx of dollars to buy are primarily US government bonds. The government issues these bonds to finance its budget deficits (when government spending is greater than tax revenue; this figure was projected at around $400 billion this year alone!), and the Chinese are happy to buy these bonds for a couple of reasons: They are secure investments, meaning that unless the US government collapses, the interest on US bonds is guaranteed income for China. That’s one reason; but the primary reason is that the purchase of these bonds puts US dollars that were originally spent by American consumers on Chinese imports right back into the hands of American consumers (via government spending or tax rebates), so they can continue buying more Chinese imports.

The Chinese demand for dollar denominated financial assets, including government bonds, corporate stocks and bonds, and real assets like real estate, factories, buildings and so on, has resulted in a long period of a strong dollar. If the Chinese ever decided to stem the flow of dollars into American assets, the dollar’s value would plummet to record lows, leading to high inflation and eventually a balancing of America’s enormous current account deficit with China and the rest of the world.

However, a falling dollar is the last thing China wants to see happen, for two reasons: One, it would make Chinese imports more expensive thus less attractive to American households, thus harming Chinese manufacturers and slowing growth in China. Two, US dollars are an asset to China. Its $1.4 billion of US debt would evaporate if the dollar took a major plunge. To China, this would represent a loss of national wealth; in effect all that “savings” that makes China so unique would disappear as the dollar dived relative to the RMB. For these reasons, it seems likely that China will continue to be a willing buyer of America’s debt, thus the financier of Americans’ insanely high consumptive lifestyle.

Discussion Questions:

1. Many people in America are terrified that the Chinese might dump their dollar holdings. What would happen to the value of the US dollar if China decided to change its foreign reserves to another currency?
2. Why is it very unlikely that China will do this? In other words, how does the status quo benefit China as well as the US?
3. How do American households benefit from China’s financing of the government’s budget deficits? In what way to they suffer from this arrangement?
4. Do you think America can continue to finance its budget deficits through the continued sale of debt to foreigners forever? Why or why not?

FT.com / Asia-Pacific / China – Weak dollar troubles Beijing

Inflation, with its erosive effects on wealth and income, has plagued China at increasing rates since mid-2007. In February it reached an annualized rate of 8.7%, threatening to undermine China’s GDP growth rate, which has been predicted in the 8% range for this year.

As we have discussed in our our AP Econ class here in Shanghai, China’s inflation is caused by a combination of demand and supply-side factors. On the demand-side, a growing middle class has driven consumer spending to record levels recently, surpassing investment as the largest component of China’s GDP in 2007. Of course, as always, high inflation (thus low real interest rates), optimism about rising consumption in the future, and a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing (albeit a diminishing one as wages continue to rise) all combine to keep investment extremely high. Furthermore, cheap exports have helped keep demand for China’s output from abroad strong. The combination of increasing consumption, strong investment, and its trade surplus have resulted in demand-pull inflation.

On the supply-side, China has encountered additional inflationary pressures of late. Rising energy prices (mostly due to coal and oil shortages) combined with record rises in food prices (24% increase in the last year), have driven costs to firms up, shifting the aggregate supply curve leftward, further fueling inflation.

Knowing the damaging effects inflation has on income and wealth, it might be assumed that Beijing would place the utmost emphasis on taming the country’s rising prices. This, however,is not at the top of the government’s macroeconomic goals, according to premier Wen Jiabao:

On the issue of whether he would sacrifice economic output to bring down inflation, at the risk of increasing unemployment, Mr Wen indicated that growth re­mained the overarching priority. “We must ensure that our economy will grow…in order to ensure employment,” he said. “China is a developing country with 1.3bn people. We have to maintain a certain degree of fast economic growth to provide enough jobs.

”He said China needed to add about 10m jobs a year for the next five years, a lower figure than in the past when the aim was growth of 15m-20m jobs a year.

The tradeoff between inflation and unemployment to which Mr. Wen refers is a text book example of the challenges faced by macroeconomic policymakers everywhere. This trade-off is illustrated in the Phillips Curve model, which shows that in the short-run, there exists an inverse relationship between the price level and the unemployment rate.

In his words above, Mr. Wen demonstrates Beijing’s preference in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment: He’ll take inflation… Here’s why.

In case you haven’t heard, China is not a democracy. Nor is it a, ehem, “free” country. According to Alan Greenspan in his book “The Age of Turbulence”, democracy and freedom of speech act as “safety valves” in Western countries; in other words, in times of economic or political unrest, the right to gather in the streets, the right to vent frustrations through a free press and the opportunity to advocate political and economic change through the various media, all combine to prevent violent and revolutionary uprisings when times get tough economically.

Take the US for example. Times are certainly tough right now. Inflation’s approaching 4-5%, while nominal growth has nearly stagnated. Unemployment, while it has technically fallen recently, in reality has risen as hundreds of thousands of workers have given up searching for work. The bursting of the housing bubble represents one of the most massive losses of wealth in recent history. A weak dollar has meant that even cheap imports don’t seem so cheap anymore. Throw in the desperate war in Iraq, the nuclear threat from Iran, rising food prices, $110 oil and an incredibly unpopular national leader, and by some measures the country would appear ripe for revolution. However, a revolution is about the least likely thing to occur in America, because it enjoys the “safety valve” of democracy. Rather than overthrowing their government, Americans have the right to go to the pole and vote for a new one, which in all likelihood will occur this November when it seems either Barrack or Hillary stand the greatest chance and winning the White House.

Now let’s look at China. The picture’s not quite so gloomy for the Chinese right now. Yes, inflation is high, as in the US. But unlike America, China is still growing at a very healthy pace, unemployment is probably still below its natural level, the real estate markets in China’s cities are still booming, meaning the middle class residents there are experiencing leaps and bounds in terms of personal wealth. Demand for its exports remains strong, and ever more poor Chinese are finding jobs in high paying factories across the country. Investments in capital, infrastructure and education point towards a bright future of continued growth for the foreseeable future.

But wait, 8.4% is something to worry about, especially when we take into account the 24% increase in food prices. Shouldn’t Wen and Beijing be taking drastic steps to reign in this high rate of inflation? In short, NO, they shouldn’t. Because as can be seen in the Phillips Curve, to reduce inflation could result in another, far more serious problem for Beijing; rising unemployment.

It appears that Beijing’s greatest fear is a population out of work. Its goal of creating 10 million new jobs is ambitious, but in the eye’s of the government, necessary. The Chinese people do not enjoy the “safety valve” of democracy through which economic frustrations and hardships can be channeled were the country to experience a slowdown in growth and an increase in unemployment. The last time the economy faced high inflation AND high unemployment, students, workers, soldiers and tanks all gathered for an afternoon of urban warfare under Mao’s somber gaze in Beijing. To avoid such massive revolutionary movements in the future, Beijing must do all it can to insure job creation continues and growth remains strong, even if the trade-off is record high inflation.

This one passage spoken by Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, tells a vivid story about the reality of Communist dictatorship in China. Sound economic policy may go on the back burner in times of political uncertainty. Price controls, such as those on petrol in Shanghai (speaking of, the long lines at gas stations are back!), were a microeconomic example of bad economics; Beijings hesitance to seriously tackle inflation is a macroeconomic example. Holding on to power seems to be more important than stabilizing prices, at least for now.

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What’s sinking the dollar? – November 26, 2007

The US dollar has continued its downward spiral against the currencies of many of its trading partners. Today an American wanting to exchange his or her dollar for a Euro would have to fork over $1.46; for a British Pound, $2.07, and for a Canadian dollar, $1.05! It’s been 35 years since the Canadian dollar was even near parity ($1US = $1CA)! But what are the real forces behind this continually sinking dollar? This article lays it out straight and clear:

The forces behind the dollar’s weakening have been building for years but didn’t have much effect until recently. Most fundamentally, we Americans have been living beyond our means, buying more from the rest of the world than the world buys from us (that’s the trade deficit); to do that, we have to give foreigners claims on our assets in the form of government bonds and corporate bonds, or sometimes the assets themselves. A country as rich as America can do that for a long time, but eventually the world ends up holding more dollars than there is dollar-denominated stuff they want to buy, so they start offloading dollars. They also worry that any country with loads of debt–even the U.S.–may be tempted to inflate its currency, and that fear reduces its value.

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This post was originally published on March 17, 2008. It is being re-published today to support a recent lesson in IB Economics.

FT.com / World – Surplus countries told to encourage demand

Is it strange at all that in a time of rising unemployment, increasing uncertainty, rising prices and falling wages, consumers are being told to spend spend spend? This is the paradox of capitalistic markets in which macroeconomic health depend on continued spending, either in the form of consumption, investment, government spending or the sale of exports to foreigners. It is this last type of spending that has begun to slow for many of the world’s developing economies, those historically dependent on strong demand from consumers abroad for their output.

The “coupling” of the economies of several developing countries to that of the United States refers to the dependence on strong consumption by Americans of their exports for domestic macroeconomic health. This symbiotic relationship, while it has contributed to a long period of high growth rates in many Asian economies, threatens to drag growth rates in several developing economies downward as Americans’ spending on imports declines.

China, one of those countries heavily dependent on export-driven growth, is now facing the prospect of a more balanced current account, which measures the difference between a countries income from exports and its expenditure on imports. Since the early ’90s, China has experienced consistent surpluses in its current account, and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Today, with falling demand for its exports from the US, China faces a new challenge:

Unwinding imbalances required domestic demand growth to slow in deficit countries but also to accelerate in countries with big surpluses from exports – such as China and oil-producing states.
It was, therefore, helpful that China planned to spend more on infrastructure, encourage household spending and allow more flexibility than previously in the exchange rate, he said.

“If the slowdown is not to dominate, we need to see a shift in relative prices to rebalance demand – that is a gradual real exchange rate depreciation of deficit countries against surplus ones,” he said.

In IB Economics, we are in the middle of our unit on international trade, in which we study exchange rate determination and the effects of an depreciation of a nation’s currency on its balance of trade. In this case, a weaker dollar will change “relative prices” by making Chinese imports more expensive to American consumers. Likewise, American goods will become cheaper to Chinese consumers, encouraging Chinese to buy more American products and fewer domestic ones.

The combined threat of falling exports and the change in relative prices that results in falling domestic demand will shift trade between the US and China towards a greater balance. According to NYT Economics columnist Paul Krugman, this rebalancing between the US and its trading partners may be just what’s needed to soften America’s economic decline.

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