The $1.4 Trillion Question - James Fallows - the Atlantic

What’s the deal with American consumers? How, exactly, does a nation’s average savings rate fall to 2%, then 1%, and then become negative, like in the US over the last couple of years? What does negative savings actually mean? It means that Americans consumer more than they actually produce.

On the micro level, the only way to consume beyond ones income is to borrow from someone else to pay for the additional consumption. In other words, savings must be negative for one to consume beyond his or her income. The US is a nation of borrowers, but from whom do we borrow? China, in short.

China is a nation of “savers”, where national savings averages 50% of income. What exactly does this mean? Well, just the opposite what negative savings means; rather than consuming more than it produces, the Chinese consume only about half of what it produces. Here’s how James Fallows, a Shanghai-based journalist, explains the China/US dilemma:

Any economist will say that Americans have been living better than they should—which is by definition the case when a nation’s total consumption is greater than its total production, as America’s now is. Economists will also point out that, despite the glitter of China’s big cities and the rise of its billionaire class, China’s people have been living far worse than they could. That’s what it means when a nation consumes only half of what it produces, as China does.

What happens to the rest of China’s output? Naturally, it’s shipped overseas for Americans and others in the West to consume. The irony is that the consumption of China’s products has been kept affordable and cheap thanks to the actions the Chinese government has taken to suppress the value of the RMB, thus keeping its products cheap and attractive to American consumers.

When the dollar is strong, the following (good) things happen: the price of food, fuel, imports, manufactured goods, and just about everything else (vacations in Europe!) goes down. The value of the stock market, real estate, and just about all other American assets goes up. Interest rates go down—for mortgage loans, credit-card debt, and commercial borrowing. Tax rates can be lower, since foreign lenders hold down the cost of financing the national debt. The only problem is that American-made goods become more expensive for foreigners, so the country’s exports are hurt.

When the dollar is weak, the following (bad) things happen: the price of food, fuel, imports, and so on (no more vacations in Europe) goes up. The value of the stock market, real estate, and just about all other American assets goes down. Interest rates are higher. Tax rates can be higher, to cover the increased cost of financing the national debt. The only benefit is that American-made goods become cheaper for foreigners, which helps create new jobs and can raise the value of export-oriented American firms (winemakers in California, producers of medical devices in New England).

Clearly, a strong dollar is good for America in many ways. The dollar’s strength in the last decade can be credited partially to the Chinese, who have been buying dollar denominated assets in record numbers over the last seven years.

By 1996, China amassed its first $100 billion in foreign assets, mainly held in U.S. dollars. (China considers these holdings a state secret, so all numbers come from analyses by outside experts.) By 2001, that sum doubled to about $200 billion… Since then, it has increased more than sixfold, by well over a trillion dollars, and China’s foreign reserves are now the largest in the world.

China’s purchase of American assets keeps demand for dollars on foreign exchange markets strong, thus the value of the dollar high relative to other currencies, allowing American firms and consumers the benefits of a strong dollars described above.

As we learn in AP Economics, a nation’s balance of payments consists of the current account, which measures the difference between a country’s expenditures on imports and its income from exports (China last year had a $232 billion current account surplus with the US, meaning the US bought more Chinese goods than China bought of American goods), and the capital account, which measures the difference between the inflows of foreign money for the purchase of real and financial assets at home and the outflows of currency for the purchase of foreign assets abroad. In the capital account, China maintains a deficit (meaning China holds more American financial and real assets than America does of China’s), to off-set its current account surplus.

The two accounts together, by definition, balance out… usually. Any deficit in the China’s capital account that does not cover the surplus in its current account can be held as foreign exchange reserves by the People’s Bank of China. The PBOC, however, prefers not to hold excess dollars in reserve, as the dollar’s value is continually eroded by inflation and depreciation; therefore it invests the hundreds of billions of excess dollars it receives from Americans’ purchase of Chinese goods back into the American economy, buying up American assets, with the aim of earning interest on these assets that exceed the depreciation and inflation rates.

The “assets” the Chinese are using their large influx of dollars to buy are primarily US government bonds. The government issues these bonds to finance its budget deficits (when government spending is greater than tax revenue; this figure was projected at around $400 billion this year alone!), and the Chinese are happy to buy these bonds for a couple of reasons: They are secure investments, meaning that unless the US government collapses, the interest on US bonds is guaranteed income for China. That’s one reason; but the primary reason is that the purchase of these bonds puts US dollars that were originally spent by American consumers on Chinese imports right back into the hands of American consumers (via government spending or tax rebates), so they can continue buying more Chinese imports.

The Chinese demand for dollar denominated financial assets, including government bonds, corporate stocks and bonds, and real assets like real estate, factories, buildings and so on, has resulted in a long period of a strong dollar. If the Chinese ever decided to stem the flow of dollars into American assets, the dollar’s value would plummet to record lows, leading to high inflation and eventually a balancing of America’s enormous current account deficit with China and the rest of the world.

However, a falling dollar is the last thing China wants to see happen, for two reasons: One, it would make Chinese imports more expensive thus less attractive to American households, thus harming Chinese manufacturers and slowing growth in China. Two, US dollars are an asset to China. Its $1.4 billion of US debt would evaporate if the dollar took a major plunge. To China, this would represent a loss of national wealth; in effect all that “savings” that makes China so unique would disappear as the dollar dived relative to the RMB. For these reasons, it seems likely that China will continue to be a willing buyer of America’s debt, thus the financier of Americans’ insanely high consumptive lifestyle.

When it comes to America’s low personal savings rates, I have a theory here as to why we can’t break the consumptive habit that’s caused us to run up $9.3 trillion of national debt. It relates to something I teach my Asian History students when we study ancient China.

Confucius said something about government that might just explain why Americans have evolved into the negative savers that we are: “If a government desires what is good, the people will be good. The character of a ruler is like wind and that of the people like grass. In whatever direction the wind blows, the grass always bends.”

FT.com / Asia-Pacific / China - Weak dollar troubles Beijing

Inflation, with its erosive effects on wealth and income, has plagued China at increasing rates since mid-2007. In February it reached an annualized rate of 8.7%, threatening to undermine China’s GDP growth rate, which has been predicted in the 8% range for this year.

As we have discussed in our our AP Econ class here in Shanghai, China’s inflation is caused by a combination of demand and supply-side factors. On the demand-side, a growing middle class has driven consumer spending to record levels recently, surpassing investment as the largest component of China’s GDP in 2007. Of course, as always, high inflation (thus low real interest rates), optimism about rising consumption in the future, and a comparative advantage in labor-intensive manufacturing (albeit a diminishing one as wages continue to rise) all combine to keep investment extremely high. Furthermore, cheap exports have helped keep demand for China’s output from abroad strong. The combination of increasing consumption, strong investment, and its trade surplus have resulted in demand-pull inflation.

On the supply-side, China has encountered additional inflationary pressures of late. Rising energy prices (mostly due to coal and oil shortages) combined with record rises in food prices (24% increase in the last year), have driven costs to firms up, shifting the aggregate supply curve leftward, further fueling inflation.

Knowing the damaging effects inflation has on income and wealth, it might be assumed that Beijing would place the utmost emphasis on taming the country’s rising prices. This, however,is not at the top of the government’s macroeconomic goals, according to premier Wen Jiabao:

On the issue of whether he would sacrifice economic output to bring down inflation, at the risk of increasing unemployment, Mr Wen indicated that growth re­mained the overarching priority. “We must ensure that our economy will grow…in order to ensure employment,” he said. “China is a developing country with 1.3bn people. We have to maintain a certain degree of fast economic growth to provide enough jobs.

”He said China needed to add about 10m jobs a year for the next five years, a lower figure than in the past when the aim was growth of 15m-20m jobs a year.

The tradeoff between inflation and unemployment to which Mr. Wen refers is a text book example of the challenges faced by macroeconomic policymakers everywhere. This trade-off is illustrated in the Phillips Curve model, which shows that in the short-run, there exists an inverse relationship between the price level and the unemployment rate.

In his words above, Mr. Wen demonstrates Beijing’s preference in the trade-off between inflation and unemployment: He’ll take inflation… Here’s why.

In case you haven’t heard, China is not a democracy. Nor is it a, ehem, “free” country. According to Alan Greenspan in his book “The Age of Turbulence”, democracy and freedom of speech act as “safety valves” in Western countries; in other words, in times of economic or political unrest, the right to gather in the streets, the right to vent frustrations through a free press and the opportunity to advocate political and economic change through the various media, all combine to prevent violent and revolutionary uprisings when times get tough economically.

Take the US for example. Times are certainly tough right now. Inflation’s approaching 4-5%, while nominal growth has nearly stagnated. Unemployment, while it has technically fallen recently, in reality has risen as hundreds of thousands of workers have given up searching for work. The bursting of the housing bubble represents one of the most massive losses of wealth in recent history. A weak dollar has meant that even cheap imports don’t seem so cheap anymore. Throw in the desperate war in Iraq, the nuclear threat from Iran, rising food prices, $110 oil and an incredibly unpopular national leader, and by some measures the country would appear ripe for revolution. However, a revolution is about the least likely thing to occur in America, because it enjoys the “safety valve” of democracy. Rather than overthrowing their government, Americans have the right to go to the pole and vote for a new one, which in all likelihood will occur this November when it seems either Barrack or Hillary stand the greatest chance and winning the White House.

Now let’s look at China. The picture’s not quite so gloomy for the Chinese right now. Yes, inflation is high, as in the US. But unlike America, China is still growing at a very healthy pace, unemployment is probably still below its natural level, the real estate markets in China’s cities are still booming, meaning the middle class residents there are experiencing leaps and bounds in terms of personal wealth. Demand for its exports remains strong, and ever more poor Chinese are finding jobs in high paying factories across the country. Investments in capital, infrastructure and education point towards a bright future of continued growth for the foreseeable future.

But wait, 8.4% is something to worry about, especially when we take into account the 24% increase in food prices. Shouldn’t Wen and Beijing be taking drastic steps to reign in this high rate of inflation? In short, NO, they shouldn’t. Because as can be seen in the Phillips Curve, to reduce inflation could result in another, far more serious problem for Beijing; rising unemployment.

It appears that Beijing’s greatest fear is a population out of work. Its goal of creating 10 million new jobs is ambitious, but in the eye’s of the government, necessary. The Chinese people do not enjoy the “safety valve” of democracy through which economic frustrations and hardships can be channeled were the country to experience a slowdown in growth and an increase in unemployment. The last time the economy faced high inflation AND high unemployment, students, workers, soldiers and tanks all gathered for an afternoon of urban warfare under Mao’s somber gaze in Beijing. To avoid such massive revolutionary movements in the future, Beijing must do all it can to insure job creation continues and growth remains strong, even if the trade-off is record high inflation.

This one passage spoken by Wen Jiabao, China’s premier, tells a vivid story about the reality of Communist dictatorship in China. Sound economic policy may go on the back burner in times of political uncertainty. Price controls, such as those on petrol in Shanghai (speaking of, the long lines at gas stations are back!), were a microeconomic example of bad economics; Beijings hesitance to seriously tackle inflation is a macroeconomic example. Holding on to power seems to be more important than stabilizing prices, at least for now.

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FT.com / World - Surplus countries told to encourage demand

Is it strange at all that in a time of rising unemployment, increasing uncertainty, rising prices and falling wages, consumers are being told to spend spend spend? This is the paradox of capitalistic markets in which macroeconomic health depend on continued spending, either in the form of consumption, investment, government spending or the sale of exports to foreigners. It is this last type of spending that has begun to slow for many of the world’s developing economies, those historically dependent on strong demand from consumers abroad for their output.

The “coupling” of the economies of several developing countries to that of the United States refers to the dependence on strong consumption by Americans of their exports. This symbiotic relationship, while it has contributed to a long period of high growth rates in many Asian economies, threatens to drag growth rates in several developing economies downward as Americans’ spending on imports declines.

China, one of those countries heavily dependent on export-driven growth, is now facing the prospect of a more balanced current account, which measures the difference between a countries income from exports and its expenditure on imports. Since the early ’90s, China has experienced consistent surpluses in its current account, and this will continue for the foreseeable future. Today, with falling demand for its exports from the US, China faces a new challenge:

Unwinding imbalances required domestic demand growth to slow in deficit countries but also to accelerate in countries with big surpluses from exports – such as China and oil-producing states.
It was, therefore, helpful that China planned to spend more on infrastructure, encourage household spending and allow more flexibility than previously in the exchange rate, he said.

“If the slowdown is not to dominate, we need to see a shift in relative prices to rebalance demand – that is a gradual real exchange rate depreciation of deficit countries against surplus ones,” he said.

In AP Economics, we will soon begin our unit on international trade, in which we’ll study exchange rate determination and the effects of an depreciation of a nation’s currency. In this case, a weaker dollar will change “relative prices” by making Chinese imports more expensive to American consumers. Likewise, American goods will become cheaper to Chinese consumers, encouraging Chinese to buy more American products and fewer domestic ones.

The combined threat of falling exports and the change in relative prices that results in falling domestic demand will shift trade between the US and China towards a greater balance. According to NYT Economics columnist Paul Krugman, this rebalancing between the US and its trading partners may be just what’s needed to soften America’s economic decline.

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Managing Globalization » Business Blog » International Herald Tribune » Blog Archive » Here’s that silver lining, finally

In IB Economics we’ve been studying concepts relating to balance of trade and exchange rates. The Marshall-Lerner Condition and the J-curve are two concepts that explain the relationship between a the exchange rate for a nation’s currency and the country’s balance of trade. (click on the graph to see a larger version)

Common sense might indicate that if a country’s currency (let’s say the US dollar) depreciates relative to other currencies, then this should lead to an improvement in the country’s balance of trade (economists call this the current account). The reasoning goes as such: a weaker dollar means foreigners will have to give up less of their money in order to get one dollar’s worth of American output. At the same time, since the dollar is worth less in foreign currency, imports become more expensive, as Americans have to fork over more dollars for a certain amount of another country’s output; hence, imports should decrease.

Fewer imports and more exports means an improvement in the country’s balance of trade, right? Well, not necessarily. What matters is not whether a country is importing less and exporting more, rather, whether the increase in income from exports exceeds the decrease in expenditures on imports. Here is where the Marshall-Lerner Condition can be applied. Continue Reading »

What’s sinking the dollar? - November 26, 2007

The US dollar has continued its downward spiral against the currencies of many of its trading partners. Today an American wanting to exchange his or her dollar for a Euro would have to fork over $1.46; for a British Pound, $2.07, and for a Canadian dollar, $1.05! It’s been 35 years since the Canadian dollar was even near parity ($1US = $1CA)! But what are the real forces behind this continually sinking dollar? This article lays it out straight and clear:

The forces behind the dollar’s weakening have been building for years but didn’t have much effect until recently. Most fundamentally, we Americans have been living beyond our means, buying more from the rest of the world than the world buys from us (that’s the trade deficit); to do that, we have to give foreigners claims on our assets in the form of government bonds and corporate bonds, or sometimes the assets themselves. A country as rich as America can do that for a long time, but eventually the world ends up holding more dollars than there is dollar-denominated stuff they want to buy, so they start offloading dollars. They also worry that any country with loads of debt–even the U.S.–may be tempted to inflate its currency, and that fear reduces its value.

Continue Reading »