Welker’s Wikinomics Blog

Jun 10 2008

Hunger, poverty and fiscal policy in the United States

U.S. food stamp use up sharply, sign of hard times (Reuters) by Charles Abbott

27.88 million people in the US are going hungry this year. That’s 1.5 million more than last year. As food prices are rising all over the world, more low income families in the US are turning to the government for help.

In the US low incomes families and individuals can apply for food stamps. Food stamps are vouchers that can be used to purchase basic food items, milk, bread, eggs, cheese, chicken etc. These direct subsidies serve two functions, one is to feed more people and the other is to stimulate the domestic economy. With the unemployment rate at 5.5% and with inflation rising, everyone is affected but the poorest of the poor are most affected as they deal with these rising costs and shrinking incomes (less purchasing power).

“The record for food stamp participation is 29.85 million people in November 2005, which included emergency benefits to victims of hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, said USDA. Second-highest was 27.97 million people in March 1994, said the Food Research and Action Center, an antihunger group.”

In 2005 it was a major catastrophe that caused the jump in demand for food stamps. Today, the problem is much bigger, and broader. Rising fuel costs, rising costs of wheat, and the credit crunch are affecting businesses and businesses are beginning to lay off employees or are passing on their rising costs of production to the consumer, exacerbating rising inflation. So what can be done? Many people are encouraging Congress to take action.

“Now is the time for Congress to pass temporary increases in food stamps, extended unemployment insurance and other targeted relief that will stimulate the economy and help struggling families,” said James Weill, FRAC’s president. He pointed to May’s increase in unemployment, to 5.5 percent.

The Department of Food and Agriculture listed 1994 as the last time that 27 million people were using food stamps.

“Food stamp enrollment has exceeded 27 million people each month this fiscal year. USDA estimates enrollment will average 27.98 million people in fiscal 2009, which begins on October 1, at a cost of $40.3 billion.”

$40.3 billion dollars in government spending on food stamps alone seems like an enormous sum of money, but what is the alternative?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BqmomJJ93Ps

Discussion Questions:

What will be the affect of using expansionary fiscal policy at a time when inflation is already rising?
How will increasing government spending on food stamps when the government is already running a budget deficit affect interest rates and private investment in the economy?
What effect would expansionary fiscal policy have on aggregate supply if crowding-out of private investment occurs?
How else could the government allocate the $40.3 billion it spends on food stamps to stimulate the economy and bring relief to the hungry poor? Brainstorm other policy options in your comments.

No responses yet

May 26 2008

It may not be a recession, but it sure feels like one…

Published by Jason Welker under

FT.com / Columnists / Wolfgang Munchau - Inflation and the lessons of the 1970s

It seem that everyone’s speculating about the US economy today. Recession or no recession, that is the question. The economy has even surpassed the Iraq War as the number one issue in the US presidential race! John McCain, who has publicly admitted that economics is not his strong suit, may just find himself in trouble in a general election where the most important concern among voters is the economic situation.

So what IS that situation, anyway? Is the US in a recession? In other words, has real gross domestic, or total output in the US economy, actually declined over the last six months? Technically, the answer is no. My fellow blogger, Steve Latter, explains this clearly here. What is true, on the other hand, is that the current situation shares many similarities to the global economic slowdown that did occur in the 1970s.

In 1973 OPEC, the newly formed oil cartel consisting at the time of only Arab states, reduced its output of oil and cut off exports to the United States in response to US support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, in which the Israelis officially occupied the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza and seized the Golan Heights from the sovereign nation of Syria. To punish the US for its position on this conflict, OPEC cut off supplies of oil to the west, driving gas and energy prices upwards by 70%, triggering a supply shock characterized by a decline in total output and an increase in both unemployment and inflation, a phenomenon known as stagflation: a macroeconomic policy maker’s worst nightmare.

Recently the world has seen a similar (albeit of a different cause) rise in the price of oil and energy prices. Today the rise in energy prices is driven primarily by rising demand, rather than reduced supply (since the 1970s the OPEC cartel has grown to include many non-Arab nations, making it harder to achieve collusion to restrict output and drive up oil prices). Global demand for oil has risen steadily, driven ever higher due to rapid growth in China and other developing nations, and exacerbated by the falling value of the dollar, the currency in which oil prices are denominated.

The supply shocks of today have combined with falling aggregate demand in the US due to weak consumer spending to slow real growth rates to nearlry 0%. So technically, the US has avoided a recession, but the effect on American workers and consumers may be just as painful as the real recession of the 1970s. In order to prevent the “r” word from becoming a reality today, central banks (including the US Fed) have eased money supplies, lowering interest rates, fueling even greater increases in the price level.

…the global weighted average inflation rate will be 5.4 per cent this year, while the global money market interest rate is currently only 4.3 per cent. This means that global short-term real interest rates are negative – at a time when inflation is rapidly accelerating. As monetary policy has been excessively accommodating for more than a decade, inflationary pressures have built up in the global economy.

Central bankers like Ben Bernanke have to make tough decisions sometimes, weighing the trade-off between unemployment and inflation, and determining their monetary policies based on whatever they deem to be the “lesser of two evils”. Rising energy prices have forced firms to cut either cut back their production and raise the price of their products, both actions that result in less overall spending and output in the economy. Falling house prices have led consumers to cut back their own spending, further reducing demand for firms’ output. These factors have all pushed the unemployment rate from around 4.8% a year ago to 5.1% today, which combined with an estimated additional 3-5% of American workers having dropped out of the workforce, (referred to by the Department of Labor as “discouraged workers”) paints a pretty ugly picture of the reality for the American worker today.

The harsh reality of the weak labor market has led Mr. Bernanke and the Fed to pursue an expansionary monetary policy aimed at avoiding further increases in the unemployment rate and decreases in the GDP growth rate. Expansionary monetary policy means lower interest rates, with the goal being increased consumption and investment, both factors that could worsen the inflation problem already experienced thanks to the global supply shock. Evidence indicates that the inflation problem, even in the US where slow growth usually leads to lower price levels, is not going away:

In the US, a survey-based measure of inflationary expectations recently showed an increase to more than 5 per cent. I would estimate there are now several hundred basis points of difference between the current Fed funds rate and an interest rate that would be consistent with price stability in the medium term.

…meaning the Fed, in its attempt to avoid recession and rising unemployment, has created a condition where real interest rates are actually negative, a highly inflationary condition. All this wouldn’t be so bad if wages in the US were rising along with the price level. This however, does not appear to be happening:

The main difference between the situation in the 1970s and now is today’s absence of wage inflation, which explains why absolute inflation rates are a little more moderate. I guess this is probably because of some combination of deregulated labour markets and globalisation. But the lack of wage-push inflation is not necessarily good news. Falling real wages mean falling disposable income and tighter credit conditions mean less borrowing for consumption.

Rising prices for energy, transportation and food have put American households in a tough situation. In the past, periods of inflation have often been characterized by rising wages, meaning the full brunt of nominal price level increases was not entirely born by the American worker. Today, on the other hand, a recession has thus far been avoided, but the combination of record numbers of “discouraged workers”, rising unemployment and inflation may make the pain of our current economic situation just as real as recessions of the past.

In the words of billionaire investor and economic sage Warren Buffett just today:

“I believe that we are already in a recession… Perhaps not in the sense as defined by economists. … But people are already feeling the effects of a recession.”

“It will be deeper and longer than what many think,” he added.

Discussion Questions:

What is the difference between nominal and real GDP? Which must decline in order for the economy to be in a recession?
What impact do rising energy prices have on the behavior of individual firms?
Why are low interest rates likely to make the inflation problem even worse?

No responses yet

May 22 2008

Reflections on the weak dollar

I recently received an email from Sean Stoner, who writes a great blog, Maslow Forgot About Beer. I had previously commented on a post Sean wrote about McCain and Clinton’s proposed gas tax holiday, which is how he found my blog. Sean wanted to know my views on the weak dollar:

Jason,

What do you believe is the most direct cause(s) of the weakening of the dollar? Is it the trade deficit and/or spending deficits along with increased borrowing overseas? Is it offshoring? Tax cuts? And how direct is the causality of this to oil and commodity prices?

Of course I’ll give you full credit in the post for educating me more on this subject. Thanks in advance !

Sean

Below is my reply. I am posting it here for posterity, and because I think it may include one possible explanation of the weak dollar within the grasp of IB and AP Econ students:

Hi Sean,

Keep in mind, I’m no expert here, only a high school economics teacher… but let me just share a few thoughts about one cause of the weak dollar.

I think something you’ve forgotten to mention in your email is the role that the mortgage crisis has had on the dollar. Much of the debt from the sub-prime mortgage market was held by overseas investors. As home foreclosures picked up late last year, confidence in these mortgage-backed securities plummeted and demand for these American assets fell, thus demand for dollars among foreign investors has fallen with it, depreciating the dollar.

I think the housing market is at the core of a lot of our woes right now. In my econ class we talk about the “wealth effect” of falling home prices on consumer spending. Besides disposable income, the main determinant of overall consumption in the economy is the level of “wealth” among households. Of course, Americans’ greatest source of wealth is their homes… and the reason home prices have fallen is a simple supply and demand story, which is within the grasps of anyone who knows how supply and demand interact to determine price in a marketplace.

Low interest rates during the late Greenspan era spurred a period of new home sales, which drove prices up, spurring a building frenzy which shifted supply out. As long as demand increased more rapidly than supply, the illusion that house prices would continually rise was believable, thus buyers could be convinced that an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) was the perfect type of loan for them. But the rising prices were unsustainable, and when the Fed began increasing interest rates a few years ago, demand for new homes declined, right as inventory was at an all time high. Naturally, home prices began to stabilize then fall, and as the “adjustable” part of all those “sub-prime” ARMs kicked in, monthly payments became too much for some Americans to bear. In an attempt to liquidate their now unaffordable houses, millions of Americans put their homes for sale, while thousands began to default on their loans, both which combined to shift supply ever further outward, putting even more downward pressure on home prices.

The story continues from here: falling home prices mean less “wealth” which means less consumer spending which means less total output in the economy which means less demand for workers which means rising unemployment… aka, RECESSION! And that’s where we are today.

So, as you can see I think the housing market is at the core of our problems. The weak dollar too, as demand for American homeowners’ debt has declined among foreign investors. Now, in the face of a recession, the Fed has lowered interest rates once again to try and stimulate new spending and investment, further exacerbating the dollar’s decline, as lower returns in the US bond market divert investors out of dollars and into more secure investments, such as… you guessed it, OIL.

The falling dollar had encouraged investors to look for stable investments, such as commodities like oil, copper, coal, etc, driving demand and prices for these commodities up, contributing to the cost-push inflation that has accompanied America’s economics slowdown.

So yes, it’s all connected… rising unemployment, sluggish growth, rising price levels and falling real wages. At the core, however, is the housing market and the “irrational exuberance” that led to a speculative building and buying spree over the last six years: a bubble which began bursting late last year and continues to have a ripple effect across the economy.

Bush’s tax cuts and deficit spending just made this whole mess even worse. I did a blog post a while back about the trade deficit with China, budget deficits and the value of the dollar, you can read that here: “Excuse me China, could you lend us another billion?”

Okay, that’s all I’ve got for you today… I hope some of these observations are useful!

Best, Jason

2 responses so far

May 19 2008

China’s “silver bullet” - a strong RMB could solve her biggest economic woes…

Asia Sentinel - The Answer for China’s Inflation
Two goals recently voiced by the Chinese leadership: increased consumer spending and reduced inflation. These are worthy goals for policymakers to pursue; if accomplished, they will mean increased well-being for the average

Demand-pull inflation caused by increase in consumption

Chinese household, which will enjoy more goods and services at lower prices.

The problem is, increased consumption usually means rising prices, as can be clearly illustrated in an aggregate demand / aggregate supply diagram. Household spending makes up somewhere around 40% of China’s GDP, exports, government spending and investment account for the rest. Whenever one component of total expenditures increase in the economy, all other things equal, the price level will rise.

Only two things could happen to make the Chinese leadership’s goal of increased consumer spending and stable prices a reality: either productivity in the economy must increase more rapidly than consumer spending, shifting aggregate supply outward, or another component of aggregate demand must be reduced more rapidly than consumption increases, offsetting the increase in overall expenditures cause by rising consumption.

So what magical combination of fiscal and monetary policy can be employed to both increase consumption and stabilize the price level? The answer may not rest purely in the realm of domestic macroeconomic policy-making, but rather in the foreign exchange markets, where a weak RMB has kept domestic consumption low and net exports (thus the price level) high. Allowing the RMB to appreciate should make “magic” happen and lead to rising domestic consumption and disinflation simultaneously:

A stronger currency, commensurate with China’s increased economic strength, would both tamp down inflation and allow Chinese consumers to buy more goods and services. However, for reasons not entirely clear to me, or few others for that matter, China’s leaders are resisting this simple and beneficial solution.

The Chinese leadership’s stated goal in prodding their citizens to spend more is to decrease their economy’s dependence on exports. If the Chinese, who currently save 50 percent of their incomes, saved less, more of their production would be consumed locally. As a result, China would be less vulnerable to economic downturns abroad. Without a vibrant domestic market, over-leveraged Americans will apparently remain China’s most important customers.

A strengthened yuan would lower the real costs of goods for domestic consumers and allow the Chinese themselves to compete more evenly with consumers in other nations to whom they currently send the fruits of their labor. As goods become more affordable in China, the Chinese would naturally consume more. A rising yuan would therefore kill two birds with one stone: it would reverse recent consumer price increases and it would induce Chinese consumers to buy their own products.

Some members of the US Congress estimated sometime last year that the Chinese currency was undervalued by 27%, leading certain politicians to call for an across the board tariff on all Chinese imports to the United States. Such protectionist sentiment was not uncommon 12 months ago, but as America faces its own economic slowdown, compounded by rising inflation and the falling value of the dollar, such calls for more taxes on imports have disappeared from Washington.

The sensible action for the Chinese to take in response to its own overheating economy (letting the RMB appreciate in order to relieve inflation and encourage domestic consumption) could spell economic doom for the US. As China adopts a “strong yuan” policy, its demand for US dollar-denominated financial assets, including government debt, will decline, reducing demand in the US bond market, lowering bond prices and driving up interest rates in the US. Higher US rates will discourage investment and consumption, exacerbating the slowdown already underway in America. Furthermore, reduced demand for US assets by China will cause demand for the dollar to slide in foreign exchange markets. Since much of American’s household spending is on imports, inflation will rise in America as not only Chinese goods, but all imports, are now more expensive to Americans.

Usually in economics class, we adopt the frame of mind that economics is not a zero-sum game. In other words, through free trade based on comparative advantage and specialization, individuals and nations will benefit due to increased total output, increased productivity, higher incomes, and greater variety of goods and services produced within and among communities and nations. In the case of China and the US today, on the other hand, we appear to be in a situation where increased consumption by Chinese may be achievable only at the expense of American consumers, who because of rising interest rates and a falling dollar, may be forced to live “within their means” for the first time in decades.

Discussion questions:

Why is a strong RMB necessary to simultaneously increase consumption and reduce inflation in China?
Why would interest rates in the US rise if China adopted a “strong RMB” policy?
Would Americans be better off without trade with China? What about the statement that Americans will be worse off if China is to achieve greater levels of domestic consumption?

No responses yet

May 03 2008

A common error - confusing the money market and market for foreign exchange

Last week AP students at Shanghai American School took their final test for the class on the last Macro unit, “International Economics”. The free response question on this test was from Form B of the 2007 exam, which is written for students who take the exam outside of the United States.

Upon grading my students’ tests, I was surprised to see how poorly students did on the FRQ. The most common mistake was confusing the money market with the market for foreign currency. Read below to see the original question, along with my comments on common mistakes and the correct answer.

2007 AP Macroeconomics FRQ #1 (form B)

Assume that Australia and New Zealand are trading partners. Australia’s economy is currently in recession.

(a) Now assume that Australia begins to recover from its recession. Using a correctly labled graph of aggregate demand and aggregate supply for New Zealand, show the impact of Australia’s rising income on each of the following in the short-run.

(i) Aggregate demand in New Zealand. Explain.

(ii) Output in New Zealand

Mr. Welker: Here is where the first common mistake was made. The question asks for an AD/AS showing New Zealand’s economy, NOT Australia’s. As incomes in Australia rise, Aussies will demand more imports from NZ, meaning NZ’s net exports will rise, shifting NZ’s AD curve outward, increasing NZ’s output.

(b) Using a correctly labeled graph of the money market for New Zealand, show the effect of the output change in part (a)(ii) on the following.

(i) Demand for money. Explain

(ii) The nominal interest rate

Mr. Welker: This is the question that almost everyone screwed up on. The most common mistake was confusing NZ’s money market with the foreign exchange market for NZ’s currency. The money market, which the question is asking for, refers to the the money in circulation in New Zealand, the supply of which is determined by NZ’s central bank, the demand for which is determined by the amount of output in NZ and the public’s desire to hold money as an asset. As output increases in NZ due to higher net exports, demand for money will shift out, and if you recall the Y-axis in a money market shows the nominal interest rate, so nominal interest rates will increase as money demand shifts out.

The mistake most people made was misinterpreting the question to be asking about the foreign exchange market for NZ dollars. This market would show the price of NZ dollars in terms of Australian dollars on the Y-axes, the demand for NZ$ by Australians, and the supply of dollars by New Zealanders. This is not what the question is asking for, however, many of you included this diagram, which does not show the nominal interest rate.

(c) Assume that the price level in New Zealand rises. Given your answer to part (b)(ii), explain what will happen to real interest rates.

Mr. Welker: Here’s another question that most people messed up on. The answer is that as nominal interest rates rise while the price level is rising, we don’t know what will happen to real interest rates! Remember, real interest rate = nominal interest rate - inflation rate. Whether real interest rates rise or fall depends on the degree to which nominal interest rates and inflation rise. Therefore, the real interest rate cannot be determined.

(d) Although recovering, Australia remains in recession and its government takes no action. Indicate whether each of the following curves will shift to the left, shift to the right, or remain unchanged in the long run in Australia.

(i) Aggregate supply

(ii) Aggregate demand

Mr. Welker: I was truly shocked to see how many people got this one totally wrong. In fact, I suspect about half of you just guessed on this one, which was a surprise to me because this was something we had emphasized heavily in our class discussions; in fact you had even seen a very similar question in an FRQ a couple of units ago.

The key to knowing what this question is getting at is the phrase “its government takes no action.” This must, therefore, be referring to a “self-correction” scenario, which is based on the neo-classical theory of a vertical long-run aggregate supply curve, made possible by the downward flexibility of wages and prices.

If Australia remains in a recession, high levels of unemployment and low levels of overall spending will put downward pressure on wages and prices. As price levels fall and large number of workers are unemployed, people will begin accepting lower wages, which means input costs for firms will decrease, inducing firms to hire more workers, shifting short-run aggregate supply and output back towards the full-employment level. Since the question makes no mention of any new spending (implied by the “government takes no action” statement, meaning no fiscal or monetary stimulus is employed), there is no impact on aggregate demand.

The question simply says “indicate”, therefore the correct answers are:

(i) Aggregate supply will shift right

(ii) Aggregate demand will remain unchanged

The mistakes made on this FRQ are fairly common and simple mistakes. But this final macro test should serve as a wakeup call to some of you who may have coasted through the last few units. Macroeconomics is the harder of the two AP subjects. Last year’s classes averages .42 points lower on the macro AP exam than the micro, despite having completed Macro more recently.

Over the next 12 days, AP Econ students all over the world need to focus on their review and studies for the AP exams. To help you, I’ve put all of our review materials onto one page here on the blog. Click on the tab at the top of this page that says “Exam Prep”, and there you will find downloadable .pdf study guides for every unit in the course, as well as links to each unit’s wiki over at Welker’s Wikinomics Page. New on the wiki is a “graph bank” containing all of the graphs we’ve learned this year. As part of your exam review, please add titles and descriptions to these graphs by May 8.

One response so far

Apr 18 2008

From the Help Desk: Long-run vs. short-run economic growth, consupmtion and investment…

Published by Jason Welker under

*Click on the graphs to see full-size versions

The following message was submitted through the AP/IB Econ Help Desk:

Jason,

An AP Macro Question: Comes from the recently published AP Practice Exam

An increase in which of the following is most likely to promote economic growth?

A. Consumption Spending
B. Investment Tax Credits
C The natural rate of unemployment
D The trade deficit
E Real Interest Rates.

The answer is B, and I understand the economic principles of why that would promote economic growth, but what I can’t answer for my students is why A, Consumption Spending wouldn’t work. I know that consumption spending makes up part of the demand in aggregate demand, but I can’t help but think that an increase in it, would promote economic growth.

Thanks, “Econ Teacher”

For what it’s worth, here is my reply:

Hello “Econ Teacher”,

That’s a good question. I would explain to my students that in the short-run, an increase in AD alone will lead to some growth, but would be accompanied by inflation, since AS does not shift out when consumption increases. However, an investment tax credit will result in REAL long-run economic growth (by real I mean nominal GDP will increase while the price level remains stable), since it encourages investment. Investment is a determinant of AD, just like consumption, so AD will shift out, but it is also a determinant of AS, since firms are investing in capital. Increase the quantity or the quality of capital, and labor becomes more productive. Greater productivity shifts out AS, leading to growth AND stable prices.

Economic growth is defined, in terms of the AD/AS model, as an outward shift of both AD and AS. Increases in consumption will increase AD, but this will lead to inflation, and in the long run, workers will demand higher wages, increasing the costs of production and shifting AS leftward, returning the economy to the full employment level of output at an even higher price level, i.e. no economic growth occurs (see graph to the right). Investment, however, encouraged through a tax credit, will have positive demand and supply side effects, resulting in real economic growth and stable prices (see graph below)

Hope that helps!

Jason Welker

No responses yet

Apr 02 2008

Supply - side economists: “lower taxes, more growth, more tax revenue!”

Published by Jason Welker under

This is a follow up to a recent post to this blog, Hey, what are you Laffing at? The relationship between tax rate and tax revenue

The unbearable lightness of being Martin Feldstein | Free exchange | Economist.com

Supply-side economics, advocated by most Republican politicians, including presidential candidate John McCain, places great emphasis on the idea that investment is the main engine of economic growth, price level stability, and low unemployment. To encourage firms to invest, government should play a minimal role in the economy; taxes should be sufficiently low to incentivize firms to invest, while at the same time government spending should be reduced to avoid crowding-out of private investment.

Without a healthy level of investment, a country’s capital stock wears out and is not replaced, raising costs of production and shifting short-run (and maybe even long-run) aggregate supply leftward. If investment remains sufficiently low, over time an economy’s output could even begin to shrink.

In the article below, The Economist’s Free Exchange explores the relationship between tax rates and long-run economic growth. The Economist takes the position of “supply-siders” who study the impact of tax rates on the level of output. The idea of supply-side economics is that lower taxes encourage more investment and thus higher growth rates.

Here’s the gist of the supply-side argument:

Our baseline specification suggests that an exogenous tax increase of one percent of GDP lowers real GDP by roughly three percent.

On the other hand…

…we find that a tax cut of one percent of GDP increases real output by approximately three percent over the next three years.

In the case of the Laffer Curve, which shows the relationship between tax rates and tax revenue, the article concludes that:

Tax cuts don’t exactly “pay for themselves”, but they also don’t diminish revenue after about two years. That is, after about two years, the government receives revenues equal to what it would have received at the higher rate, but taxpayers enjoy a lower burden. It is an important advance to discover that because cuts do lead to an immediate dip in revenue, they often inspire offsetting tax increases that retard the growth effect of the origina cut. Nevertheless, the effect of cuts on output is generally strong enough to bring revenue back to where it would have been otherwise.

Supply-side economics, folks. Understanding the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on not only aggregate demand, but on aggregate supply (both short-run and long-run) is a crucial skill in answering AP free response questions.

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14 responses so far

Mar 31 2008

Politics, priorities, and the Phillips Curve

Published by Jason Welker under

Archive for the 'AD/AS Model' Category